Do hands do all your thinking? – An experimental study of 'Manipulation Specificity' by Paschek, Gabriele
 DO HANDS DO ALL YOUR THINKING? 
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ‘MANIPULATION-
SPECIFICITY’ 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
GABRIELE PASCHEK, M. A. 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of   
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
in the Department of Psycholinguistics at the 
 UNIVERSITY OF BIELEFELD 
FACULTY OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERARY STUDIES 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Jan de Ruiter 
Co-Supervisor: Dr. Lorenz Sichelschmidt 
 
 
 
April 2014
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Für meine Mutter.  
Weil Du mir gezeigt hast, wie kostbar Wissen ist.  
Weil Du mir mit Deinem Kampfgeist das größte Vorbild bist.  
Weil Du immer an mich glaubst. 
Acknowledgments  iii 
Acknowledgments 
So many people have contributed to the success of my dissertation. First and 
foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Jan de Ruiter, who 
taught me that science has to be fun. That is exactly, what my dissertation was – 
most of the time. And this was made possible by Jan, his support and his unusual 
way of thinking, which convinced me to take the road less travelled by. The best 
example for this, was the very special and very entertaining car drive to Düsseldorf 
Airport, which I will never forget. Apropos by nothing, a great conversation turned 
into a firework of extraordinary ideas and resulted in laying the foundation stone of 
the most central thesis of my dissertation.  
 
The foundation stone of my statistical knowledge was laid by Max Sichelschmidt, 
when I was a young student in my first semesters in Bielefeld. Thus, being 
supported by him as co-supervisor now, gave me the necessary confidence and 
confirmation, while juggling with all these figures. That is why I want to give my 
sincere thanks to him.  
 
Furthermore, I wish to thank Sebastian Loth, who helped with words and deeds so 
many times. Especially, his programming skills saved me from going crazy, while 
designing my first computer-based experiment. I also would like to thank Chris 
Cummins for his detailed proofreading. His special feeling for the English language 
was such a great help when I was desperately searching for the right words to 
express my thoughts.  
 
Finally, I want to thank my partner and best friend Markus for his support and his 
age-long patience. Years over years, he braved all my monologues about 
embodiment, understood without a word that I had far too little time and suffered 
with me, when I looked desperately for left-handers – for months. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  iv 
 
Abstract 
People are equipped with an additional ‘mental pair of hands’ that has a 
strong impact on how they act, but not on the decisions that they make. This 
is the conclusion drawn by this thesis. Two experiments discover the 
limitations of the body specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009) by revealing 
that the impact of handedness is only relevant in active placement tasks and 
not in perceptual judgment tasks. Hence, people seem to act the way they do 
only for reasons of comfort. Whereas people place superior objects in a way 
that guarantees optimal accessibility, they do not consider the placements 
themselves to constitute positive or negative attributes of the object. This is 
further manifest in an extended replication of the Shepard task (Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971), which tests the ability to rotate virtual objects mentally. This 
task revealed that people prefer to virtually move the objects that are placed 
on the preferred side of their body. This finding also fits the results from the 
first two experiments. Taking into account the findings from all three 
experiments, a modified account of embodiment suggests itself. For this 
reason a manipulation-specificity hypothesis is articulated, which at once 
points to the link between real and mental manipulation of objects and 
explains the economy with which people solve active placement as well as 
mental simulation tasks. Thus, mental acting indeed seems to be embodied, 
but judging does not. 
 v 
Zusammenfassung  
Menschen sind mit einem zusätzlichen „mentalen Händepaar" ausgestattet. 
Es hat einen starken Einfluss auf das Handeln – nicht aber auf 
Entscheidungen. Dies ist die Schlussfolgerung, welche aus dieser Arbeit 
gezogen werden kann. Zwei Experimente decken die Grenzen der body 
specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009) auf, indem sie zeigen, dass 
Händigkeit nur auf das aktive Platzieren einen Einfluss hat, perzeptive Urteile 
hingegen davon unbeeinflusst bleiben. Folglich scheinen Menschen das, was 
sie tun, nur aus Gründen der Bequemlichkeit zu tun. Menschen neigen dazu, 
bessere Objekte so zu platzieren, dass ihre optimale Erreichbarkeit garantiert 
werden kann. Platzierungen selbst werden nicht als positive oder negative 
Attribute der Objekte wahrgenommen. Dies ist mit einer erweiterten 
Replikation des Shepard-Experiments (Shepard & Metzler, 1971) 
untermauert, welche die Fähigkeit testet, virtuelle Objekte geistig zu drehen. 
Dieses Experiment hat gezeigt, dass Menschen es vorziehen, diejenigen 
Objekte virtuell zu bewegen, die auf der bevorzugten Seite ihres Körpers 
platziert werden. Damit entspricht das Ergebnis auch den Resultaten der 
ersten beiden Experimente. Die gebündelte Betrachtung der Erkenntnisse 
aller drei Experimente legt sogar eine modifizierte Darstellung des 
Embodiment nahe. Aus diesem Grund wird eine manipulation-specificity 
hypothesis formuliert, welche auf die Verbindung zwischen der realen und 
mentalen Manipulation von Objekten verweist und zugleich das ökonomische 
Verhalten erklärt, mit denen Menschen Aufgaben lösen, die aktives 
Platzieren sowie mentales Simulieren erfordern. Dieser Hypothese nach ist 
mentales Agieren in der Tat embodied – das Urteilen hingegen nicht. 
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1.   Introduction 1 
1.   Introduction 
Embodiment – this word has been a game changer for cognitive science, 
since it appeared in the 1990s. After centuries throughout which the human 
mind was considered to be an isolated computing center that operated far 
from the influences of the body, more and more experiments provided 
evidence that it is rather the form of the human body that largely determines 
the nature of the human mind (e.g. Barsalou, 1999; Goldstone & Barsalou, 
1998; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). But is this influence really as strong as the 
proponents of embodiment have suggested? Critics have complained about 
the overblown conclusions drawn from the results of embodiment studies. 
For instance, Adam (2010) pointed out that studies showing significant 
effects could also be interpreted in terms of priming or facilitative movements. 
However, researchers investigating embodiment have almost always 
interpreted their results as evidence in favour of embodied cognition. This 
thesis aims at testing whether the critical prediction holds that the body 
determines the mind, or whether other interpretations are possible and even 
more plausible.  
Specifically, I present three experiments which test whether the ability to 
perform mental simulations is determined by being left- or right-handed. 
Handedness is defined as a preference for performing certain tasks with 
different sides of the body, for example holding a pen in the left or the right 
hand. If the body determines the mind as strongly as the proponents of 
embodiment have suggested, people with different body-related preferences 
such as handedness should think in a different way. Thus, studying the 
effects of handedness might reveal interesting aspects of embodiment. 
Indeed, there is neuroscientific evidence indicating that processes related to 
tasks such as writing recruit different hemispheres of the brain in left- and 
right-handers (Holder, 1997). However, this distinction could also be 
attributed to individuals having more training in computing precise movement 
with one hemisphere than with another, resulting in a preference depending 
upon handedness. This interplay between cerebral activities, frequency and 
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handedness could offer a valid explanation for why one side of the body is 
typically able to perform certain fine motor tasks more precisely and faster. 
The psychologist Daniel Casasanto (2009) conducted a series of 
experiments on the differences between right- and left-handers and 
interpreted the results as supporting the body-specificity hypothesis. This 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that people with different bodies 
create different mental representations of reality. These differences are 
suspected to significantly influence the way people form a decision at every 
single moment of their lives. Casasanto (2009) claims, for instance, that right-
handed people should be influenced by having had frustrating experiences 
connected with the use of their less able left hands, and consequently 
develop negative associations with that side (such that, abstractly, ‘right is 
good’ and ‘left is bad’). However, data supporting this claim was only elicited 
from the right-handers tested. The data of left-handers did not show signs of 
the corresponding preference structure (‘right is bad’ and ‘left is good’). 
In summary, these results are clearly important to the validity of the 
embodiment hypothesis, but the experimental support is less than 
conclusive. To address this shortcoming, I decided to attempt to replicate one 
of Casasanto’s (2009) experiments. This experiment, which I report in this 
thesis, focuses on the influence of handedness in perceptual judgment tasks. 
I will use the results of this task to motivate two further experiments – the first 
involving active placement, the second a variation of Shepard and Metzler’s 
(1971) study investigating the perception and processing of drawings. Taken 
together, the experiments provide evidence both from perception and 
production tasks, and consequently offer more comprehensive and 
conclusive findings than prior studies. This permits a better evaluation of the 
body specificity hypothesis and other accounts of embodiment (e.g. Wilson, 
2002). 
In this thesis, I start by explaining the embodiment theory and the potential 
influence of the body on the development of abstract concepts in Chapter 
1.1. The body-specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009), which extends the 
embodiment theory, is outlined in Chapter 1.2. After presenting a general 
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view of the current research in Chapter 1.2.3, a perceptual judgment task of 
Casasanto (2009) – the so-called Shopping Tour – is evaluated in Chapter 2. 
In this Chapter I reanalyse and reinterpret this experiment with regards to the 
question of whether a body-specific effect occurs in both groups – the right-
handers and the left-handers. In Chapter 3 I present an experiment for 
testing perceptual judgment. This experiment is a modified version of the 
Shopping Tour experiment of Casasanto (2009) and is analysed within the 
framework of this dissertation. The results are compared to the original 
experiment (Casasanto 2009). Additionally, in Chapter 4 I test the influence 
of handedness on active placement. Neither experiment supports the body-
specificity hypothesis. 
The body-specificity hypothesis claims that mental and physical differences 
also affect mental tasks, which are not linked to values such as “good” and 
“bad”. One well-known example is the Shepard Task (Shepard & Metzler, 
1971). In Chapter 6, I review replications which are related to embodiment 
and discuss Wilson’s (2002) claims about offline cognition. Experiment 3 
tests spatial computations. I conclude by presenting a modified account of 
embodiment that takes into account the findings from all three experiments. 
The account explicates how the body influences the cognitive processes in 
manipulation tasks, and for this reason I refer to it as the manipulation-
specificity hypothesis. 
 
1.1   How do mental metaphors emerge? 
At least since de Saussure (1916), arbitrariness has been identified as an 
important characteristic of language. One and the same object is named 
differently in different languages. A connection between the meaning of 
words and their form or sound is not recognizable in the majority of cases.  
Arbitrariness does not mean that the individual speaker can proceed 
quite freely in the choice of linguistic constructions: from the standpoint 
of language acquisition and communication, the speaker experiences 
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the connection between sign and meaning as customary and 
obligatory. (Bussmann, 1996, p. 32).  
Consequently, arbitrariness is established as a universal characteristic of 
language. The comparison of different languages makes this particularly 
clear. "It's generally impossible to guess the meaning of an unfamiliar word, 
and each new word just has to be learned individually.” (Trask, 1999). Much 
evidence suggests that the meanings of words are not generally predicted by 
the letters that they happen to contain. Consequently, the production of 
particular speech sounds does not necessarily convey especial meanings. It 
may be due instead to the “principle of least effort” (Zipf, 1949; Martinet 
1955). The assimilation of /n/ to /m/ in a word such as “input” does not reflect 
a change of meaning but merely articulatory convenience. Similarly, on this 
account, falling intonation at the end of sentences is reflective merely of the 
lower air pressure available to the speaker at this stage of the utterance, 
rather than any conscious decision to mark declarative sentences in this way. 
Any alternative realisation would simply require more effort.  
Since arbitrariness and the “principle of least effort” serve as valid 
explanations for many characteristics of language, these concepts might also 
be applicable to the development of linguistic metaphors such as “he reached 
the summit of his career” and familiar phrases that connect spatial 
expressions with abstract concepts in such a way as to associate the “top” 
with positive qualities and the “bottom” with negative qualities (be on top, hit 
rock bottom, and so on). Linguistic metaphors facilitate the expression of 
complex issues, if the metaphors are easy to memorize. In the case of spatial 
metaphors, there are several factors that reinforce this connection. Even 
elementary mathematics serves as a mnemonic for these concepts. In a 
coordinate system top is linked with more, which in turn tends to be 
associated with positive attributes (having more food, more time or more 
money is good). The permanent confrontation with these arbitrarily 
developed linguistic metaphors could have led to the emergence of mental 
metaphors. That means, in effect, that speakers would have been simply 
conditioned by language in establishing a link between top and good and 
between bottom and bad. If so, a person’s body and their physical 
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experiences would not be responsible for the emergence of the 
corresponding spatial metaphors.  
In contrast to this, the body-specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009) claims 
that physical properties influence the development of linguistic metaphors. 
This hypothesis is rooted in embodiment – the idea that the experiences of a 
person’s body, and the mental representations of those experiences, are able 
to exert influence on the way the person thinks and acts. Hence, before 
introducing the body-specificity hypothesis in more detail and continuing the 
discussion about the emergence of linguistic metaphors, I will provide a short 
overview of the research findings concerning embodiment.  
Compared to the classical point of view in cognitive psychology, embodiment 
seems to change everything. For centuries, classical cognitive psychologists 
used to posit the mind as the origin of abstract information. The body was not 
perceived as the main determiner (e.g. Chomsky, 1968). This claim 
originated more than three centuries earlier. Descartes (1641) formulated the 
doctrine of Cartesian Dualism, which states that the mind is nonphysical and 
the container of consciousness, self-awareness and, hence, cognition. In 
contrast to the brain, which was seen by Descartes as the seat of 
intelligence, the mind was strictly separated from physical or environmental 
influences. In more detail, Cartesianism asserts the existence of a mode of 
cognition which is not influenced by the characteristics and experiences of 
the human body.  
The proponents of embodiment highlight the relationship between 
environment, experience and cognition. With this rationale, embodiment 
succeeds in showing that mental representations are closely linked with 
those sensorimotor systems that experience represented objects (Barsalou 
1999; Beilock & Holt 2007). A large number of experiments have provided 
evidence in support of these theories. For instance, Riskind & Gotay (1982) 
analysed the effect of posture on motivation and emotion. Participants sitting 
in a bent position significantly more often exhibited a state of mind described 
as learned helplessness. An experiment conducted by Strack, Martin & 
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Stepper (1988) verified the so-called Facial Feedback Hypothesis, originated 
by Darwin in 1872.  
The free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it. On 
the other hand, the repression, as far as this is possible, of all outward 
signs softens our emotions... Even the simulation of an emotion tends 
to arouse it in our minds.” (Darwin, 1872, p. 366) 
Strack, Martin & Stepper (1988) tested this claim by telling the participants 
they wanted to investigate the difficulty of performing certain tasks when 
people are not able to use their hands and arms. The participants were 
asked to hold a pen in their mouth in one of two ways: in a lips condition, 
activating the orbicularis oris muscle and leading to a frown, as well as in a 
teeth condition activating zygomaticus major and leading to a smile. In one of 
the tasks the participants had to rate how funny a cartoon was. The 
participants in the teeth condition gave significantly higher ratings than the 
participants in the lips condition or the control group. The unintentional smile 
put the subjects in a more cheerful mood, as predicted by Darwin’s (1872) 
theory. 
In another experiment (Tettamanti et al., 2005), participants were asked to 
read out loud words such as ‘run’ or ‘kick’, which could be associated with the 
movement of arms or legs. The results showed that the perception of these 
words activated the same cerebral areas that are involved while moving the 
corresponding extremities, and thus cohered with the embodiment view. 
Zhong & Liljenquist (2006) went one step further in detecting the “Macbeth 
Effect”. Participants remembering and talking about an immoral situation 
linked physical cleansing with an act of washing away their sins. Hence, the 
concepts of moral and physical cleanliness seem to be closely linked. But is 
the “Macbeth Effect” a result of physical experiences or merely learned from 
the culture that a person lives in?  
This controversy leads us back to the issues discussed earlier about the 
development of mental representation and, furthermore, the body as the 
origin of linguistic metaphors. Undeniably, mental representations are not 
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merely products of our mind. A person’s body and the sensorimotor 
experiences that the person makes with this body are highly involved in the 
creation of mental representations. Some proponents of embodiment even 
go one step further, and promote the shape and the abilities of the human 
body as being mainly responsible for our way of thinking. That would imply 
that all areas of cognition – categories, concepts, information and ideas – as 
well as language and linguistic structures are products of the body’s 
experiences and perception.  
Casasanto (2009) argues that it is the body that determines the shape of 
abstract concepts such as good and bad. The fact that we use the concepts 
top is good and bottom is bad in our everyday life, seems to support this 
approach (Schubert, 2005). The literal meaning of top and bottom is 
established on the basis of spatial orientation. Nevertheless, speakers of 
many languages also use these terms with an evaluative meaning. Thus, top 
and bottom can also be used in order to characterize issues, objects or 
persons as good or bad. For instance, the phrase high on life is used for a 
happy person, whereas low IQ would describe someone who is not very 
intelligent. Other idioms which include these spatial concepts can often be 
found in subtle areas of the English language. The phrases spirits soar and 
hopes plummet, for instance, visualize movements that cannot be observed, 
since these movements have only a metaphorical or abstract meaning (Gibbs 
1994; Lakoff & Johnson 1999). This metaphorical use can also be applied to 
hierarchical structures.  
When someone has a high status, or is up in the hierarchy, he or she 
has control over and can oversee others who have lower status. One 
can look up to those who rose to the height of their power or look down 
on underlings. (Schubert 2005, p. 1) 
These spatial terms can be found in many languages, when – for example – 
hierarchical structures in society or power relations are described. Words that 
contain the concept top often describe positive qualities. Hence, they are 
placed above those words that include the concept bottom. In German, 
phrases like ‘am Boden zerstört’ (= dashed to the ground) and ‘mit 
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hängenden Schultern’ (= with sloping shoulders), contain the concept bottom. 
These phrases serve to express a person’s sadness or their negative state of 
mind. The metaphors for the antonyms of these emotional expressions are 
placed on the upper half of this fictive ordinate. That means that, for example, 
a happy and successful person is often referred to as being ‘an der Spitze’ (= 
in the forefront) and as walking ‘erhobenen Hauptes’ (= with head held high).  
Persons who are in a higher position than others can be described as 
‘übergeordnet’ (= superior). ‘Oberkellner’ (= headwaiter), ‘Oberoffizier‘ (= 
superior officer) or ‘Topmanager‘ (= top executive) are also common 
examples of expressions that contain spatial terms. The usage of spatial 
expressions for abstract concepts exists in several languages and hence 
seems to be cross-cultural.  
However, these observations leave an important question unanswered. 
Where do we find the origins of this obvious global linking of top with good 
and of bottom with bad? Why do spatial words often, even though not 
always, convey an evaluative meaning? Schubert (2005) showed that people 
also tend to represent social structures and power relations in vertical spatial 
positions. Thus, these abstract concepts seem to be influenced by physical 
patterns and seem to be embodied. Schubert came up with the hypothesis 
that these concepts could already arise in early childhood development, 
when children generate certain mental representations of their parents and 
other closely associated persons. All these persons are bigger than the 
children. So, the feature large could easily be linked with good. As Schubert 
(2005, p.18) puts it, the difference in size between children and parents 
contributes to „the embodiment of power by verticality“. 
A similar hypothesis is articulated by Casasanto (2009) and closely linked to 
the early childhood imprinting suggested by Schubert. In early stages of their 
development, people could have learned that there is a connection between 
emotional experiences and the simultaneously emerging physical reactions. 
A sad person, for instance, tends to hang his head and to drop his gaze. In 
contrast to this, a person having a good and successful day will express this 
physically by walking with his head held high. Thus, our feelings impinge 
upon our posture. This influence contributes to the formation of mental 
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metaphors like top is good or top is good-humored versus bottom is bad or 
bottom is bad-tempered. Consequently, these mental concepts also influence 
the way we speak and our choice of expressions. If this is true, mental 
metaphors would have become linguistic metaphors, which are universal 
parts of our active vocabulary and, hence, of our everyday life.  
This hypothesis is not sufficient for answering the question of whether 
physical characteristics are the origin of linguistic metaphors that include 
spatial expressions. Since all people tend to hang their heads when they are 
sad or depressed and all people walk with their heads held high when they 
are proud of themselves, there is no reference group with which we could 
compare the results of “normal” people regarding the origin of their concepts 
top is good and bottom is bad.  Thus, Casasanto (2009) suggests the body-
specificity hypothesis as an appropriate tool. The assumptions made by 
researchers working on embodied cognition constitute the basis of this 
hypothesis. It expresses the idea that people with different bodies develop 
different abstract concepts of the same objects, and consequently that 
people with different bodies should also think in different ways. 
That is, if concepts and word meanings are constituted in part by 
simulations of people’s own perceptions and actions, then people with 
different bodily characteristics, who interact with their physical 
environments in systematically different ways, should form 
correspondingly different mental representations. (Casasanto, 2009) 
In order to illustrate this body-specificity hypothesis, Casasanto discusses the 
example of color-blind people from Simmons et al. (2007). This study showed 
that the mental representations of apples differ between persons with red-
green color-blindness and persons who do not have this condition. A person 
who tries to imagine an apple does not only retrieve the shape and the size 
of this object. In order to complete this mental representation and simulate 
this object in his mind’s eye, this person also has to retrieve the color of the 
apple. It is precisely this mental retrieval of the apple’s color that leads to the 
difference between the mental representation of apples in persons who are 
red-green color-blind and those with normal color vision. Hence, the reason 
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for the difference lies in the feature color, which is conceived differently when 
a color-blind person looks at an apple. This putative difference in the mental 
representations of apples seems intuitively plausible. Two persons looking at 
the same object will never create an identical mental representation of the 
object. Factors such as vision or body size, which also leads to a slightly 
different point of view being adopted, influence the perception of the object. It 
is highly likely, for instance, that a six-foot tall person would not see a small 
garden fence as a formidable obstacle, whereas the same fence would be 
perceived as insurmountable by a three-year-old child. Even though both are 
contemplating the same object, their mental representations of this object 
differ significantly. 
However, Daniel Casasanto further suggested that such differences can also 
be observed in the mental representations of human motor functions. This 
claim presupposes significant differences in these persons’ bodies, such as 
handedness:   
If thinking about actions involves mentally simulating the way we 
typically execute them, actions that we perform with our dominant 
hands such as throwing a ball, turning a key, or signing a check should 
have different neurocognitive representations in right-handed and left-
handed individuals (Casasanto, 2009). 
 
1.2   The abstract meaning of left and right in 
relation to handedness 
1.2.1   An evaluation of the terms left and right 
As discussed above, Casasanto (2009) suggested two possible answers to 
the question of why spatial expressions like top and bottom could evolve into 
evaluative linguistic metaphors. But how can we determine which of these 
hypotheses is correct? Casasanto suggested testing these two options on a 
concept which was universal, but which was not associated with the physical 
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properties of a certain group of people. As Casasanto claims, such a concept 
can be found in the universal preference for the right rather than the left. This 
concept resembles the pattern of top is good versus bottom is bad. People 
similarly associate the right with positive abstract qualities like intelligence 
and honesty and the left with negative abstract issues like stupidity or 
deception. In common with the abstract concepts of top and bottom, these 
links also emerge in a large number of languages spoken all over the world.  
The English language contains many idioms and phrases that make 
reference to these horizontal spatial concepts in the expression of abstract 
qualities. Passing an exam, for instance, is often accomplished by giving the 
right answers, in which case we could describe the student as right on the 
button. Students who are overwhelmed by the requirements of this exam 
might have been left in the lurch by their mental abilities and hence end up 
out in the left field (Casasanto, 2009). A good and caring person can be 
described as someone whose heart is in the right place. This phrase 
especially invites closer consideration inasmuch as it is, literally speaking, flat 
wrong, if the term right is interpreted as a spatial expression: the human 
heart is in fact usually located on the left side of the thorax. It could be 
argued that in the right place is simply a synonym of the phrase in the correct 
place and has nothing to do with the spatial meaning of the word right. The 
same might be true for the term left, which can also be interpreted as quit or 
as remained.  
A closer look at the German language reveals that this objection does not 
seem to be tenable, since this language displays similarities in the case of 
these abstract concepts. First, speakers of the German language also use 
the phrase ‘das Herz am rechten Fleck haben’ (= to have one’s heart in the 
right place). This idiom has the same content as the English one – with one 
significant difference. The German version of the phrase contains the spatial 
phrase ‘am rechten Fleck’ (= on the right-hand side), which conveys that the 
heart is positioned on the right side of the thorax. Hence, this phrase cannot 
be translated literally as in the correct place, since the term ‘rechts’ only 
means right, whereas ‘richtig’ means correct. Of course, it is conceivable that 
the more logical formulation ‘am richtigen Fleck’ (= in the correct place) 
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changed into ‘am rechten Fleck’ (= in the right place) arbitrarily or because of 
considerations of economy. If this were true, it would lead inevitably to the 
question of where the German word ‘richtig’ (= correct) emerged from. Is the 
apparent similarity to ‘rechts’ (the spatial expression right) merely arbitrary or 
does ‘rechts’ implicitly include the meaning of the word correct? The theory 
that horizontal expressions in German have the same abstract meaning as in 
English becomes even more likely when we consider the word ‘links’ (= left), 
which, as in English, has negative connotations. A clumsy person, for 
instance, has ‘zwei linke Füße’ (= two left feet) and somebody who is corrupt 
is described as ‘link’ in German, whereas a good or indispensable assistant 
is often described as ‘rechte Hand’ (= right hand). The terms ‘das Recht’ (= 
law) and ‘Gerechtigkeit’ (= justice) also include the word ‘rechts’, the German 
word for right. Despite the fact that the German words ‘rechts’  and ‘das 
Recht’ do not have the same origin1, both terms are orthographically and 
phonologically effectively identical. This relationship suggests that both 
mental metaphors have emerged in the course of language change. Hence, it 
is highly probable that the concept right is good, which is also observable in 
the German language, can also be transferred to ‘das Recht’.  
These principles are also applicable in French. Speakers of this language 
denote a clumsy person as ‘maladroit’. This example is highly interesting, 
since this word arises from ‘mal à droite’. This expression means literally that 
the person concerned is bad at acting right and, thus, contains implicitly the 
concept left is inferior and right is superior and more important. This issue 
becomes even clearer by considering the word ‘gauche’. The English 
equivalents for this word are left, dubious and clumsy. Consequently, ‘mal à 
droite’ and ‘gauche’ are synonyms, which both refer to the concept left is 
inferior. Justice, in this case, is – similarly to German – called ‘droite’ in 
French. This term can be translated with the spatial expression right.  
However, these abstract concepts do not only emerge in combination with 
language. A closer look at the social conventions in the Western culture also 
                                                
1
 ‘Rechts’ derives from the Latin word ‘dexter’, whereas the expression ‘das Recht’ originates in the 
Latin term ‘ius’. Although ‘dexter’ can be used as a spatial expression, it can also be translated as 
lucky. In contrast to ‘dexter’, ‘ius’ has an analogy in the English word correct (Pertsch, 2007). 
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reveals these concepts. In order to greet one another, people offer their right 
hands. Reaching out the left hand without a good reason is considered 
impolite und disrespectful. The validity of this principle can often be observed 
in situations in which a child reaches out the “wrong” hand with which to 
shake an adult’s hand. In all likelihood, the parents or guardians will rebuke 
the child for its error of proffering the “bad hand”. In other cultures this left is 
bad principle has an even wider influence. In Islam, using the left hand for 
food intake is strictly forbidden. Similarly, social conventions in Ghana, 
mandate that people are not allowed to perform deictic gestures with their left 
hands or direct the left index finger towards another person (Kita & 
Essegbey, 2001).  
What distinguishes these concepts of right is good and left is bad from the 
previously described concepts top is good and respectively bottom is bad? 
This can be explained with regard to human anatomy. Section 1.2 presented 
the theory introduced in Casasanto (2009) that the bodily experiences that a 
person has exert a strong influence on the mental representations of this 
person. If this theory is correct, left-handers should have a lower or even 
nonexistent affinity for the right side. As a consequence, the universal 
concept right is good in language use would simply have emerged because 
of the overwhelming majority of right-handers in the Western culture, in which 
only one person out of ten is bodily left-dominant. These right-handers could 
have transferred their positive experiences with their dominant (right) part of 
their body to their everyday vocabulary. This could have led to the previously 
explained idioms. So, these given concepts right is good and left is bad might 
only be a product of the mental representations of right-handers. Left-
handers, meanwhile, would have applied these concepts merely because 
they became a standard in language and culture. In this case, these 
concepts might, indeed, relate closely to the thinking and acting of right-
handers, because they are originated by bodily experiences. However, for 
the left-handed part of mankind these concepts would merely be a figure of 
speech – and stand in stark contradiction to their mostly negative 
experiences with the right side.    
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If the second possibility suggested in Casasanto (2009) is the correct one, 
linguistic metaphors concerning the right or the left would have emerged 
arbitrarily. This scenario would entail that these concepts developed similarly 
in the mind of right- and left-handers, since the previously represented idioms 
were established arbitrarily over the course of time. On the basis of the 
permanent confrontation with certain linguistic concepts in a language, the 
speakers of the language would become accustomed to the underlying 
mental concepts and transfer them, as a first step, to their active vocabulary. 
In a second step, the mental concepts would penetrate their minds. By this 
mechanism, linguistic concepts would be converted into mental concepts. 
Consequently, idioms such as two left feet or to put something right would 
shape new representations that influence decision-making procedures even 
when these processes do not have anything in common with language. Due 
to this permanent confrontation, people would become conditioned that right 
is a synonym for good – and that this principle was true with reference to the 
whole world. Certainly this principle would also lead to the adoption of the 
belief that right was better than left.    
The correctness of this theory would also imply that the belief that right was 
better than left would be independent of and unaffected by a person’s 
handedness. Essentially, it implies that the abstract concept should be 
equally pronounced in the minds of right- and left-handers. By definition, 
right- and left-handers would still have bodies with differently dominant parts, 
but the preference for the right would not be motivated by these physical 
differences, but rather by universal linguistic concepts, that were equally 
strongly developed in the minds of right- and left-handers. These hypotheses 
admit and call for experimental investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.   Introduction  15 
1.2.2   The concepts of left- and right-handers  
If Casasanto’s first theory is correct, we must ask how these extremely 
different abstract mental representations could have emerged in the minds of 
right- and left-handers. Casasanto suggests early childhood development as 
the locus of the difference (Casasanto & Henetz, 2012). Children tend to 
realize in early stages of their development that just one of their two hands is 
able to perform fine motor tasks2, whereas the other is already overloaded 
with simple tasks like tooth-brushing or painting. Nevertheless, children try 
repeatedly to optimize the abilities of their non-dominant part of their bodies, 
because they are not willing to accept this obvious physical restriction. Since 
this eager repetition is usually unavailing, Casasanto (2009) asserts that the 
process of trying must give rise to frustration and disappointment. 
Consequently, right-handers link these negative experiences caused by the 
dysfluent left side with negative emotions. As a result, the spatial expression 
left is mentally associated with this negative evaluation and comes to be 
used as a synonym of bad or negative.    
Exactly the opposite occurs in connection with the right side of a right-
hander’s body. A child that tries to solve certain fine motor tasks with his 
dominant hand will experience a sense of achievement, since the abilities of 
this side of their body surpass those of the non-dominant side many times 
over. Writing, painting and throwing – all these tasks which are insoluble on 
the non-dominant side are unproblematic when performed with the right hand 
of a right-hander’s body. In the course of time, right-handers connect more 
and more positive experiences with the fluent action of their right hand. Thus, 
these experiences result in the linguistic concept right being evaluated 
positively. As an example of this, Casasanto discusses research on the 
preferences of expert typists: 
… expert typists have shown a preference for pairs of letters that can 
be typed easily over pairs that are more difficult to type (even when 
typing is not relevant to the task), suggesting that motor experience 
                                                
2
 Ambidextrous people are excluded from this assumption, because this small group of people is able 
to perform tasks similarly efficiently with both sides of their bodies.  
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can influence affective judgments (Beilock & Holt, 2007; Van den 
Bergh, Vrana, & Eelen, 1990). In a sense, we are all “experts” at using 
our dominant hands. Perhaps over a lifetime of lopsided 
perceptuomotor experience, people come to implicitly associate good 
things with the side of space they can interact with more fluently and 
bad things with the side of space they interact with less fluently? 
(Casasanto, 2009, p. 353) 
This theory seems to predict that right-handers’ and left-handers’ abstract 
concepts for the expressions of right and left should be entirely different. 
Nevertheless, it can be observed that right-handers and left-handers use the 
same linguistic concepts including these spatial expressions when literally 
describing areas on a horizontal axis. By common consent, idioms such as 
two left feet are used to describe a clumsy person, and there is no need to 
inquire into the speaker’s handedness in order to capture the correct 
meaning of this sentence. The mental representations of the abstract 
concepts left and right seem to be determined by a person’s handedness, but 
the linguistic concepts associated with these expressions appear to be 
unaffected by a speaker’s handedness. Thus, there is a strict congruency for 
linguistic concepts including spatial expressions.  
Therefore, it is highly probable that left-handers have adopted these linguistic 
concepts of right and left, even if it stands in marked contrast to their mental 
representations of these concepts. This assumption suggests that the 
concept right is good has been chosen as the universal one because about 
90 percent of humans are right-handed (Corballis, 2003). Consequently, this 
overwhelming majority have asserted the implicit right to transform their 
mental representations into linguistic metaphors. For reasons of 
simplification, everyone regardless of his or her handedness has been 
obliged to understand these idioms. The fact that left-handers have 
historically been retrained into right-handers, and were not accepted in many 
societies as recently as a few decades ago, corroborates this theory of a 
linguistic oppression of the left-handers’ abstract mental concepts (Sattler, 
1995). Writing with the left hand was considered to be unpleasant and 
undesirable, just like reaching out the left hand in order to greet someone. 
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Right-handed people evaluated this behavior simply as a bad habit which 
could be eliminated with practice.    
If Casasanto’s (2009) body-specificity hypothesis is correct, the mental 
concepts of left-handers would indeed differ from the linguistic concepts they 
had to learn and have to apply. This assumption raises the question of 
whether unsatisfactory experiences with the right hand could have persuaded 
the left-handers that their non-dominant side is, in general, the worse side – 
the process that was argued earlier to take place in right-handers. 
Alternatively, it is conceivable that left-handers, having adopted these 
universal linguistic concepts of right is good and left is bad, unconsciously 
generate mental concepts which fit these principles.  
As remarked earlier, the preference for the right hand is also applicable in 
social conventions. Reaching out the left hand in order to greet someone is 
taboo in Western culture, and food intake or writing with the left hand are 
completely forbidden in some other cultures. Given the existence of these 
conventions, it is plausible that left-handers have been turned into ‘mental 
right-handers’ in spite of all the negative experiences with their non-dominant 
hand. The permanent confrontation with a way of thinking and speaking 
established by a mostly right-handed society could have influenced the way 
in which left-handers judge the right versus the left. This might be especially 
applicable since left-handers are often forced to use their body in the same 
way as right-handers do in their everyday lives. Left-handers simply have to 
fulfill certain fine motor tasks with their right hand and consequently are 
frequently confronted with their physical differentness. For instance, 
conventional scissors, writing pads or potato peelers are made in order to be 
used by right-handers. A left-hander who suddenly has to use scissors and 
borrows them from his office neighbor will receive right-handed scissors nine 
times out of ten3. Consequently, a left-hander’s environment makes him 
frequently conscious of the fact that he is part of a minority and has to cope 
with numerous constraints in his everyday life.  
                                                
3
 Given that only about ten percent of people are left-handed, tools made especially for this group 
should be quite uncommon.  
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This leads us to ask which of the two influences is stronger for a left-hander: 
the positive experiences with the left hand or the negative experiences 
caused by this “different” body that does not fit a world dominated by right-
handers and hence right-handed concepts, devices and rules? Or could it be 
that these opposite experiences lead to a mental neutralization, just as 
positive and negative quantities cancel one another out? In this case, left-
handers should not judge left or right as better or worse – they should rather 
see these words only as spatial expressions without an evaluative meaning. 
Besides that, left-handers should not have a preference for the left side apart 
from writing and other fine motor tasks they tend to perform with their left 
hand. At least, a potential preference for the left should not be as extremely 
marked as would be expected of the right-handers’ preference for the right. 
This is due to the fact that social conventions and the problems with being 
part of a minority should weaken the effect of positive experiences with the 
left hand. Left-handers realize day by day that they do not conform to the 
norm because of their handedness, whereas right-handers live in a “right-
handers’ world” that is tailored to this group of people and the way they use 
their bodies. Right-handed children are not encouraged to write with their left 
hand, nor is this described as  the good hand.  They use the right hand 
intuitively because it possesses fine motor skills. Consequently, it is entirely 
self-evident for this group of people to prefer the right hand and thus the right 
side.        
In sum, the experiences that right-handers gain with their dominant side are 
positive in two respects – they are able to act confidently and fluently with 
this hand and they conform to the norm of handedness. However, these two 
positive experiences are gained much less consciously than is the case for 
left-handers’ negative experiences. Hence, it could be theorized that right-
handers do not develop such well-marked mental concepts as left-handers, 
since they are not aware of the advantages intrinsic to the usage of their 
dominant hand. Being a right-hander is not seen as a privilege by this 
majority. It is simply a matter of course, which is neither to be evaluated as 
positive nor as negative. For that reason it could also be possible that neither 
1.   Introduction  19 
group exhibits a large directional preference where abstract concepts are 
concerned.    
 
1.2.3   Previous and current research 
In order to substantiate the differences between the abstract concepts of 
right- and left-handers, a series of experiments has already been conducted. 
The results of these experiments seem to show that left-handers do indeed 
establish unconsciously the concept that left is good. Casasanto and Jasmin 
(2010) analysed video recordings showing politicians delivering speeches. 
The left-handed president of the United States, Barack Obama, and the right-
handed former US president George W. Bush each used their dominant hand 
conspicuously often in order to emphasize positive utterances. By contrast, 
gestures performed with their non-dominant hand served to highlight 
negative utterances or were used to introduce unpleasant topics. In that 
respect, the gestures of the observed right-handers and left-handers seemed 
to be mirrored. Both groups used their dominant or good hand to emphasize 
positive aspects and their non-dominant or bad hand to highlight negative 
aspects. If these observations turned out to be universally valid, a speaker’s 
gestures and the hand he uses for a certain utterance could have the power 
to reveal hidden thoughts. For example, if George W. Bush evaluates the 
climate policy of other countries as insufficient, he would, in all likelihood, 
underline this topic with his left hand, although his words might convey a 
positive evaluation.  
Casasanto and Jasmin also observed that right- and left-handers use their 
hands for the purpose of expressing two contrasting aspects of an issue – a 
positive one and a negative one. While talking about the negative facts, 
speakers gestured with their non-dominant hand. In order to emphasize 
positive aspects, they applied their dominant hand. From this Casasanto and 
Jasmin draw the following conclusion: 
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It was not simply the case that people gestured more with their 
dominant hands. Rather, right- and left-handers also used their hands 
in contrasting ways when expressing ideas with positive and negative 
emotional valence, suggesting that they automatically activated 
contrasting associations between action and emotion. These data 
corroborate the results of laboratory tests showing that people implicitly 
associate good things with their dominant side and bad things with 
their non-dominant side. (Casasanto & Jasmin, 2010, p. 3) 
Casasanto and Jasmin (2012) further explored these findings in the domain 
of typing, and discovered hints towards a potential “QWERTY-effect”. Most 
English-speaking people use the so-called QWERTY keyboard when 
communicating via typing. We can consider half of the letters to be situated 
on the right of the keyboard and half of them to be on the left. Inevitably, 
some words contain a greater proportion of letters on one side of the 
keyboard than the other. Casasanto and Jasmin investigated whether this 
difference, mediated through the action of typing, might give rise to 
differences in the meanings of the corresponding words. Three experiments 
were conducted in order to test whether asymmetries in the usage of the 
keys on the right and left side of the keyboard influence how people evaluate 
the emotional valence of the typed words. The findings hinted at the 
existence of a relationship between emotional valence and the side on which 
the typed letters were located. This QWERTY-effect seems to exist in several 
languages – and had the greatest magnitude in the case of pseudowords and 
words of recent origin.  
Casasanto and Henetz (2012) investigated the abstract concepts of children 
as a function of handedness. The authors determined that different 
evaluations of the abstract meaning of right and left emerges in early 
childhood development. Thus, the evaluation of abstract concepts like 
intelligence or kindness should be different if these concepts were related to 
horizontal positioning. Casasanto and Henetz asked the young participants to 
sort toys into two boxes. One of these boxes was positioned to the right of 
the child, whereas the other one was positioned to the left. It turned out that 
the participants tended to sort their favorite toys significantly more frequently 
1.   Introduction  21 
into the box on their dominant side, and their disfavored toys into the box on 
the non-dominant side.  
However, this raises the question of whether the children placed the favorite 
toy next to their dominant side simply for practical reasons. The authors ran 
further experiments in order to investigate whether the children only wanted 
to position the superior toys next to them for the purpose of making them 
conveniently situated, or whether they chose the dominant side because this 
side matched their mental concept that the good side is reserved for the good 
toy. These experiments revealed that the mental link of good with dominant 
and bad with non-dominant persisted when the participants expressed their 
decision only verbally and thus without moving their body. To enable this test, 
the children were confronted with pairs of pictures of cartoon animals. One 
picture was placed on the right side and the other picture was placed on the 
left side. In this condition, the participants had to judge whether the right or 
the left animal was the nicer or more intelligent one. The results confirmed 
the hypothesis that positive attributes were associated with the dominant 
hand: the participants’ preferences depended significantly on the side on 
which the pictures were placed. Hence, right-handed children rated the 
objects as being better when they were placed on the right side. By contrast, 
the left-handed children preferred objects placed on the left side.  
Prior to Casasanto’s work, former studies indicated that handedness does 
not become established until the age of eight (Corballis & Beale, 1976). 
However, Corballis and Beale claimed that a weak tendency for one part of 
the body can be observed in earlier stages. Nevertheless, a fixed 
handedness, which lasts for an entire lifetime, cannot be detected in children 
who are younger than eight. Casasanto, contrastingly, succeeded in showing 
that also children aged five were able to link positions on a horizontal axis 
with emotional valence. It turned out that all observed behavioral patterns 
also emerged in kindergarteners.     
Casasanto and Chrysikou (2011) tried to create “artificial left-handers”. The 
participants were asked to wear ski gloves on their dominant hand in order to 
reduce the fine motor skills of this hand. To increase the degree of difficulty, 
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another ski glove was tied on the wrist of the participant’s dominant arm. In 
spite of this handicap the participants had to stack two chains of domino 
gaming pieces simultaneously – one with the handicapped right hand and 
one with the left hand. This made the participants feel as though they were 
“artificial left-handers” because their original dominant side became the 
weaker one and caused much more problems in solving the domino task. 
The preparation of the participants was designed to make the original 
dominant hand inferior to the non-dominant hand with its less marked fine 
motor skills. This handicap influenced the perception of the participants. This 
in turn affected the outcome of a later task, in which the “artificial left-
handers” were asked to evaluate objects. The objects placed close to the 
non-dominant side of their bodies were preferred significantly often, whereas 
objects placed close to the dominant side were more often rejected, although 
this artificial imbalance disappeared after a while. Thus, Casasanto and 
Chrysikou succeeded in creating “temporary artificial left-handers”. 
The first three experiments presented in Casasanto (2009) also corroborate 
the body-specificity hypothesis. These experiments explore the influence of 
evaluative terms on the choice of certain positions in space. The fourth and 
the fifth experiment of this paper, which dealt with the influence of 
handedness on decision-making procedures, were less definitive in their 
outcomes. In the first experiment the participants had to solve a drawing task. 
They were asked – similarly to the first experiment of Casasanto and Henetz 
(2012) – to draw animals in boxes. The participants were told which of two 
animals was the smarter, better, or more sympathetic one. They did not 
reveal their individual likes and dislikes but had to judge in place of a visitor 
of a zoo, who was going to see these animals (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Examples of stimuli in the zoo experiment (Casasanto, 2009). 
Casasanto designed two conditions of this task. In the first condition, the two 
empty boxes were placed one above the other. In the second condition, 
these boxes were positioned side by side on an imaginary horizontal axis. 
People tend to draw the better animal in the upper box, as the previously 
discussed vertical mental metaphors would lead us to expect. Similarly, in the 
horizontal case, the participants tended to draw the preferred animal in the 
box closer to their dominant side. Consequently, the results again supported 
the body-specificity hypothesis.    
The second and the third experiment in Casasanto (2009) also dealt with the 
influence of descriptions on placement, and served as extensions of the first 
experiment. In the second experiment, the participants were asked to draw 
the previously described animals into the boxes. After doing so, the 
participants were asked to guess the purpose of the drawing task. The 
results provided an almost exact replication of experiment 1, and the follow-
up question revealed that only 1% of participants correctly guessed the 
motivation for the experiment.  
Nevertheless, it could still be argued that the participants chose the side for 
the simple reason that their bodies were actively involved in the task 
performance, since drawing animals into boxes requires movements of the 
dominant hand. Thus, it is conceivable that the observed effect only arose for 
reasons of comfort – right-handers are able to draw on the right side of a 
sheet of paper with minimal effort. That is why this side could be seen as 
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being the better one for the superior animal. Therefore, the third experiment 
examined whether the answers would still be the same if the participants 
simply had to express their decisions verbally instead of drawing the animals. 
The findings were still significant, but not as convincing as in the previous two 
experiments. A large majority of the left-handed participants still chose to 
place the preferred animal into the left box, but the right-handers only 
displayed a slight tendency towards putting the better animal into the box 
placed closer to their dominant side. This raises the question of whether the 
participants in the previous variations of this experiment displayed such a 
strong inclination because they associated their dominant side with good or 
merely for the reason that they acted with this side of their body. The latter 
option would imply that the participants simply made their decisions for 
reasons of convenience. 
The last two experiments in Casasanto (2009) were dedicated to 
investigating how placement exercised influence over the evaluation of 
objects. In the first of these experiments, the participants had look at a list 
with different pairs of so-called Fribbles4. They then had to judge, which 
Fribble out of each pair seemed to be the more intelligent or more 
sympathetic one. Within each pair, one Fribble was placed on the right side 
of the questionnaire, and the other one on the left side (Figure 2). 
                                                
4
 Fribbles are alien creatures, designed by Michael J. Tarr, Brown University (www.tarrlab.org). 
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Figure 2: Examples used in the Fribble experiment in Casasanto (2009). 
It became apparent that the participants were not as greatly affected by the 
side on which the Fribbles were placed as the authors seemed to expect. 
The effect was only significant at the .05 level. Moreover, the effect was 
caused solely by the small group of left-handed participants, whereas the 
right-handed participants only revealed a small tendency for preferring 
objects placed on the right side. Nevertheless, it is possible that the results 
only occurred on the basis of Casasanto’s way of analysis, as will be 
discussed in more detail later in this thesis.  
The second experiment that dealt with placements and their influence on 
decision making processes also revealed a bias for the dominant side. But, 
as seen in the Fribble task, this bias was not as well-marked as expected. In 
this last experiment, the participants got the task of going on a Shopping 
Tour. The design of this experiment was similar to the fourth experiment. The 
only difference was the absence of alien-like creatures. These creatures 
were substituted by semantically identical product descriptions. The 
participants had to imagine they would choose one of two possible brands 
out of each product category.  
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1.2.4   Two different types of experiments  
It is clear that two different types of experiments were implemented by 
Casasanto and colleagues: active placement experiments and perceptual 
judgment experiments. Table 1 depicts how the described experiments can 
be classified into these groups. 
Type I: Active placement Type II: Perceptual judgment 
A trip to the zoo Shopping Tour 
A trip to the zoo (+ awareness test) Fribbles 
A trip to the zoo (verbal version) “Which toy is smarter?” 
The QWERTY-effect  
Spontaneous Gestures of Politicians  
“Put a toy into a box!” (children)  
“Put a toy into a box!” (hemiparesis 
patients) 
 
Glove experiment + toy placement  
Table 1: Distribution into active placement and perceptual judgment experiments 
It is striking that there is a strong imbalance in the distribution. So far, 
Casasanto has performed eight versions of active placement experiments 
and only three versions of perceptual judgment experiments. This imbalance 
might be explained by an observation which is applicable to all the 
experiments within one group. The results of both types of experiments 
showed significant handedness effects. However, in the case of the 
perceptual judgment experiments the effects were only significant at the .05 
level. Moreover, the effects in these experiments were caused solely by the 
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small group of left-handed participants. This raises an important question: 
what is the reason for these obvious differences in the results of the active 
placement experiments and the perceptual judgment experiments? To obtain 
a more robust estimate of the statistical reliability, we performed a replication 
of one of the central perceptual judgment experiments, the Shopping Tour 
(Casasanto, 2009). 
 
2.   The Shopping Tour 
Is the impact of handedness so strong that it determines the outcomes of 
decision-making tasks? In the following, I will investigate the actual impact of 
handedness on the mind. In order to establish a basis for my investigations, I 
will take a closer look at one of the experiments described under the title 
“Body-Specific Decisions about the Office and Marketplace” by Casasanto 
(2009). For simplicity, I will refer to this experiment as the Shopping Tour. 
Although Casasanto discussed two experiments, I will focus on the one about 
product descriptions because of its greater external validity, and will only 
briefly discuss the other experiment (concerning job applicants). After 
explaining the data in more detail, I introduce another interpretation of the 
existing data and provide an improved design for replicating the results.  
 
2.1   Method 
2.1.1   Materials and procedure 
The Shopping Tour experiment was conducted with 371 English-speaking 
students from Stanford University and the University of California, Riverside. 
321 of these participants were right-handed; the remaining 50 were left-
handed. The description of this experiment (Casasanto, 2009) suggests that 
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the participants provided only a verbal indication of their handedness. 
However, handedness is crucial for this experiment. Thus, the Edinburgh 
Handedness Test (Oldfield, 1971) would have been an appropriate tool with 
which to check the participants’ handedness.  As discussed in chapter 1, the 
experimenters first administered a questionnaire to ask participants to make 
a series of decisions as to which of two products they would prefer. 
Importantly, these products were described in different but semantically 
equivalent terms. Thus, the experiment tested the impact of handedness 
rather than the description of these products. 
The questionnaire consisted of six items. For each item, one set of 
descriptions was placed on the right-hand side of the product name and the 
other set of descriptions was placed on the left. Table 2 displays two of these 
product categories. I am grateful to Daniel Casasanto for being so kind as to 
provide the raw data from all 371 participants for this research, and enabling 
me to adopt these product categories for a replication of this experiment.  
kills germs 
fresh-scented 
moisturizes hand 
 
DISH SOAP 
antibacterial 
clean smelling 
conditions skin 
money back guarantee 
physician 
recommended  
affordable luxury 
 
MATTRESS 
unconditional warranty 
physician approved 
luxurious and 
affordable 
Table 2: An excerpt from the original Shopping Tour questionnaire  
As a first step, I will analyse the first category displayed in Table 2 in more 
detail. This category displays the item dish soap. In this item the participants 
had to decide between one type of soap with the properties kills germs, 
fresh-scented and moisturizes hand and a different one with the features 
antibacterial, clean smelling and conditions skin. 
Following the first part, there was another set of items. However, this set was 
focussed on job applicants. Each job description (e. g. programmer) was 
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paired with two sets of words describing the applicant. Similarly to the 
previous procedure, the participants saw one of these job titles and the 
descriptions of two job applicants in each line. One of these descriptions was 
placed on the right side of the category name, and the other description was 
placed on the left side. The participants had to decide which of the two 
applicants was most suitable. Importantly, the descriptions of the applicants 
were said to be semantically equivalent. For instance, the participants had to 
decide between an engineering major from Virginia Tech who programs in 
Perl and a math major from Georgia Tech who programs in Python. Thus, as 
argued by Casasanto (2009), the only criterion which made these two options 
distinguishable was the side on which the description was placed.  
Casasanto used four different versions of the original questionnaire, which 
displayed the categories mirrored and in two different orders. Thus, the 
presentational aspect of the procedure was varied, controlling for any 
potential differences of meaning that might have been perceived between the 
two sets of descriptions. After the participants had chosen one of the two 
options for a category, they had to mark their decision in a certain way: 
specifically, by circling the preferred option and crossing out the rejected one. 
 
2.1.2   A closer examination of the Shopping Tour design  
In the previous chapter I discussed the design and the implementation of the 
Shopping Tour in Casasanto (2009). This detailed description revealed 
several aspects which could have influenced the experiment and confounded 
the results. For instance, information about the handedness of the 
participants was only obtained by asking them which hand they use to write 
with. However, the participants recruited for the Shopping Tour consisted 
solely of students and, hence, people, who were born in the 1980s. It is 
possible that some grew up at a time and in a cultural setting in which it was 
common for left-handers to be retrained into right-handers. These becomes 
more likely when we recall that Western society traditionally considered the 
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left hand to be “dirty” and “bad”, a way of thinking that started to change only 
a few decades earlier (Sattler, 1995).  
Likewise, the participants were not interviewed as to their nationality or their 
cultural background. This could also diminish the applicability of the results, 
since the participants could have grown up in a culture that still does not 
acknowledge the existence of left-handedness and prohibits the usage of the 
left hand for certain fine motor tasks. Given this possibility, the experimental 
participants might include more numerous natural left-handers than the 
number reported by Casasanto (2009). Since a person could have been 
retrained into a right-hander, the hand with which the person writes does not 
necessarily furnish correct information about this person’s real handedness. 
Using the Edinburgh Handedness test could have addressed this issue, in 
addition to detecting ambidextrous people, i.e. those who show little or no 
preference in the use of their hands. Ambidextrous participants can provide 
valuable insight for the investigation of the body-specificity hypothesis 
because these participants are neutral in terms of preferring one hand over 
the other. Thus, any handedness-related effect in ambidextrous people 
cannot be attributed to the body or to physical ability but must be attributed to 
external influences. 
In addition, the strong mismatch in the number of left-and right-handers could 
also have led to misinterpretations. As stated in the detailed description of 
the Shopping Tour in section 2.1.1, the right-handers (321 participants) 
outnumbered the left-handers (50 participants) by more than a factor of six. 
Thus, the results obtained from the 50 left-handers cannot be as informative 
as those obtained by the 321 right-handers. It is likely that the problem of the 
low number of left-handers was caused by the method by which participants 
were recruited for the Shopping Tour. No especial effort was made to recruit 
left-handers to take part in this experiment, presumably because this would 
have made the purpose of the experiment more obvious to the participants 
and thus risked distorting the results. Instead, the experiment was performed 
with randomly recruited participants, some of whom just happened to be left-
handed. Therefore, the ratio of 50 to 321 is not surprising, since the 
proportion of left-handers in the Shopping Tour experiment (13.5 percent) 
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corresponds closely to the proportion of left-handers in the general 
population (estimated at around ten percent; Corballis, 2003).  
Nevertheless, this natural distribution of participants could have been 
circumvented. For example, the quota sampling method could have been 
applied. This method would have required the controlled recruitment of 
participants belonging to all three groups of handedness, until a certain 
number of right-handers, left-handers and ambidextrous participants had 
been achieved. This procedure calls for the preselection of potential 
participants, which could quite easily have been performed by observing the 
participants writing or eating. Of course, this procedure does not replace the 
Edinburgh Handedness Test, since the real handedness could still differ from 
the handedness observed in participants’ performance of fine motor tasks. 
Another problem with the implementation of the Shopping Tour concerns the 
pairs of terms that were used to describe the two different brands within a 
particular product category. As explained with reference to Table 2, it was 
claimed that both descriptions within one product category should be 
semantically identical. This immediately raises the question of whether it is 
possible to find two descriptions of the same item that truly are exactly 
identical. According to semantics, it is not. That is mainly because it is always 
necessary to distinguish between the intension and the extension of certain 
expressions. This semantic difficulty can be illustrated with reference to the 
so-called Morning-Star and Evening-Star issue (Carnap, 1947; Frege, 1892). 
The intension or the inherent expression of the term Morning Star is ‘a 
celestial object that is visible in a certain location in the morning. However, 
the expression Evening Star contains the intention of ‘a celestial object that is 
visible in a certain location in the evening’. This example discloses the 
existence of more than one intension related to a single extension. This 
extension is a single object in the world that these expressions are referring 
to, which in this case is the planet Venus. Hence, the extension is the same, 
but the intension varies. In a similar way, speakers of the same language 
could evaluate two terms differently and create two different intensions 
corresponding to the same extension. Consequently, in the participants’ view, 
the reference object would be the same in both cases, but they would 
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nevertheless develop different mental representations. After all, the term 
Morning Star incorporates the concept of early in the day. So, if somebody 
would call the planet Venus the Evening Star, when seeing it in the morning, 
this would be a mistake – although the reference would still be correct. 
Casasanto eliminated the influence of possible inconsistencies in content by 
creating four counterbalanced versions of the questionnaire. That means that 
he mapped the pairs of descriptions in a different order and mirrored them on 
the response sheets. Still, the possibility persists that the – generally 
vanishingly small – difference in semantic content played a significant role in 
contributing to a decision for one of the two products. If a participant has to 
evaluate the two brands in the product category dish soap, it is striking that 
kills germs as opposed to antibacterial has a well-marked difference 
semantically. While the term kills germs is primarily used in the field of 
vernacular or oral communication, antibacterial is associated with technical 
language and therefore might be a foreign word for some people. Hence, it is 
likely that many participants would tend to prefer the product described as 
antibacterial because this word is associated with a higher register of 
language, and this in turn suggests that the product is of higher quality. 
Furthermore, the participants might process the verb phrase kills germs in a 
different way than the adjective antibacterial because these two terms have 
different semantic origins. More precisely, the term kills contains an 
extremely radical abstract concept. The phrase kills germs, therefore, 
expresses that the product described with this term is able to kill bacteria 
actively. The alternative, conversely, carries the prefix anti-, which only 
expresses that this particular product diminishes the impact of germs. In 
short, the meaning of these two terms is different for a number of reasons. 
The same semantic problem can be observed in the case of the example 
mattress. A money back guarantee is more transparent for a potential 
customer than an unconditional warranty. In the first case, customers can be 
sure that, in the event of their returning the product, the purchase price would 
definitely be refunded. Hence, the manufacturer of this product seems to be 
expressing a high degree of confidence in the quality of the product, which 
conveys an indication that a good decision has been made in buying the 
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product. The meaning that is conveyed by the phrase unconditional warranty 
is less clear. It suggests that the manufacturer is less accommodating, and is 
merely willing to replace a faulty product with another or offer perhaps a 
partial refund. Consequently, the choice of the product with an unconditional 
warranty might be associated with a higher risk, in which the customer 
purchases a potentially inferior product. A similar difference is manifest in the 
terms physician recommended and physician approved. On closer 
inspection, the item that is physician recommended is a better choice; this is 
a stronger statement than  physician approved. The product with the former 
description is – literally speaking – recommended by a doctor, who is implied 
to have tested and consequently approved this product before this 
recommendation. Approval is only a necessary condition for a 
recommendation, and by itself only suggests that the product meets the 
current standards. Such a product may not be worthy of an explicit 
recommendation. 
The participants had to express their decisions by drawing either a cross or a 
circle on the questionnaire. It is highly probable that this cross-versus-circle 
method was chosen in order to exclude the possible influence of motor 
activity on the participants’ decision. Otherwise, a far-reaching problem might 
have emerged. If the participants marked only the preferred product and left 
the dispreferred product unmarked, another possible interpretation of the 
results would have been feasible: namely that participants preferred the item 
that was closer to the dominant hand and thus easier to reach. 
Consequently, without this method, the experiment could not have addressed 
the central question of whether the subjects chose the product placed on 
their dominant side because they linked dominant with superior or whether 
they did so merely for reasons of physical economy. Even so, the method 
raises another question: were the two symbols, the cross and the circle, 
equally easy to draw? If the motor efforts involved were different, we might 
expect participants to draw the more difficult symbol on their dominant side, 
as this allows a more comfortable hand position and thus compensates for 
the increased difficulty. 
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2.2   Analysis 
2.2.1   Description 
The analysis of the Shopping Tour revealed that 272 of 371 participants 
showed either a preference for right or for left. 99 participants (27 percent of 
the total) chose the same number of product descriptions on each side. 
These participants, who exhibited no preference, were excluded from further 
analysis. In Casasanto (2009) this decision was explained as follows: 
The proportion of participants who showed no preference did not differ 
as a function of handedness (30% of left-handers, 26% of right-
handers), χ²(1) = 0.18, Fisher’s exact prep = 0.62, so these 
participants’ data were excluded from further analysis. (Casasanto, 
2009, p. 359) 
The problems with this rationale will be discussed below in more detail. In the 
case of the remaining 272 participants, 74 percent of the left-handers 
revealed a preference for the left side, whereas a slight majority of 52 percent 
of the right-handers preferred the right side. Thus, via this method of 
analysis, a correlation could be shown between the choices and the 
participants’ handedness, which was interpreted as a preference for 
descriptions positioned on the dominant side. 
 
2.2.2   Criticism of the analysis 
Certain steps of the analysis of the Shopping Tour experiment raise 
important questions. A crucial point is the exclusion of 99 participants from 
the analysis. As stated in section 2.2.1, this group was excluded because 
these participants recorded the same number of circles and crosses on each 
side and consequently showed no preference for one particular side. 
However, this justification is highly doubtful. The decision was defended on 
the basis that an approximately equal percentage of right- and left-handers 
(30 percent of the left-handed subjects and 26 percent of the right-handed 
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subjects) had no preference for one side over the other. However, the 
relation between this observation and the decision to omit these subjects 
without a preference is tenuous. Why does this similarity justify the exclusion 
of the participants‘ data? Why is it so substantial that nearly the same 
number of right-and left-handed showed no preference? This issue assumes 
particular importance when we recall that nearly as many right-handers 
preferred the left side as the right, as I will argue in the following.   
As already discussed, in Casasanto (2009) it was hypothesized that right-
handed people often ascribe a higher value to the right-hand side because of 
the good experiences associated with the right side of their bodies. In the 
case of the left-handers the exact opposite applies. However, this would also 
imply that those participants without a preference implicitly falsified the body-
specificity hypothesis, or at least that their results should be weighed as 
evidence against this hypothesis. In defiance of body-specificity, this group of 
participants were apparently unaffected in their decisions by the side on 
which the products were placed. This argument obliges us to challenge the 
justification for omitting these 99 subjects. The exclusion of these 
participants, on the basis of their results, has the effect of artificially 
increasing the statistical significance of the tested effect. That is because this 
procedure removed data points which otherwise would have reduced the 
significance of the handedness effect.  
According to Casasanto (personal communication), the effect in the 
Shopping Tour experiment was in fact only weak5, but the same experiment 
run with children as participants elicited much stronger effects. A reason for 
the success of this variation of the Shopping Tour and the failure of the same 
experiment with adult participants was not specified. Nevertheless, on the 
basis of this experience, Casasanto suggested replicating this experiment 
only with young participants, in order to achieve a significant effect. 
                                                
5
 Daniel Casasanto consented to answer some of the unacknowledged questions concerning the 
Shopping Tour experiment in an e-mail correspondence. In this case, he admitted that this experiment 
was not as convincing as many other experiments performed to prove the body-specificity hypothesis.  
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Figure 3: Results of the original Shopping Tour experiment 
Figure 3 illustrates the results of the Shopping Tour experiment as a tree 
diagram. These results were also presented in Casasanto (2009) and they 
show, as previously discussed, that the number of participants that were 
included in the analysis was reduced from 371 to 272. Despite the 
manipulation, the experiment did not have the required power. Even once 84 
right-handers without a preference were excluded from the analysis, only 
52% – a very narrow majority – preferred the right side when choosing the 
products in the questionnaire. After the elimination of 15 left-handed 
participants with no bias, the remaining left-handers exhibited a strong bias 
for the left side, with 29 of the 35 participants (74%) preferring a majority of 
products on that side. 
This procedure reveals two problems. The first one is the small number of 
left-handers. After the elimination of those left-handers with no preference 
only 35 left-handed participants were considered in Casasanto’s analysis. In 
contrast to the 287 right-handers this number seems to be extremely low and 
raises the question of whether such a small sample could be judged as 
representative. Even then, ten of the left-handed participants showed a 
tendency towards choosing more products positioned on the right side of the 
questionnaire. Thus 26% of the small cohort of left-handers refuted the body-
specificity hypothesis (excluding those who exhibited no preference, who 
could also be argued to refute the hypothesis). Of course, still 29 participants 
confirmed it. 
N = 371 
35 L 
123 R>L 114 R<L 29 L>R 10 L<R 
52 % 48 % 
237 R 
26 % 74 % 
99 excl. 
Excl 
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This analysis drew attention to a further problem with the original analysis of 
the experiment. After excluding the 15 neutral left-handers, only 35 left-
handed participants remained. However, the original version of Figure 3 
stated that 29 left-handers preferred the left side and 10 the right, for a total 
of 39 participants. Casasanto was able to confirm that the published data 
contained a calculation error, which introduced this discrepancy. The 
corrected figures are shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Corrected results of the Shopping Tour experiment 
There were indeed 35 left-handed participants who exhibited a preference 
one way or the other. Of these, 25 preferred the left-hand side and 10 the 
right-hand side. Thus, in fact, 71 percent of left-handers preferred the left 
side, and 29 percent of left-handers preferred the right (see Figure 4a).  
Despite this correction, there remained a two-thirds majority of left-handed 
participants, who showed a preference for their dominant side while working 
with the questionnaire. The evaluation showed that, despite this change still a 
significant difference existed. This difference pointed towards how the group 
of left-handers as opposed to the group of right-handers performed in 
answering the questionnaire (χ²(1, N = 272) = 6.641, p = .01, Φ = 0.16). 
However, the smallness of the group of left-handers is reflected in the small 
effect size, as expressed by Cramer’s Phi6. That implies that the effect is 
                                                
6
 Cramer's Phi takes different values depending upon the effect size, and can be interpreted as follows. 
Values of about 0.1 represent a small effect. Values of about 0.3 represent a medium effect. And 
values of about 0.5 represent a large effect (Cramér, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N = 371 
237 R 35 L 
123 R>L 
R>L 
114 R<L 25 L>R 10 L<R 
52 % 48 % 71 % 29 % 
99 excl. 
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significant, but the strength of the relationship between both groups is quite 
low.  
As a final step I will now restore into the analysis the previously excluded 99 
participants who showed no preference for the right or the left side. This 
procedure creates an entirely new distribution, which is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Reanalysis of the Shopping Tour results 
In the case of the right-handers, this change leads to a strikingly different 
distribution. In this reanalysis, we see that only 38% of all right-handed 
participants revealed a preference for the right side. Assuming that all those 
participants without a preference for the dominant side can be considered to 
refute the body-specificity hypothesis, 62% of participants did so. This 
suggests that only the elimination of these 99 participants had led to the 
described handedness effect in the Shopping Tour experiment – and thus to 
the experiment being interpreted as supportive of the body-specificity 
hypothesis. Without this elimination the effect is – at least in the case of the 
right-handed participants – almost non-existent.  
In the case of the left-handed group, the consideration of the previously 
excluded 15 subjects led to a marked shift in the distribution. If we divide left-
handers into three preference groups (the left-preferring, the right-preferring 
and those subjects without preference), the largest group with 25 participants 
(50%) is the group with left-preference, as predicted by body specificity. 
Nevertheless, the observed effect of handedness on preference is still barely 
significant (χ² (2, N = 50) = 6.71, p = .035). Moreover, if we group the neutral 
and right-preferring left-handers into one single group, the resulting 
371 N 
321 R 50 L 
123 R>L 84 R=L 114 R<L 25 L>R 15 L=R 10 L<R 
38 % 27 % 35 % 50 % 30 % 20 % 
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distribution is totally uniform: exactly half of the participants act in accordance 
with the body-specificity hypothesis and exactly half do not. As discussed 
earlier, I argue that this procedure is valid on the basis that participants 
without a clear preference are acting contrary to the predictions of the body-
specificity hypothesis. From this perspective, it is first clear that no strong 
effect could be observed in these experimental data without the exclusion of 
the 99 participants with no preference.  It is equally clear that the untrimmed, 
raw results would prima facie have contradicted the body-specificity 
hypothesis completely. 
 
2.3   Re-Analysis 
The more detailed discussion of the results of the Shopping Tour still leaves 
the main question unanswered. That is, on precisely what basis did the 
participants decide how to place their crosses and circles on the 
questionnaire? If a preference for one side does exist, this preference can 
differ in strength between individuals. It is possible that a participant might 
only exhibit a slight preference for the right or for the left side. This could 
have been expressed in, for instance, choosing five objects on one side and 
seven objects on the other side. Other participants, meanwhile, might exhibit 
a stronger preference, and could correspondingly select all twelve products 
from the same side of the questionnaire.  
In Casasanto (2009) the extent of a potential right- or left-preference 
remained undiscussed. A precise 6-6 split in responses led to the exclusion 
of the participant from the analysis, as discussed above. However, 
participants who deviated from this pattern in a particular direction were 
grouped together, irrespective of the strength of their preference. 
Examination of the size of participants’ biases might have provided a useful 
basis for drawing conclusions about whether their preferences were stable or 
potentially random in origin. Thus, a more definite result might be achieved 
by analysing the original data from the Shopping Tour experiment in a certain 
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way. The exact distribution of the selected products on the questionnaires 
should be included into the analysis rather than just the tendency for a 
particular side.  
I performed such an analysis on the original data, which was provided by 
Daniel Casasanto. For each participant, I considered their degree of 
deviation from the uniform distribution.  I then computed a new statistic, 
which I will refer to as bias. This is defined such that a negative value 
corresponds to a preference for the left and a positive value corresponds to a 
preference to the right. The magnitude of the value indicates the strength of 
the preference. 
Bias is calculated by taking the number of objects selected from the right 
side, subtracting the number of objects selected from the left side, and 
halving the result. For this experiment, bias thus falls in the range [-6, +6], 
with a value of +6 applying to participants who selected all 12 items from the 
right of the questionnaire and a value -6 applying to participants who selected 
all 12 items from the left of the questionnaire. Zero bias indicates that the 
participant selected 6 items from the left and 6 items from the right of the 
questionnaire. 
The resulting bias for the left-handed participant is plotted in Figure 6. 
Considering this distribution, we see that only a very slight tendency toward 
the left emerges in the decisions of left-handed participants. This 
phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Bias of the left-handed participants 
It is striking that 39 out of the 50 left-handers showed no preference or only a 
very slight preference in their choices (bias magnitude 0 or 1). As already 
discussed, 15 of the left-handed participants chose exactly six objects on the 
left and six objects on the right side. A deviation of only one object from this 
balanced distribution towards the left side was shown by 18 left-handed 
participants, while six participants showed the same slight deviation towards 
the right side of the questionnaire. These figures already indicate a strong 
concentration on the mean. This is also suggested by the diagram in Figure 
6, which approximates a Gaussian distribution.  
A statistical computation of the mean values that includes all left-handers 
confirms this assumption. This mean value of the left-handers 
averages -0.36. This result does not significantly differ from zero under a t-
test (t(34) = -1.999, p = .54).If we define a tolerance value of 1 to be applied 
to the bias, we find that only 11 of the 50 left-handed participants showed a 
distinct preference for one side or the other, and of these 7 preferred the left 
and 4 the right (not a significant difference, if we apply the sign test).  
In the case of the right-handers, this approach discloses an even less 
pronounced handedness effect. In this case the mean value is positioned at 
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0.05 (t(236) = 0.483, p = .629). The diagram shown in Figure 7 once again 
approaches a Gaussian distribution. 
 
Figure 7: Bias of the right-handed participants 
As Figure 7 reveals, 198 of the 321 right-handers fall within the previously set 
tolerance range (exhibiting a bias of magnitude 0 or 1). Of these, 59 selected 
seven items from the right side, but 56 selected seven items from the left 
side. Only 121 of the 321 right-handers showed a more pronounced 
preference for one side, with 64 revealing a clear tendency to the right and 
58 to the left. It is striking that precisely one participant chose only those 
objects that were positioned on the left, but no participant did the opposite. 
Throughout the analysis, no significant preference for one side over the other 
is visible. The participants’ mean bias values reflect this, showing no 
significant difference from zero (t(271) = -0.092, p = .926).  
Pooling all participants, does a bias emerge? The question can be answered 
in the negative (t(369) = 1.592, p = .112). Thus, this more detailed analysis of 
the data disclosed by Daniel Casasanto reveals that very little evidence of 
handedness effects emerges in the Shopping Tour. Thus, this experiment 
produces no proof of the claim that the side on which the descriptions of the 
products were displayed exerted an influence on the participants’ decisions.  
The slight effect that appears in the original analysis is due entirely to the 
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behavior of the small sample of left-handers and appears credibly attributable 
to chance. 
This reanalysis invites the question of whether products with certain 
descriptions were chosen on the basis of significant but unacknowledged 
semantic differences between the two sets of options. This would imply that 
the participants were not influenced in their decision making processes by 
the side on which the objects were positioned, but by more substantive 
semantic factors, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This question cannot 
be answered on the basis of Casasanto’s original data: the results record 
only how many objects each participant selected from each side of the 
questionnaire. It was not documented which description led to which 
decision. 
 
3.   Experiment I: The replication of  
the Shopping Tour 
As explained in the preceding chapter, the Shopping Tour experiment of 
Casasanto (2009) raises various questions. In particular, the results suggest 
that further investigations could be useful to clarify the influence of 
handedness in perceptual judgment tasks. For this reason, I decided to run a 
replication of the Shopping Tour experiment.  
Contrary to Casasanto, I hypothesize that this replication will reveal that the 
side on which the descriptions were placed does not affect the decisions that 
are made. First, the detailed analysis of the original Shopping Tour 
experiment indicates that the distribution of preferred products does not 
stand in any obvious relation to handedness. Secondly, the process of 
reading product descriptions involves a large number of distinct factors, any 
of which might influence the participants’ decisions. These influences could 
contribute to variability in the results, which might be misconstrued as 
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evidence for handedness effects. The null hypothesis for my study will be 
explained more detailed in the following. Additionally, since some aspects of 
the original experiments turned out to have room for improvement, I also 
decided to enhance my replication by making some optimizations. 
 
3.1   Optimizations 
When designing the questionnaire, I adhered to the format of the original 
Shopping Tour experiment. Thus, I adopted the design and, to some extent, 
the descriptions that were used. Since the experiment was performed in 
Germany, I translated the descriptions into German. Consequently, I 
established six product categories, which could also be found in Casasanto 
(2009):  
 ‘Seife’ (= soap) 
 ‘Schreibtischstuhl’ (= desk chair) 
 ‘Teppich’ (= carpet) 
 ‘Planschbecken’ (= wading pool) 
 ‘Auto’ (= car)  
 ‘Matratze’ (= mattress)  
The descriptions of the two possible products were adopted from the original 
questionnaire and faithfully translated into German. The accuracy of the 
translations was necessary in order to guarantee comparability with the 
original experiment.  
In addition to the above six product categories, I added six further categories 
of my own devising, chosen from highly divergent areas of shopping, again 
following the procedure of Casasanto (2009). However, for these six 
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categories, the competing descriptions contained formulations with different 
content. The purpose of this modification was explore the influence of 
handedness on the participants’ decisions in cases where the products were 
clearly qualitatively different. I predicted that these substantive aspects would 
play the main role in decision making processes, even if handedness might 
indeed exert some influence on the evaluation of products. Figure 8 
exemplifies the newly designed product categories. 
aus Alpenmilch 
fettarm 
mit frischen Erdbeeren 
 
ERDBEERJOGHURT 
aus frischer Kuhmilch 
 0,1 Prozent Fettanteil 
 mit Erdbeeraroma 
Umweltfreundlich 
reinigt zuverlässig 
Riecht nach Limetten 
 
WC-ENTE 
umweltschädlich 
reinigt gründlich 
duftet nach Zitronen 
zergeht auf der Zunge 
leicht nussige Note 
riecht leicht ranzig 
 
VOLLMILCH-
SCHOKOLADE 
zartschmelzend 
feines Vanillearoma 
duftet stark nach Kakao 
 
Figure 8: Excerpt of the replication’s questionnaire, which shows categories with different 
content. 
These categories are: 
 ‘Erdbeerjoghurt’ (= strawberry yogurt)  
 ‘WC-Ente’ (= toilet cleanser)  
 ‘Vollmilch-Schokolade’ (= milk chocolate)   
 ‘Kartoffelchips’ (= potato chips)  
 ‘Flachbildfernseher’ (= flat-screen TV)  
 ‘Mobiltelefon‘ (= mobile phone) 
The addition of these products enabled me to add the component content to 
the original Shopping Tour experiment. Since the differences between the 
two products in each category were not supposed to be completely obvious, 
distinctive content was only present in one of the three descriptive features. 
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This is shown in Figure 8, where only the italicized descriptions expressed 
qualitative differences. The other two descriptive aspects remained 
semantically almost identical, and were again adopted from the original 
Shopping Tour experiment in Casasanto (2009). This balance was adopted 
in the hope that participants would develop only a slight preference towards a 
certain choice. I expected that the use of multiple distinctive features would 
influence the participants’ choice to such a great extent that other effects, 
including that of handedness, would have been completely outweighed.  
Moreover, the strength of the difference differed from product category to 
product category. In three of these six items with a qualitative difference, this 
difference was intended to be quite obvious, whereas in the other half the 
difference was vaguely perceptible. For instance, the distinguishing features 
‘mit frischen Erdbeeren’ (= contains fresh strawberries) and ‘mit 
Erdbeeraroma’ (= contains strawberry flavor) in the product category 
‘Erdbeerjoghurt’ (= strawberry yogurt) – printed in italics in Figure 8 – would 
not be expected to give rise to a strong tendency towards the former product. 
It seems logical that the majority of participants would prefer the product ‘mit 
frischen Erdbeeren’ to the other possibility, but this is not mandatory; people 
make their decisions subjectively and on the basis of their own likes and 
dislikes.  
By contrast, in the case of the product category ‘WC-Ente’ (= toilet cleanser), 
the difference between the distinguishing features is much more pronounced. 
Assuming the mass of the Western population feel a certain responsibility 
towards the environment, it can be predicted that the majority of participants 
should prefer the environmentally friendly toilet duck instead of the polluting 
product. The distinguishing features in the category ‘Vollmilch-Schokolade’ (= 
milk chocolate) should be able to influence the participants even more 
substantially: here, the participants could choose between a product that 
smells ‘leicht ranzig’ (= slightly rancid) and another product that ‘duftet stark 
nach Kakao’ (= smells strongly of cocoa). As a rancid smell is an indication of 
spoiled food, it can be assumed that all participants who read the 
questionnaire carefully and had no specific motivation for another choice 
would choose the chocolate that smells strongly of cocoa. Thus, this product 
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served as a control: it indicated whether the participants read the descriptions 
carefully or just randomly distributed the crosses and circles on the 
questionnaire. 
As shown in Figure 8, the distinguishing features did not always appear in the 
first row of the descriptions. This was on the basis that, in everyday life, it is 
often the things that are mentioned first that have the biggest impact. This 
principle is very often manifest: for instance, in lists of ingredients it is the 
main ingredient that is usually mentioned first. Similarly, in movie credits, the 
principal actors are usually named first. In order to reduce the risk that the 
participants might apply this principle unconsciously to the descriptions, the 
positions of the significantly distinguishing features were varied between 
items. 
The ultimate and most important aim of the Shopping Tour replication was to 
rectify the mismatch between the number of left-handed and right-handed 
participants in the original study. The effect of handedness could be 
examined more objectively in a balanced sample, thus bolstering the validity 
of the results. In order to achieve this, I cancelled out the natural distribution 
of left-handers and right-handers in the general population by a process of 
pre-selection. I set out to recruit 100 left-handed participants, aware that, 
given the distribution of right-handers versus left-handers in the population, it 
would be relatively easy to then recruit an equal number of right-handed 
participants.  
This natural distribution also constituted the major challenge in recruiting an 
approximately equal number of right-handed and left-handed participants. 
Due to this overwhelmingly large number of right-handers in the world, it was 
impossible to find and test 100 left-handers without particularly searching for 
them. Finding 100 left-handers by a random recruitment process would also 
have resulted in the recruitment of 900 right-handers. On the other hand, a 
call for participation explicitly directed at left-handers, could have led to a 
distortion of the results, in that it would have revealed that handedness was 
the object of investigation.  
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For this reason, the participants were not invited with a notice, but personally 
asked to participate. A particularly effective approach for this was to recruit at 
places at which people were writing. Unobtrusive observation of potential 
participants revealed their handedness. Every potential participant who was 
observed to write left-handed was asked to fill in the questionnaire. In order 
to prevent the participants thinking that they were only chosen because of 
their handedness, the right-handers who accompanied them were also 
invited to fill out the questionnaire. Thus, this technique also involved the 
recruitment of some right-handed participants.  
This search for left-handers was conducted at the University of Bielefeld and 
at several locations with mixed clientele. In addition to the canteen, cafeteria, 
lounges and libraries of the University of Bielefeld, various lottery outlets in 
Wolfsburg and Bielefeld were visited. Customers of these outlets fill out 
lottery tickets, so I was able to detect a large number of left-handers merely 
by observing the shops. I also observed training sessions in table tennis 
clubs. Not only was it easy to discover left-handers by watching the game, as 
these players always hold the bat with the left hand, but the proportion of left-
handers is also much higher among table tennis players than in the general 
population (20 to  55 percent; Heinzel, 2008). This is hypothesized to be 
because people with left-dominant bodies have two advantages in the game: 
they have a slightly faster response time than right-handers in return plays, 
and they are accustomed to playing against right-handers (still the majority 
group), whereas the reverse is not true (Wood & Aggleton, 1989). For this 
reason, when playing right-handers, left-handers are able to interpret their 
opponents’ movements more effectively than their opponents can interpret 
their movements.  
This multi-faceted search for left-handers should also ensure that the sample 
of 100 left-handers includes not only academics but also people with lower 
educational qualifications. This would enable me to investigate the 
hypothesis that people with different educational levels would prefer different 
formulations, regardless of the side on which these formulations are 
positioned. A primary school graduate, for instance, might prefer a soap that 
kills germs rather than an antibacterial soap, on the basis that the first term is 
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more firmly established in his active vocabulary than the potentially more 
difficult foreign word antibacterial. By contrast, a high school graduate or 
university student might be more likely to choose the less frequent word 
antibacterial, since a highly qualified person tends to communicate using a 
higher language level. For this reason, participants were asked to respond to 
a multiple-choice question about their educational attainment. 
In addition to this, the participants were asked other demographic questions. 
The principal focus here was on the age of the participants and their 
performance on the Edinburgh Handedness Test. In this test, the participants 
had to answer whether they tended to perform various activities such as 
writing, drawing, throwing objects or tooth-brushing with their right or left 
hand or if they used both hands interchangeably. The major advantage of 
using this test was the exact determination of the participants’ handedness 
that it afforded. This contrasts with the procedure of Casasanto (2009), in 
which the participants were only asked as to their writing hand, which might 
not correspond to their real handedness. It is possible that some participants 
only used the right hand for writing tasks and performed all other activities 
with their left hand, in which case these participants would have been 
categorized as right-handers for the original Shopping Tour experiment, but 
clearly and correctly defined as left-handers by the Edinburgh Handedness 
Test. One reason for this variable preferences in the use of hands could be 
the once widely practiced retraining of left-handed children, who were forced 
by their parents and teachers to write with their right hands. This retraining 
might in particular have affected writing but not affected the individuals’ 
preference for the usage of the left hand for other activities involving fine 
motor control. And this implicit left-handedness could potentially be revealed 
when answering the questionnaire with a preference for the left. 
This is particularly interesting in association with the participants’ age. 
Whereas the re-education of left-handers into artificial right-handers is no 
longer usual, a few decades ago this was a common practice. Therefore, the 
responses to the Edinburgh Handedness Test are of exceptional importance 
in the case of elderly participants. If several of these should be found to have 
been retrained, a very detailed analysis of this group could be useful, since 
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the results from these people might show whether their re-education had led 
to the establishment of different abstract concepts regarding horizontal 
positions. The Edinburgh Handedness Test could also detect ambidextrous 
participants, who act with both sides of their body equally fluently. These 
people, if detected, should be analysed separately here in order to avoid 
distorting the results. It is also possible to inquire into whether the degree of 
handedness of a person leads to a differential impact on mental 
representations and the evaluation of objects, because the dominance of a 
certain hand is not always as clearly marked. 
 
3.2   Method 
In the replication of the Shopping Tour experiment, the participants were 
required to accomplish two tasks. The main assignment was to choose one 
of two products from within each of the twelve categories discussed above. 
The second task involved answering questions eliciting various demographic 
data. In addition to the handedness of the participants, which was assessed 
by the Edinburgh Handedness Test, age and level of education were also 
surveyed. As previously discussed, this was to determine which of these 
factors exerted significant influence on the results. The text which introduced 
the experiment and served to inform the participants about their assignment 
was acquired from the original experiment and translated into German as 
follows. 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie wollen in einen Supermarkt gehen, um die 
folgenden Produkte zu kaufen. Zuvor surfen Sie im Internet und 
informieren sich dort über die Unterschiede der verschiedenen Marken. 
Schließlich kommen zwei Marken pro Produkt in die engere Wahl. Nun 
ist es Ihre Aufgabe aufgrund der Produktbeschreibungen zu 
entscheiden, welchen Artikel Sie kaufen sollten. Für jede 
Produktkategorie gehen Sie bitte folgendermaßen vor: Kreisen Sie die 
Beschreibung der Artikel ein, die Sie wahrscheinlich kaufen würden. 
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Streichen Sie diejenigen Artikel mit einem „X“ durch, die Sie 
wahrscheinlich nicht kaufen würden.  
(Excerpt from the questionnaire of the replicated experiment) 
Although this text represented an accurate translation from the English 
version and had therefore already been tested by 371 English-speaking 
participants, a variety of difficulties in comprehension emerged. Despite the 
detailed description many participants had some problems in understanding 
the task. A common misconception was that the participants thought they 
were asked to evaluate the formulations line by line instead of seeing the 
block of three features as related to each other, since all of these three 
features served to describe one and the same product. So, taking as an 
example the toilet cleanser, as shown in Figure 8, these participants 
attempted to choose between a product which kills bacteria and another 
product that is antibacterial, then between a product with a fresh smell and 
one that smells clean, and then between a product that is lime-scented and 
one that is lemon-scented. Three participants who interpreted the task in this 
way and were not observed while filling in the questionnaire had to be 
excluded from the analysis for this reason. 
Furthermore, occasionally participants erroneously assumed that they did not 
have to select a product from each pair, but to select half the products from 
the questionnaire as a whole. Participants who interpreted the given task in 
this way chose, for example, both offered soaps, but neglected the category 
of flat-screen TVs completely. Because of these problems in understanding 
the written introduction I chose also to give the participants a short verbal 
introduction. To avoid distorting the experiment, I made sure that each 
participant had the same information. Thus, every participant began from an 
identical starting point – and, of course, this starting point was close to the 
one at which the participants in the original Shopping Tour experiment 
began, having read the introductory text.  
However, this raises the question of why there were no similar problems in 
understanding documented in the write-up of the original version of the 
experiment, when this applied the same methodology and largely the same 
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descriptions. As noted in Casasanto (2009), the participants completed the 
questionnaires without further verbal explanations or additional care. This 
disparity cannot be attributed to the selection of a wider demographic spread 
of participants, including those with relatively low educational attainment, in 
the replication: in fact, most of the difficulties occurred among the student 
participants, and the majority of lottery players had no problems in 
understanding the introductory text and in completing the questionnaire. 
The recruitment methods described above (section 3.1) enabled me to find 
100 left-handers, while keeping the number of right-handers relatively low. 
The 100 recruited left-handers were accompanied by only 137 right-handers. 
Thus, the proportion of left-handers was considerably greater in this 
replication: 40.8% compared to 13.5% in the original Shopping Tour 
experiment. 
Two measures were taken in order to prevent participants discerning the real 
purpose of the experiment. First, the participants were given a two-page 
questionnaire. The twelve product categories were printed on the first page. 
The participants were not permitted to look at the second page of the 
questionnaire – which concerned demographic data and included the 
Edinburgh Handedness Test, and could have divulged the likely purpose of 
the experiment – until they had completed the evaluation of the twelve 
products. Secondly, after completing the first page, I asked participants 
verbally whether they had any idea as to the real purpose of the experiment. 
The majority assumed that this experiment was an attempt from the 
marketing sector to discover the impact of different types of descriptions on 
the behavior of potential customers. In this context, some people guessed 
that the experiment was investigating whether technical or familiar terms 
were more inviting to potential customers. Similarly, some participants 
guessed that the experiment was to examine whether foreign words in 
product descriptions appealed especially to people with higher educational 
attainment. Another large group of participants thought that the experiment 
was merely designed to test the patience of the participants, since some of 
the descriptions were indistinguishable and there was no apparent purpose 
to asking for a preference. Only one of the participants guessed that the 
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experiment tested the correlation between handedness and the preferred 
side – but this person thought that, as he said, only for the reason that he 
was very familiar with the embodiment approach. In total, approximately one-
third of the participants believed that they had correctly understood the real 
purpose of the experiment. Furthermore, approximately one third of the 
participants stated to be able to explain the real purpose of this experiment. 
 
3.3   Results and interpretation 
As explained in section 3.1, it was particularly important not to exclude any 
participants from further analysis without a compelling reason. This principle 
has been strictly adhered to. Apart from the three subjects who had 
misunderstood the task, all the remaining 245 subjects were included in the 
analysis. Using the Edinburgh Handedness Test, a third group besides the 
right- and left-handers could be found – the ambidextrous people. This group 
was relatively small: we identified only eight participants who did not have a 
dominant hand. For this reason, the results from this group will not be 
considered in full detail in the following analysis.7 It is interesting that only 
one out of the eight ambidextrous people stated that they wrote with both the 
right and the left hand. In the original Shopping Tour (Casasanto 2009), 371 
participants were recruited – about a hundred more participants in total than 
in this replication. Consequently, although it is not surprising that no 
participants in the original study declared themselves ambidextrous, it is 
highly likely that there were ambidextrous participants in that study. Recall 
that, in that experiment, participants only had to disclose which hand they 
use to write with. As shown in the replication, this activity is not necessarily 
an indication of a person’s real handedness. If ambidextrous participants 
were in fact present, they were classified incorrectly as members either of the 
group of left- or of right-handed participants. In addition to the difficulties 
                                                
7
 The eight ambidextrous people, who participated in the replication of the Shopping Tour, are too few 
to draw serious conclusions about ambidextrous people in general. If I had treated these eight 
participants as just as representative as the groups of right-handers and left-handers, this might have 
led to a distortion in the overall results.  
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mentioned earlier, this error of classification might also have distorted the 
results, although it is also possible that the errors balanced out statistically. 
In order to guarantee maximal comparability to the original experiment, the 
first step for the analysis of the newly collected data was the same as that 
performed by Casasanto (2009). In this step, all participants, who showed no 
preference for one side, but instead chose six objects on the right and six 
objects on the left side of the questionnaire, were excluded from the analysis. 
In addition, the ambidextrous people were also excluded. This was both to 
ensure that this analysis was comparable to that of the original Shopping 
Tour experiments (in which no ambidextrous people were present, and only 
the two groups of right- and left-handers were compared), and because the 
group of ambidextrous people was too small for their separate analysis to be 
statistically meaningful.  
In this case, this method of analysis led to the exclusion of 60 participants 
who exhibit no preference for side (see Figure 9), along with 8 ambidextrous 
participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 9: Analysis of the replication based on Casasanto (2009) 
The results show that exactly 50 percent of the right-handed participants (52 
out of 104 people) showed a tendency towards the right side. However, the 
other 50% preferred the left side. A similar result emerges from the analysis 
of the left-handers: 46.6 percent (34 out of 73 people) preferred the left side, 
N = 245 
104 R 73 L 
52 R>L  52 R<L 34 L>R 39 L<R 
50 % 50 %  46.6  %  53.4 % 
60 excl. 8 A 
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while the majority of 53.4 percent (39 people) showed a preference for the 
right side. There was no statistical difference in the choices of left-and right-
handed people (χ²(1, N = 177) = 0.201, p = .654). This analysis suggests that 
right-handers and left-handers have answered the questionnaire in a similar 
way. This interpretation becomes even more likely when we consider the 
value of Cramer’s Phi, which in this case is Ф = 0.03, suggesting an 
extremely small effect size. 
It seems remarkable that this lack of preference emerges even when 
excluding the group of participants who individually showed no preference, 
and even without taking into account the intensity of preference. In the 
original Shopping Tour experiment this method of analysis still generated a 
significant effect. Thus, the participants of the original experiment seem to 
have exhibited influence of handedness while answering the questionnaire, 
while the participants in the replication have not.  
In a second step, the participants who were previously excluded on account 
of not exhibiting preference for a particular side were reinstated into the 
analysis (see Figure 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Analysis of the replication including all participants 
This procedure also did not reveal a significant effect of handedness on the 
left- or right-preferences (χ²(2, N = 237) = 0.459, p = .795, Ф = 0.04). 
Compared to the previous analysis, Figure 10 reveals an even more 
balanced distribution. The groups of participants who preferred the left side, 
who preferred the right side, and who chose an equal number of products on 
N = 245 
137 R  100 L 
52 R>L 33 R=L 52 R<L 34 L>R 27 L=R 39 L<R 
38 % 24 % 38 % 34 % 27 % 39 % 
8 A 
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each side are approximately equally large, each constituting around one-third 
of the total. On closer inspection, the group of participants with no preference 
for a particular side is slightly smaller each of the groups who exhibited a 
preference. 
In a next step of the analysis, the strength of the bias is taken into account. 
As before, the bias can occupy values between -6 to express a strong 
tendency towards the left and +6 to express a strong tendency towards the 
right. The uniformity of the previous distribution suggests that the mean 
values in the groups of the right-handers and left-handers are likely to be 
near the zero point, in that participants from different handedness groups 
showed no preference on average. However, the documented distribution 
would also be compatible with a situation in which some members of each 
group exhibited a slight bias in one direction, while other members exhibiting 
a much stronger bias in the other direction. The mean value of these two 
groups, however, gives reason to believe that the first interpretation is the 
right one. In the case of the right-handers, this mean value was 0.06, which is 
nearly coincident with the zero point. This indicates that the right-handed 
participants, on average, showed no preference for a particular side and 
chose the same number of objects on each side of the questionnaire (t(103) 
= 0.407, p = .685). The same is applicable to the left-handed participants, for 
whom the mean value was 0.13, also not significantly different from zero 
(t(72) = 0.881, p = .381). It is striking, however, that both groups showed a 
deviation to the right (as signified by the values being positive) even if these 
deviations were very low. Thus, the left-handed participants on average 
showed a slight preference for their non-dominant side. Figure 11 depicts the 
distribution of bias values within both groups.  
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Figure 11: Bias of the group of right-handers and the group of left-handers. 
It is particularly striking that both parts of Figure 11 closely resemble each 
other and are evocative of a Gaussian distribution, as exhibited in the 
reanalysis of the original Shopping Tour experiment. It is also striking that the 
most extreme bias values are not attested at all. In the case of the left-
handers, no biases of magnitude greater than 4 were obtained. For both 
groups, an absolute majority of participants exhibited bias values in the range 
[-2, +2]. Moreover, in both cases, the modal bias value was 0. These 
findings, augmenting the previously calculated mean values, show more 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
C
o
u
n
t 
Right-handers 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
C
o
u
n
t 
Left-handers 
3.   Experiment I: The replication of  the Shopping Tour  58 
clearly that the participants did not seem to be influenced by their 
handedness to any significant extent.  
In the reanalysis of the original Shopping Tour I proposed to consider 
participants who exhibited bias of zero or one in magnitude as exhibiting 
effectively no preference, as was the case for participants who chose the 
same number of products on the left and the right. In the context of this 
replication, this would imply that 90 of the 137 right-handers showed no 
preference for a particular side, and that 66 of the 100 left-handers were 
likewise within the tolerance range. 
Here I will also consider the group of eight ambidextrous people, who were 
omitted from the preceding analysis. None of the ambidextrous people 
showed a preference for the left side: two had no preference for a particular 
side, but six of the eight exhibited a slight preference for the right. Although 
none of the bias values exceeded 2, this preference for the right side raises 
questions that cannot be answered on the basis of such a small sample of 
ambidextrous people. Why did the ambidextrous people have this tendency 
to prefer the right side? In order to establish this clearly, further experiments 
with a larger number of ambidextrous people are needed. In the case of this 
experiment, one might speculate that this result has come about by chance – 
and is therefore not representative of the population at large. However, there 
is nevertheless the possibility that at least some of these eight ambidextrous 
people are re-educated left-handers. This assumption arises from an 
interesting observation: only two of the eight ambidextrous participants 
declared that they use their left hand for writing. If one assumes that the 
majority of ambidextrous people are retrained left-handers, this result is 
suggestive of a potentially important conclusion: the childhood prohibition 
against using the left hand for important activities could have resulted in 
natural left-handers developing at least a slight preference for the right. 
In the following analysis, I explore the relations between the choice of objects 
and demographic data. First, the Edinburgh Handedness Score is included in 
the analysis. This score is obtained by the use of the Edinburgh Handedness 
Test (Oldfield, 1971) and quantifies the strength of participants’ handedness 
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preference. If the Edinburgh Handedness Test8 yields a figure in the range of 
-100 to -41, the participant in question is a left-hander. Values between -40 
and +40 correspond to ambidextrous people that have no preference for a 
particular side of their bodies. Values between +41 and +100 refer to right-
handers. The greater the magnitude of the value, the more pronounced the 
handedness preference. Within this replication, we can therefore explore the 
question of whether people with a stronger handedness also show a greater 
tendency to their dominant side. If this is the case, participants with an 
Edinburgh Handedness Score with a large magnitude should also exhibit 
large values of bias. 
The examination of a possible link between the Edinburgh Handedness 
Score and the bias value shows that there is no significant correlation 
between the two factors (r = -0.036, p = .571). That is, there is no apparent 
correlation between the strength of handedness and the tendency to prefer 
one particular side. However, this result was predictable, insofar as the 
uniform distribution in answering the questions gave a first indication for the 
non-existence of a link. An equally clear result, again showing no appreciable 
correlation, was obtained for the relation between the participants’ choice and 
their age (r = 0.028, p = .664). The same is true for the gender of the 
participants and their bias (r = 0.083, p = .201) and between their degree of 
education and their bias (r = -0.015, p = .823). 
The most noticeable difference between the initial Shopping Tour experiment 
and the replication was the substantive component. The subjects were asked 
to choose one of the two possible products out of each of the twelve 
categories. Six of these pairs of products were substantively different. This 
raises a key question: would the participants – if there is an effect of 
handedness – continue to make their decisions based on their handedness 
despite the qualitative differences? It was already shown that no effect of 
handedness could be found in the general analysis. This suggests that 
handedness, particularly when deciding between options with different 
                                                
8
 First of all, I added all crosses made on the left and right side. The selection of the response no 
preference represents a cross on each side. After that, the left crosses are subtracted from the right 
crosses. The resulting number is then divided by the total number of crosses. The result is multiplied by 
100.  
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content, might play no role. Nevertheless, a closer examination is still useful, 
particularly for the cases in which the difference in content was small. These 
cases are of special interest because, when subjects decide unconsciously 
between superior quality and preferable positioning, handedness might affect 
their choice. 
In the following analysis the eight ambidextrous people were also taken into 
account, since it can be assumed that ambidextrous people will make their 
decisions for or against a product based wholly on qualitative differences. 
Unlike the previous analyses, the consideration of this group would not distort 
the results in this case. 
The results of this analysis were as expected given the results of the 
previous analysis. Recall that each participant had to choose their favorite 
object from six categories, which contained descriptions of different content. 
Contingent on these differences, the outcome of the selection process was, 
indirectly, determined. This manipulation, however, was very weak in some 
cases and therefore difficult for the participants to recognize, at least within 
some of the six categories. Nevertheless, in 72 percent of all cases, the 
content was taken into account by the participants, who chose the objectively 
better product. Only in 28 percent of the cases did the participants’ decision 
conflict with expectations. This is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Rates at which participants select the superior object, depending on its placement and 
their handedness.  For cases with no substantive difference, rates of selection of the right-hand 
object are stated. 
  
 
  
Handedness 
  
Ambidextrous Right Left 
Location 
of 
superior 
product 
 
Left 67 % 70% 73% 
Right 75 % 70 % 76 % 
indifferent  63 % 51 % 51 % 
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The first two lines in Table 3 show how often the participants selected the 
side on which the objectively better product was placed. The last line is used 
as a comparison. It shows the decisions in those categories which were 
identical in content. For clarity, this last line only states how many people 
(classified by handedness) chose the product on the right when there was no 
difference between the products. This comparison reiterates that the 
distribution was balanced, and therefore evenly split between the right and 
the left, only when there was no qualitative difference. This applies to all 
groups of handedness. 
All groups favored about half of the products on the left side and the other 
half on the right side. The deviation in the case of the ambidextrous people 
(63% preference for the right) can potentially be explained by the low number 
of participants, as discussed above. However, when the factor content is 
added, the uniform distribution shifts – and it is obvious that this shift is 
clearly performed in the direction of the superior content. This content fidelity 
is particularly distinctive in the case of the left-handed participants. However, 
in those cases in which the better product was placed on the right side, 76 
percent of all left-handers identified this as the better product. In the cases in 
which the better product was placed on the left side, 73 percent of all left-
handers chose it. The right-handers identify the superior product around 70 
percent of the time, below the average of 72 percent. But these results still 
demonstrate clearly that the factor content strongly influenced their decisions. 
The previously made assumptions are brought into focus when we consider 
how Table 3 would change if the participants were wholly influenced by their 
handedness. If handedness had such a mighty impact on decision-making 
processes, the participants would have chosen products placed on their 
dominant side 100 percent of the time – and they would have done this in 
spite of the qualitative influences. If this scenario was true, all right-handed 
participants would have made their decisions against the objectively superior 
product when this product was placed on the left side. Only if the superior 
product was placed on the right side would the right-handed participants 
have chosen it. Only in the case of the ambidextrous people, whose bodies 
have two dominant sides, would the outcome have been more balanced. 
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However, Table 3 showed that this is clearly not the case: the distribution is 
too consistent between participants with different handedness. 
So is it the content that affects 100 percent of the participants in their 
decision? If this was true, participants would always have chosen the 
objectively better product despite differences in handedness – and not just 72 
percent, as the empirical data reveal. Nevertheless, there are reasons to 
suppose that the content may still be the most important component. First, it 
has to be accepted that not all participants have read the product 
descriptions carefully. Minor differences, such as those between a yogurt 
with fresh strawberries and a yogurt with strawberry flavor, could easily have 
been disregarded. Secondly, a choice that conflicts with the objective facts 
might possibly also be based on the personal preferences of the participants. 
As already explained, the participants were closely attended while answering 
the questionnaire. This allowed the recording of what the participants 
expressed when they were solving the task. When a qualitative difference 
was detected and the participants nevertheless chose the objectively inferior 
product, they sometimes justified this decision verbally. For instance, the 
participants often refused the environmentally friendly version of the toilet 
cleanser. This was justified by the fact that they had had the experience of 
environmentally friendly cleaning products which were not able to clean 
effectively. A similar argument was given by all participants who rejected the 
low-radiation mobile phone in favor of the radiation-intensive mobile phone. 
They argued that the intense radiation devices would ensure better call 
quality and better service in remote areas and that they only radiate strongly 
when conditions demand it. Both reasons were often voiced by experts in the 
surveyed areas. In the case of toilet cleansers it was mainly homemakers 
and cleaners who expressed the argument stated above, whereas in the 
case of mobile phones, mechanical engineering students and engineers 
recognized the potential problem with low radiation devices. 
Even personal taste plays a role in choosing an objectively inferior product. In 
the category milk chocolate some participants chose the product that smelled 
rancid, rejecting the alternative which had, among other properties, fine 
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vanilla flavoring was rejected. The respective participants justified their 
choice in classifying the aroma of vanilla as unpalatable. So, the rancid smell 
would be the lesser of two evils. Similarly, the yogurt with strawberry flavor 
was preferred over the yogurt with fresh strawberries by some participants, 
who expressed their subjective dislike of fruit pieces in yogurt, thus 
explaining their choice of the objectively inferior product. 
A similar pattern could be observed in the case of the flat screen TV. In this 
case, the participants had to choose between a screen size of 37 inches and 
one of 48 inches. Some of the participants judged the 37-inch TV to be the 
better one, because they did not know the word inch (in German, Zoll) as a 
measurement. The reason for this misunderstanding is that ‘Zoll’ has two 
completely different meanings. First, it represents a unit of measure (inch). 
Secondly, it refers to an additional payment that must be made (duty). For 
those who were not familiar with the former meaning, the description seemed 
to indicate that an additional payment would be necessary in order to buy the 
device. These participants assumed that the smaller the number in front of 
the word, the smaller the additional expenditure. One participant mentioned 
this explicitly: “I do not want to pay duties when buying a TV. But if it is 
absolutely necessary, then I would pay as little as possible”. In sum, although 
the responses were only congruent with the preferable item in 72 percent of 
all cases, at least some of the residual cases were those in which the 
objectively inferior product was subjectively superior in the participants’ view.  
This effect is further underlined when we look at the effect of qualitative 
differences in detail. The more obvious the qualitative difference of the 
products was, the less frequently the participants decided against the 
objectively better product. This was the case for the three products with 
extremely divergent descriptions (toilet cleanser, milk chocolate and mobile 
phone). On average, only 14 percent of the participants in these three 
product categories refused the objectively better product (toilet cleanser: 
18%, milk chocolate: 14%, mobile phone: 11%). When the differences in 
content were not as pronounced as in these three cases, the rates at which 
participants chose the objectively inferior product increased: in effect, the 
decision for or against a particular product became more random.  
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This can be illustrated in the case of the flat-screen TV. The decision for a 
certain size of TV is made in accordance with personal taste. The properties 
and the size of the room in which the TV is to be installed are relevant criteria 
as well. In this respect, the largest possible screen size is not always sought 
after. This is reflected in the results. As opposed to the predicted decision, 25 
percent of the participants favored the smaller TV. Only two products with a 
very small difference, potato chips and strawberry yogurt, were above the 
average (which was a 28 percent selection rate for objectively inferior 
products). In the case of the potato chips the participants had to decide 
between an expensive and high-quality product and a reasonable test 
winner. It was expected that the majority would judge the reasonable test 
winner to be the better product. The descriptions should imply that both 
products are very good, but the latter also impresses with a low price and 
confers the additional advantage that customers can save money by 
purchasing this product. This marginal difference in content is also reflected 
in the results. 48 percent of the participants decided against the reasonable 
test winner and preferred a brand product instead of a product that is 
obviously provided by a discount store. A similar situation could be observed 
in the case of the product category strawberry yogurt. The previously 
presented arguments against the objectively better product have probably led 
to the choice of the 52 percent of participants who refused the yogurt with 
fresh strawberries. Consequently, the results observed in product categories 
with little difference also tend to confirm the hypothesis that the content is the 
most important factor in the evaluation of objects. 
A final question regarding the content is still to be answered: is there a 
relationship between these demographic data and the tendency to choose 
the objectively better products? Is it because of the educational attainment, 
sex or age of the subjects that in 28 percent of all cases the objectively better 
product was chosen? No correlation could be observed between educational 
attainment and choices, or between gender and choices. However, the age 
of the subjects did correlated with the choices made (F(1) = 5.054, p = .025). 
The higher the age of the subjects, the more often they chose the objectively 
better product. One possible interpretation for this phenomenon may lie in the 
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unconventional perspective of younger people. For instance, the older 
generation is more likely to always choose fresh fruit (such as in the example 
of the product category strawberry yogurt) over strawberry aroma with an 
uncertain origin. Younger people, due to the increasing chemicalization in 
foods, may be less hostile to artificial aromas in food. Thus, they respond 
less consistently in the way predicted. A similar argument can be made in the 
case of the mobile phone radiation. Young people grew up with this medium 
and may be less concerned about the radiation exposure caused by these 
devices than is the case for older people. Consequently, it is possible that the 
correlation between age and content just reflected individual taste and the 
views of different generations. 
 
3.4   Joint analysis 
As summarized in Table 4, the data from the initial Shopping Tour 
experiment (Casasanto, 2009) exhibited, in the case of the right-handed 
participants, a slight right preference (when participants with no preference 
were removed from the analysis). The preference for the left, in the case of 
the left-handed subjects, however, was more pronounced. In contrast, the 
replication revealed, in the case of the right-handers, a very weak preference 
for the right; in the case of the left-handers, there was a slightly more 
pronounced preference for the right. 
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 Left-handers Right-handers Joint 
Original 
experiment 
bias:  
t(34) = -1.999,  
p = .054 
bias:  
t(236) = 0.483,  
p = .629 
bias:  
t(271) = -0.092,  
p = .926 
|L/R|: χ²(1,N=272)  
= 6.641, p = .035 
Replication bias:  
t(72) = 0.881,   
p = .381 
bias:  
t(103) = 0.407,  
p = .685 
bias:  
t(182) = 1.172 
p = .243 
|L/R|: χ²(1,N=177) 
= 0.201, p = .654 
Table 4: Previous results from the original experiments and the replication 
Given the relatively small samples, especially of left-handers, that are being 
considered, it is of interest to run an analysis over the pooled data, which 
should lead to more powerful statistical results. Therefore, it was of great 
interest to investigate what would happen, if I combined the data of both 
experiments, the original Shopping Tour and the replication – and thus, 
evaluate the results of all participants in the same analysis. The group of 
ambidextrous people was excluded because this group did not appear in the 
original experiment, and hence the pooled data for this group would be 
identical to the data already analysed above. Thus, we consider the results 
from 371 participants in the original experiment and 237 participants in the 
replication. 
As expected, the combination of the two data sets resulted in a shift towards 
neutral preference. In a first step, as before, we just consider the preference 
of participants for a particular side, and ignore the extent of their bias. It turns 
out that there was no significant difference between handedness and the side 
on which the subjects selected the majority of the objects (χ²(2, N = 608) = 
1.494, p = .474). In a second step, the bias values were considered. It was 
found that subjects on average were very close to zero bias. Thus, there was 
no significant preference for a particular side. Neither of the two groups 
showed a significant deviation from the uniform distribution: the right-handed 
participants revealed an average bias value towards the right side of 0.05 
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(t(339) = 0.627, p = .531), whereas the left-handed participants exhibited an 
average left bias of -0.03 (t(106) = 0.285, p = .776). The lack of an overall 
effect reflects the fact that the sample of left-handers who exhibited a 
collective bias in the original Shopping Tour experiment was relatively small.  
However, one must note at this point that the two datasets are not completely 
comparable due to the added “content” component in the replication. As 
shown earlier, in half of the product categories in the replication, there was 
one objectively better and one objectively worse product. Thus, the 
participants were influenced in their choice for these objects. However, the 
remaining six product categories had, as far as possible, the same contents. 
 
3.5   Discussion 
The re-analysis of the Shopping Tour experiment, and the criticism regarding 
the implementation and analysis of the original work, point in the same 
direction as the replication and the joint analysis of both data sets. They 
suggest that no significant relationship exists between the decision for a 
particular product out of a product category and the side on which the 
product was displayed.  That is, handedness does not seem to influence 
decision-making processes in this perceptual judgment task. The right-
handers and the left-handers in both experiments did not seem to abstract 
any negative or positive aspects from the sides on which the descriptions of 
the products were positioned. It is much more likely that they chose one of 
the given product options primarily on the basis of its properties or apparently 
at random. 
Thus, neither the original Shopping Tour experiment – after closer inspection 
– nor the modified replication was able to confirm the body-specificity 
hypothesis. On the contrary, the results from the left-handers in the 
replication conflict with the claims the body-specificity hypothesis makes. 
More left-handers showed a tendency to the right side than to the left side of 
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the questionnaire. Though this majority is very small and cannot be taken as 
evidence for a left-handers’ bias to the right, it nevertheless reveals that the 
left-handers were not influenced by the position of the object in the performed 
perceptual judgment task. In contrast to the claims of Casasanto (2009), a 
more detailed examination of the original data of the Shopping Tour could not 
prove a significant effect of handedness on the side which the participants 
tended to prefer. 
 
3.5.1   English versus German 
The Shopping Tour experiment focused on language, to a much greater 
extent than all other experiments concerning the body-specificity hypothesis. 
If linguistic metaphors actually arise from mental metaphors, as suggested in 
Casasanto (2009), the language in which the experiment was implemented 
would exert a profound influence on the results. In the English language the 
word right is not only a spatial expression, but also a synonym for justice. In 
German, the word ‘rechts’ (= right) expresses only the spatial word right. This 
also applies to the noun ‘das Rechte’ (= the right). All other words including 
the word ‘rechts’ or the corresponding noun ‘das Rechte’ are minimally but 
still clearly distinct. If somebody wants to thematize the law with German 
expressions, he has to use the word ‘das Recht’. In contrast to its origin 
(‘rechts’) the -s at the end of this word is missing. That is, unlike the English 
equivalent, a completely new phonological word has evolved.  
The similarity of ‘rechts’ (= right) and ‘richtig’ (= correct) is only minimal. 
However, as discussed previously, in the old German adage ‘Er trägt das 
Herz auf dem rechten Fleck’, the phrase ‘am rechten Fleck’ could be 
interpreted in two different ways. The adage could mean that this person’s 
heart is located on the right side of his body. But it could also mean that his 
heart is on the correct side, which makes this person particularly ‘big-
hearted’. This leads to the assumption that the shift to the currently used 
‘richtig’ has only been caused by language change. Nevertheless, this phrase 
is nowadays not very frequently used in everyday German. Therefore, the 
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word ‘rechts’ is not likely to be used as a synonym for ‘richtig’. Thus, the 
slight shift in the results of the original Shopping Tour experiment and the 
replication could be explained with reference to the language in which the 
test was performed. However, since the more detailed analysis of the original 
experiment revealed that no robust handedness effect occurred, this aspect 
is highly likely to be negligible. 
There is another issue concerning cultural influence which merits discussion. 
It is also possible that the characteristics of the country in which the 
experiment was implemented has exerted influence over the outcome. 
Although the original experiment and the replication were both implemented 
in Western countries, there will inevitably be small differences between the 
points of view of Americans and Germans. The word right occupies only 
positive implications in the English language, whereas the German ‘rechts’ is 
– due to the National Socialist past of Germany – strongly negatively 
connoted. As previously shown, the term ‘rechts’ is always weakly (‘das 
Recht’) or strongly (‘richtig’) modified, when it is not used as description of a 
position. Only in one situation does the word ‘rechts’ remain in its original 
form: this applies to circumstances in which the word is to be understood 
politically. In the political context, the word can convey two different 
meanings. In one interpretation, it states that an individual or a party is 
oriented conservatively. On the other, ‘rechts’ is often used synonymously 
with radical right-wing and evokes mental representations regarding the 
extremely negatively affected history of Nazi Germany.  
In sum, it is possible that the word right is not as positively connoted for 
German participants as it is for American participants. So, this is another 
possible explanation for the slight differences between the two versions of 
the Shopping Tour experiment. However, it does not explain why the left-
handed participants displayed a slight bias towards the right. In this case, two 
different forces could have influenced the participants in opposite directions: 
firstly, the constant exhortations addressed to a left-handed child who is 
trained to work with the right hand could have led to a strong bias towards 
the right. Secondly, this effect could then have been weakened by the 
cultural context, which has taught Germans that ‘rechts’ is bad. If the body-
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specificity hypothesis is correct, then this would be an appropriate approach 
to explain the slight discrepancies in the replication. But, as already 
mentioned, there was no certain difference between the results of both 
versions of the experiment, which suggests that a detailed search for an 
explanation would be premature.  
 
3.5.2    The importance of content in decision making 
processes 
The previous section has already touched upon the issue of semantic 
differences. The replication of the Shopping Tour experiment did not provide 
any additional insights into how participants choose between qualitatively 
equal objects, other than that there was no evidence that the handedness of 
the participants was a critical factor. However, if a fundamental difference 
between the two selectable objects was recognized, this difference was 
supposed to be the determining factor in the choice for or against an object.  
This became especially clear in comparing objects with strong qualitative 
differences with those that were only marginally different. In the case of the 
descriptions with strong substantial differences, the objectively better product 
was chosen in 72 percent of all cases. However, if this difference conflicted 
with the subjective taste of the participants, the rate fell, sometimes to below 
50 percent. Both findings show how strongly the participants were influenced 
by the component content, which – in contrast to handedness – is a non-
negligible factor in every person’s decision making processes. If an object is 
placed on the non-dominant side of the participant, but has significant 
qualitative benefits, this participant is likely to prefer this objectively superior 
object instead of the product in the putatively more admired position. 
Therefore, the component content has more influence on the participants 
than the factor handedness. 
A further indication of the importance of content in the evaluation of 
descriptions lies in the behavior of participants when consciously making 
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choices that do not meet the standard. Virtually every participant felt obliged 
to justify such unconventional decisions. This shows that the participants 
recognized the difference in content and knew which product was objectively 
better. Indeed, the participants not only recognized the objectively better 
product, but appeared to know that it would actually be their task to choose 
this product – and that their different choice implicitly violated certain 
unspoken rules. After all, people in the Western world experience several 
times a day the need to perceive and internalize substantive information. 
Whether we are dealing with the listing of ingredients on food packages, the 
package inserts of drugs or the fine print on the cellphone contract – if we fail 
to perceive substantive content, we may be vulnerable to health problems or 
financial hardship.  
By contrast, none of the participants displayed any need to justify the choice 
of a product just because it was positioned on the non-dominant side. This 
implies that the content is consistently accepted as an aid to decision-making 
– and that people are also aware of this. It is obvious that the same is not 
applicable to handedness. It is not conventionally expected that participants 
will choose an object based on its position. Thus, handedness is used only 
unconsciously in support of decision making, if it is used at all. 
 
3.5.3   The “right” left-handers and ambidextrous people 
As discussed earlier, the majority of the 50 left-handers in the original 
Shopping Tour experiment showed a preference towards the left (a pattern 
that was not mirrored in right-handers). After reanalysing the results, this 
preference turned out to be not that pronounced any more. However, a slight 
preference was still extant. This phenomenon has been explained on two 
possible grounds by Casasanto (2009): 
First, asymmetries in perceptuomotor experience may be more salient 
for left-handers, who are habitually inconvenienced by customs and 
devices designed for righthanders. More salient perceptuomotor 
asymmetries could result in stronger associations between actions with 
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the dominant hand and experiences with positive emotional valence. 
Second, culturespecific mental metaphors may be interacting with the 
bodyspecific left–right spatialization of valence through a blending of 
three metaphorical mappings. (Casasanto, 2009, p. 362) 
However, given the results of the replication, it appears somewhat likely that 
the apparent preferences of left-handers in the original experiment arose as a 
matter of chance.After all, compared to the original Shopping Tour 
experiment in the replication twice as many left-handers were tested. With 
this number no significant effect occurred. On the contrary, the left-handers 
even showed on average a minimal preference for the right. How could this 
be brought in line with the body-specificity hypothesis? These results simply 
do not seem to be consistent with the claims made in Casasanto (2009), nor 
do they fit with the explanation that Germans do not link the expression right 
with exclusively positive mental representations (see section 2.2.1).  
Similarly, the question arises of why, in all of the experiments proving the 
body-specificity hypothesis – especially in the Shopping Tour experiment – 
such a large group of participants acted completely inconsistently with the 
expectations of Casasanto (2009). If different bodies entail a different 
perception of the environment, then this principle should apply to a large 
majority or even to the totality of people. Nevertheless, a large number of 
participants in all studies concerning the body-specificity hypothesis have 
contradicted the hypothesis in their actions. How can we interpret the 
behavior of these people? Why has this supposedly universal body-specificity 
hypothesis no applicability to such a large number of people (in the 
replication of the Shopping Tour experiment, even the clear majority of 
participants)? Does this hypothesis need a detailed elaboration that specifies 
the extent to which people are influenced by their physical characteristics – 
and which kind of people are influenced at all? 
On this latter point, it is possible that sensitivity to handedness is only cued in 
those persons who had become aware of the advantages of their dominant 
side through particular experiences. As I argued earlier, left-handers, for 
instance, might have gained positive experiences regarding their left side of 
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the body. Nevertheless, they were told or often experienced that their 
handedness makes them part of a minority, which could make them 
consciously or unconsciously believe that they are in some way “wrong”. 
Consequently, if a positive handedness effect occurred, this effect could have 
been cancelled out by the negative experiences regarding being part of a 
minority. Another possibility might be that people who experienced a broken 
arm, or tried to play piano with both hands, could have been particularly 
sensitized to the positions of objects as positive or negative features of these 
objects. All these so far unanswerable questions reveal the need for further 
investigations. 
The surprising result that occurred in the case of ambidextrous people could 
provide some insight into these questions. Six of the eight members of this 
group had a selection bias to the right. As before, it is quite possible that this 
pattern arose just by chance, with participants placing their crosses at 
random. Another explanation, which corresponds to the body-specificity 
hypothesis, is that the participants experienced repeatedly that the right is 
linked with the abstract meaning of good or at least better than. As already 
indicated, the majority of ambidextrous people might have been re-educated 
left-handers (Sattler, 1995). These people were perhaps often and 
successfully told that using the left hand for certain activities such as shaking 
hands or writing is considered rude or impractical. These warnings may have 
been heeded by the potentially left-handed child, who later became an 
ambidextrous person, and represented as a mental concept.  
Importantly, this potential concept would have different characteristics from 
those assumed in Casasanto (2009) as a reason for the right-is-good-bias of 
the right-handers and the left-is-good-bias of the left-handers. This concept 
has nothing in common with the physical experiences which led to the 
development of abstract concepts concerning horizontal positioning. Rather, 
this mental concept was adopted from the concepts of people of higher rank, 
such as parents or teachers. It is obvious that the constant reinforcement of 
the convention right is good in the education of some left-handers could have 
been able to cause an adoption of this concept in the decision-making 
processes of these left-handers. This idea has a greater applicability to the 
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ambidextrous people, since in this group the re-education of the right hand as 
a writing hand was successful. This leads back to the thesis that the body-
specificity hypothesis still requires further differentiations. People who have 
consciously learned to appreciate the dominant side, or people who became 
used to this right-is-good concept in their early childhood, might tend to 
incorporate this concept into their unconscious decisions. 
 
3.5.4 The missing component 
So far one aspect has been unacknowledged. This aspect is the cerebral 
lateralization of a human’s brain, which is normally structured as follows. The 
left hemisphere processes and produces language and similar functions. The 
right hemisphere deals with visual-spatial tasks (Levy 1973, Levy & Reid 
1978). However, this does not apply to all humans: 
… in 35% - 50% of sinistrals [left-handers] and 1% - 10% of dextrals 
[right-handers], the right hemisphere is specialized for linguistic skills, 
and in some unknown fraction of the two handedness groups, verbal 
and/or spatial abilities are, to varying extents, bilateralized. (Levy, 
1978, p. 119) 
This reversed lateralization could also be responsible for slightly altered 
mental representations in this group of people. This hypothesis could be 
brought in line with the body-specificity hypothesis, which states that people 
with different physical properties shape different mental concepts of the same 
reality (Casasanto, 2009). This raises the issue of whether the Shopping 
Tour experiment should be further extended with reference to this issue in 
order for us adequately to be able to interpret the resulting data. That is, the 
recording of handedness alone may not be sufficient to make a statement 
about whether and how the body-specificity hypothesis applies in this case. 
The recording of a participant’s handedness and lateralization experiments 
probably could have achieved clearer results. Such results could be able to 
confirm or disprove the body-specificity hypothesis in a more definitive way. 
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According to Levy and Reid (1978), lateralization can be tested by observing 
a person’s hand position while writing. This position is an indicator for the 
lateralization of the brain. If a person’s dominant hand holds a pen in the 
traditional way, then this person’s brain is probably normally lateralized. If his 
hand holds a pen in the inverted position, in which the hand is above the 
point of writing and the pen is directed towards the body, then the right 
hemisphere processes language functions, while the left brain copes with the 
visual-spatial functions. However, this procedure will not be applied in the 
experiments reported here, for two reasons. First, very few right-handers are 
not normally lateralized, and it would therefore be difficult to obtain useful 
information about the interaction of handedness and lateralization. Secondly, 
I could not compare the resulting findings with the results of other 
experiments concerning the body-specificity hypothesis. Since I attached 
great importance to comparability of the experiments, I implemented the 
experiments in this dissertation within established paradigms such as those 
of Casasanto (2009), in which lateralization was not explored. 
 
3.5.5   The limited validity of the body-specificity hypothesis 
As discussed earlier, many experiments confirming the body-specificity 
hypothesis already have been performed. For this reason, the replication of 
the Shopping Tour experiment alone is simply not sufficient to reject the 
hypothesis that different bodies experience their environment differently and, 
consequently, manifest different mental concepts of the same reality 
(Casasanto, 2009). Nevertheless, it is worth considering what this replication 
tells us about the limitations of the influence of bodily properties on the mind. 
Taking again a closer look at the other experiments proving the applicability 
of the body-specificity hypothesis, it is clear that all of the experiments can be 
classified into two different categories – active placement experiments and 
perceptual judgment experiments (see section 1.2.4). Active placement 
experiments investigate whether abstract evaluative concepts of objects have 
an impact on the people positioning these objects. In this type of experiments 
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participants had, for example, to transfer a word or an abstract concept to a 
position in space. The participants were explicitly asked to place objects with 
certain positive or negative features on a lateral axis. The results of these 
active placement experiments revealed participants often placing those 
objects that they judged to be of superior quality on their dominant side. This 
tendency to place the better object on the side with which they acted more 
fluently appeared in both children and adults. However, this handedness 
effect was reduced when the participants had to express their placing 
decisions for a certain object only verbally. The effect of physical 
considerations on decision-making processes therefore seems to be closely 
connected with the motor functions. 
The second line of studies testing the body-specificity hypothesis – the 
perceptual judgment experiments – highlighted the influence of placement on 
the evaluation of a product’s quality. To test this impact, only three 
experiments were performed, which could also be seen as three variations of 
one and the same experiment (Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto and Henetz, 
2012). One of these modifications is the Shopping Tour experiment, as 
already surveyed in detail. This experiment did not uncover convincing 
findings. Results that were significant at the .05 level were only achieved 
after one third of all participants were eliminated and important analytic steps 
– such as, for instance, the consideration of mean values – were foregone. 
This raises the question whether a detailed re-analysis of another 
experiment, the Fribble Task, would similarly suggest the absence of any 
significant handedness effect. As previously mentioned, Daniel Casasanto 
confirmed (personal correspondence) that the Shopping Tour and the Fribble 
Task were not entirely suitable to demonstrate the influence of handedness 
on the mind. But in what way are these perceptual judgment experiments 
unsuitable? From my point of view, these two versions of the experiment 
suggest that the body-specificity hypothesis applies only in those cases in 
which features have to be transferred to positions. It seems to have much 
less validity in cases where people are hypothesized to judge objects 
because of their position.  
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Consequently, it is possible that in perceptual judgment tasks, as exemplified 
by the Shopping Tour experiment, no mental connection exists between the 
positions of objects in the questionnaires and the unconscious preferences of 
the dominant side. This might be due to the numerous cognitive processes 
which are activated while viewing pictures or reading product descriptions. In 
these situations, the working memory of the participants is fully stretched. 
Consequently, the positioning of an object might not be perceived as a 
significantly positive or negative property of the object, because the person’s 
mind is already busy with other processes, which are – as experience 
probably teaches – more important for the evaluation (Bruce et al., 1996). 
Maybe the positioning of an object plays no role, or at least no significant 
role, in evaluating objects. This issue requires further experimental 
investigation. These experiments must address the question of whether 
evaluative spatial concepts can be evoked not only in active placements, but 
also in perceptual judgment tasks. 
 
4.   Experiment II: The Supermarket 
Manager 
The re-analysis and the replication of the Shopping Tour gave reason to 
suspect that handedness has no impact, or just a small impact, on decision 
making processes in perceptual judgment tasks. This could be the reason for 
the existence of the extreme imbalance in the results of these perceptual 
judgment tasks compared with active placement experiments (Casasanto, 
2009; Casasanto & Chrysikov, 2011; Casasanto & Henetz, 2012; Casasanto 
& Jasmin, 2012). Table 1 in section 1.2.4 indicated that a large number of 
active placement experiments have been implemented in order to test the 
body-specificity hypothesis, outnumbering the implemented perceptual 
judgment experiments many times over. Almost all of these active placement 
experiments were able to furnish evidence in support of the body-specificity 
hypothesis. These results could be achieved without the exclusion of any 
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groups of participants. It has been indicated that people seem to project 
abstract properties of objects in their placement decisions, and tend to 
arrange superior objects close to their dominant side and inferior objects 
close to their non-dominant side.  
However, there might be a reason why only such a small number of 
perceptual judgment experiments have been implemented, since it seems to 
be difficult to obtain valid results supporting the body-specificity hypothesis 
with this type of experiment. Consequently, it can be assumed that these 
perceptual judgment experiments are simply not suitable to establish the 
body-specificity hypothesis, because the results suggest that the task of 
perceptual judgment does not seem to be influenced by a person’s body. 
These observations further suggest that the results of the original Shopping 
Tour experiment and the replication could give a hint to potential limitations of 
the body-specificity hypothesis.  
The absence of body-specificity effects in perceptual judgment tasks might 
indicate that an object’s position is simply not a feature that increases or 
decreases perceived quality at all. In contrast, the active placement tasks 
might have achieved these highly significant effects simply because the 
participants were aware of the superior abilities of their dominant hands and 
therefore knew that the better product would be much better accessible, if it 
was placed closer to their dominant side. If this assumption is correct, it 
should be possible to obtain a highly significant handedness effect from the 
Shopping Tour by turning this perceptual judgment task into an active 
placement task.  
As previously described, in the Shopping Tour experiment the participants 
were confronted with different product categories. They had the task of 
choosing one of two products out of each category. Each product was 
presented alongside short descriptions, which were placed in columns to the 
right and left of each category. In order to test the possible limitations of the 
body-specificity hypothesis this Shopping Tour experiment was reconstrued 
as an active placement experiment, as follows. 
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4.1   Method 
As in the Shopping Tour replication, the participants for the Supermarket 
Manager experiment were also recruited by preselection at the University of 
Bielefeld as well as at lottery outlets and table tennis clubs in Wolfsburg and 
Bielefeld. This strategy once again led to the recruitment of a wide range of 
people from various different age brands, educated classes and occupation 
groups, and obtained 100 left-handers and the quite similar number of 120 
right-handers. Again, in contrast to the active placement experiments 
implemented by, for instance, Casasanto (2009), the proportion of left-
handed participants in this sample was appreciably higher. Besides these 
two groups, one participant was classified as ambidextrous.  
In this reversed version of the Shopping Tour, the participants were asked to 
imagine they were the manager of a supermarket standing in front of a 
supermarket display. Each shelf consisted of three parts. The middle part 
displayed certain product categories, while the rightmost and leftmost parts of 
the shelf were empty. The participants were asked to place two objects of the 
same category into the boxes next to the category names. Thus, in contrast 
to the Shopping Tour experiment, the participants had to choose a position 
for both objects belonging to a category, instead of judging one object of 
each category to be superior and another object to be inferior. By this slight 
modification, the substance of the Shopping Tour experiment was preserved, 
but transformed from a perceptual judgment experiment to an active 
placement experiment. The display that the participants saw is depicted in 
Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: The shelf design of the Supermarket Manager Task 
 
The specific details of the Supermarket Manager task were as follows. As in 
the Shopping Tour experiment, the participants were required to accomplish 
two tasks. The main assignment in this case was to position two products on 
shelves for each of the twelve categories. The second assignment, as before, 
involved answering questions regarding various demographic data. In 
addition to the handedness of the participants, which was assessed by the 
Edinburgh Handedness Test, age, gender and education were also 
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surveyed. As previously discussed, this questionnaire was primarily intended 
to determine the actual handedness of the participants, since it is highly likely 
that asking a person only with which hand he tends to write is not sufficient to 
determine handedness. Besides this, the demographic data were intended to 
permit investigation into which of these factors exerted significant influence 
on the decision-making processes. Prior to the questionnaire, the participants 
each received a laminated sheet of paper depicting the display presented in 
Figure 12 and a short text that introduced the assignment. This text retained 
many aspects of the Shopping Tour experiment in order to ensure a high 
comparability with the perceptual judgment version of this experiment. Given 
the possibility of certain expressions causing subtle semantic differences, this 
short text is shown below for clarity. 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie sind Supermarkt-Manager. Ihre heutige 
Aufgabe besteht darin, die Marken verschiedener Produkte in die 
Regale einzusortieren. Sie erhalten nacheinander zehn Paare von 
Produkten. Die einzelnen Paare bestehen aus zwei unterschiedlichen 
Marken eines Produkts (Beispiel: Produkt  Taschentuch; Marken  
Tempo versus Kleenex). Entscheiden Sie nun, auf welcher Regalseite 
die Produkte Ihren Platz finden sollen und platzieren Sie die Marken 
neben ihren jeweiligen Produktnamen. 
This German text expresses – as already mentioned – that the participants 
were asked to sort different products onto shelves. They received ten product 
pairs in succession. Every pair consisted of the descriptions of two products 
within the same category. The participants were then asked to decide which 
product should be placed on the right and which one should be placed on the 
left of the depicted shelf. As in the Shopping Tour experiment, the product 
descriptions consisted of short phrases, and each product was illustrated by 
three such descriptions. Unlike the Shopping Tour replication, in which six 
categories contained qualitative differences but the other six did not, the 
Supermarket Manager task only used pairs consisting of an objectively 
superior and an objectively inferior product. Again, this difference of quality 
was only expressed by one of the three descriptions, in order to avoid an 
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exaggerated contrast. An excerpt of these descriptions is shown by Figure 
139.  
aus Alpenmilch 
fettarm 
mit frischen Erdbeeren 
 
ERDBEERJOGHURT 
aus frischer Kuhmilch 
 0,1 Prozent Fettanteil 
 mit Erdbeeraroma 
trocknet nicht aus 
hautfreundlich 
Peelingeffekt  
 
SEIFE 
mit Feuchtigkeitskapseln 
kann Brennen verursachen 
entfernt Hautschüppchen 
Anti-Kalk-System 
stromsparend 
Keramik-Sohle 
 
BÜGELEISEN 
muss entkalkt werden 
geringer Energieverbrauch 
teflonbeschichtete Sohle 
Figure 13: An excerpt of descriptions used in the Supermarket Manager Task 
The majority of the descriptions used in the Supermarket Manager task have 
already been used in the Shopping Tour. This applies, for instance, to the 
item ‘Erdbeerjoghurt’ (= strawberry yoghurt). However, the number of product 
pairs was reduced from twelve to ten. This was to reduce the length of the 
experiment in order to enable participants to maintain their concentration on 
the task. In addition, the product categories which were already used in the 
Shopping Tour and did not contain qualitative differences were modified. This 
was done, for instance, in the case of the category ‘Seife’ (= soap). Other 
items without qualitative differences were replaced by other categories, as for 
example in the item ‘Bügeleisen’ (= flat iron). I elected to adopt this 
procedure on the basis that it was important to convey the impression that 
there were genuinely substantive differences between the products, and the 
exercise was not merely a trial of patience.  
As in the Shopping Tour experiment, the qualitative differences between 
products varied in strength. In the case of the flat iron the participants could 
choose between a product that prevents calcareous deposits and another 
one that has to be descaled manually. This difference is rather weak, insofar 
as some customers might consider the technology not to be particularly 
useful. In contrast to this, the item soap contained a rather strong substantial 
                                                
9
 As before the italics in Figure 13 only serve to highlight the descriptions which contained substantial 
differences. In the experiment, there was no such accentuation. 
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difference, since the participants had to decide between a product which was 
kind to the skin and a product which may cause a burning sensation. 
The experiment was carried out in the same chronological order as the 
Shopping Tour experiment. In the first part of the Supermarket Manager task, 
the participants saw the display shown in Figure 12 and read the scenario. 
Then the participants received the product pairs. Each product was 
represented by a small laminated cards of the same size as the shelves. The 
participants did not receive the next pair of cards until they had arranged the 
preceding pair on the shelf. 
In the second part of the experiment, the participants received the 
questionnaire, which was identical to that used in the Shopping Tour. The 
questionnaire was handed out as soon as the participants finished the sorting 
task. Again, this sequential order avoided disclosing the reasons for 
implementing the experiment: no enquiry was made into the participants’ 
handedness until the sorting task had already been completed. 
As in the Shopping Tour, the participants were asked whether they could 
guess the purpose of the experiment. Again, the majority of the participants 
assumed that this experiment was supposed to investigate purchase 
patterns, in order to create new marketing strategies. Others theorized that 
this experiment only served to test the patience of people, in that, despite the 
qualitative differences between products, the sorting task made no sense 
from their point of view. Some participants even assumed that the 
experiment’s purpose was to investigate fine motor tasks, since they thought 
that the cards had to be placed as precisely as possible onto the shelves. 
Only three subjects guessed that the experiment was designed to test the 
correlation between handedness and the preferred side. However, two of 
these subjects were psychology students who had worked on a paper that 
dealt with handedness.  
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4.2   Results and interpretation 
The Supermarket Manager experiment was implemented in order to enable a 
point-by-point comparison between an active placement task and a 
perceptual judgment task. As previously explained, the Supermarket 
Manager experiment serves as a reversed version of the Shopping Tour 
experiment. Thus, the analysis was carried out in the same way as the re-
analysis of the original Shopping Tour experiment and the analysis of the 
replication. Consequently, the first step of the analysis consisted of an 
evaluation of responses to indicate the direction of preference, as per the 
approach of Casasanto (2009) to the original Shopping Tour experiment. 
This step is shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Analysis of the Supermarket Manager task based on the approach of Casasanto 
(2009). 
First, the single ambidextrous respondent was excluded from the analysis. 
This was planned on the basis of comparability with the original Shopping 
Tour experiment, in which only two groups, the right-handers and the left-
handers, were considered. In any case, as there was only one ambidextrous 
participant in the Supermarket Manager Task, it was clear that no general 
conclusions about ambidextrous persons could be drawn on the basis of this 
sample. 
Besides this ambidextrous person, the 48 participants who did not reveal any 
preference for a particular side were also excluded. These are the 
participants who placed five of the objectively superior products on the side 
N = 221 
91 R 81 L 
57 R>L  34 R<L 56 L>R 25 L<R 
62.6 % 37.4 %  69.1 %  30.9 % 
48 excl. 1 A 
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of the shelf which was closer to their dominant hand and five on the side of 
the shelf closer to their non-dominant hand. Results from the remaining 172 
participants (91 right-handers and 81 left-handers) were included in the 
analysis. Their preferences are summarized in Figure 14. As predicted, a 
highly significant majority of these participants preferred the dominant side of 
the shelf for placing the superior object (χ²(1, N = 172) = 17.343, p < .001). 
This applied to 62.6 percent of the right-handers and 69.1 percent of the left-
handers. The effect size of φ = 0.32 can be categorized as medium, which 
represents a much stronger relationship between handedness and placement 
than could be detected in the case of the Shopping Tour. Consequently, this 
result is as clear as predicted and as the results of the other active placement 
experiments testing the body-specificity hypothesis would suggest. 
One issue remains to be explored: can this highly significant result be 
maintained, when all participants are included? This question was answered 
in the second step of the analysis, which is shown in Figure 15.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Analysis of the Supermarket Manager task including all participants apart from one 
ambidextrous person. 
In this evaluation, all 120 right-handers and all 100 right-handers were taken 
into account. Only the one ambidextrous person was removed from the 
analysis for the reason discussed above. This complete analysis still showed 
that the left-handers as well as the right-handers revealed highly significant 
directional preferences in performing the task (χ² (2, N = 220) = 18.282, p = 
.005). For the left-handers, an absolute majority placed the better product on 
N = 221 
120 R  100 
L 
57 R>L 29=L 34 R<L 56 L>R 19 L=R 25 L<R 
47.5 % 24.2 % 28.3 % 56 % 19 % 25 % 
1 A 
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the left side of the shelf. In the case of the right-handers, there was not quite 
an absolute majority, but 47.5 percent of participants preferred the right side 
for better products. These results demonstrate that the elimination of the 48 
subjects with no preference was not necessary in order to achieve a highly 
significant effect, as this emerges from both analyses. This is also confirmed 
by Cramer’s Phi (φ = 0.29), which hardly differed from the value obtained by 
the analysis suggested in Casasanto (2009).  
This significant effect was also supported by the mean values. Due to the 
smaller number of only ten items per participant, the bias scale in the 
Supermarket Manager experiment ranged only from -5 to +5. Those 
participants who positioned all ten superior products on the left side were 
assigned a bias value of -5; those who placed all ten superior products on the 
right side were assigned a bias value of +5; those who placed five superior 
products on each side were assigned a bias value of zero. Any integer value 
between -5 and +5 could be achieved by some distribution of objects on the 
shelf.  
In distinction from the Shopping Tour experiment, the mean values diverged 
clearly and significantly from the zero point. The right-handers’ mean value 
was 0.98 (t(119) = 4.224, p < .001); for the left-handers it was -1.17 (t(99) = -
4.291, p < .001). For comparison with the Shopping Tour experiment, in 
which the bias scale extended from -6 to +6, we should scale these values by 
a factor of 6/5, which would yield a mean bias value of 1.18 for right-handers 
and -1.40 for left-handers. These mean values show that, unlike in the 
Shopping Tour experiment, the participants in the Supermarket Manager task 
revealed on average a clear preference for their dominant side. However, 
these mean values do not take into account the distributions of the individual 
participants: these are depicted in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Bias for the group of right-handers and the group of left-handers 
Figure 16 stands in marked contrast to Figures 6, 7 and 11, which emerge 
from the re-analysis of the original Shopping Tour experiment and its 
replication. In this case, there is little resemblance to a normal distribution. 
Both the left-handed and right-handed participants had modal bias values of 
zero, but apart from that, the visual difference between the two graphs is 
striking. While the largest proportion of right-handed participants is located on 
the right side of the scale and thus preferred more objects on the right side, a 
remarkably large majority of left-handers is located on the left side of the 
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scale. Indeed, if one graph was reflected in the y-axis, it would be largely 
congruent to the other.  
This illustration shows graphically what has already been documented by the 
statistical values. Handedness appears to be the factor that influences the 
results of both groups in a highly significant way. Consequently, all data 
gathered in the Supermarket Manager experiment supported the body-
specificity hypothesis. A highly significant majority of the participants was 
affected by their handedness in their placement decision. For clarity, these 
results are summarized in Table 5.  
Left-handers Right-handers Joint 
bias: 
t(99) = -4.291, p < .001 
bias: 
t(119) = 4.224, p < .001 
bias:  
t(271) = -0.092;  
p = .926 
|L/R|: χ²(2, N=220) = 
6.71; p = .035 
Table 5: Summary of the results of the Supermarket Manager Task. 
The aim of the Supermarket Manager Task was to create an active 
placement experiment that contained all the features shared by the active 
placement experiments of, for instance, Casasanto (2009). One of the most 
important features of these experiments was the use only of pairs of items 
which exhibited qualitative differences. In each active placement experiment, 
the participants could establish which object was supposed to be inferior and 
which objects was supposed to be superior. The participants became aware 
of this either through descriptions, by appeal to visually observable 
characteristics, or through appeal to personal preferences. In the case of the 
Supermarket Manager experiment, these differences were transmitted 
through product descriptions, which expressed substantive differences. As in 
the Shopping Tour replication, these differences were strong in some 
categories and weak in others. 
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Unlike in the Shopping Tour experiment, every product pair in the 
Supermarket Manager experiment involved qualitative differences. This 
restriction also guaranteed maximal comparability with other active 
placement experiments. The application of largely equivalent pairs of 
products might have compromised the success of the experiment. If, for 
instance, the first product pair had exhibited no differences, the participants 
might have concluded that this was applicable to all pairs, and been given the 
impression that the experiment was merely a test of patience and not meant 
to be taken seriously. Moreover, within the Supermarket Manager 
experiment, the use of substantively identical products would not have 
furnished us with any insights. It would have remained unclear whether the 
participants were affected by their handedness when placing the objects, 
because there would have been no better and no worse object, and hence 
the choice of placement would have told us nothing about positive or 
negative associations with the right- or left-hand side. 
As mentioned, some product pairs exhibited greater differences than others. 
As in the case of the Shopping Tour replication, I hypothesized that this 
difference should influence the decisions of the participants. However, the 
situation in this experiment is slightly different. In the Shopping Tour 
experiment, the position and content are both independent variables, and a 
quality judgment is the dependent variable.  In the Supermarket Manager 
experiment, content is the independent variable and position is the 
dependent variable. It therefore makes no sense to ask whether content or 
position is more influential to the outcome of this latter experiment. However, 
it is interesting to consider whether the participants placed the products more 
frequently on the dominant side the more pronounced the higher quality of 
the product was. 
The initial analysis has shown that the participants tended to place the better 
object closer to their dominant side of their body. Specifically, in 61 percent of 
all cases, the participants placed the superior object next to their dominant 
side. This result is clearly below the value of the replicated Shopping Tour, in 
which 72 percent of decisions were based on the product quality when the 
products differed in quality. However, this disparity can be explained by 
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appeal to the detailed observations of the participants that I made during the 
experiment. Specifically, several participants placed the cards without 
reading the descriptions accurately. These participants were part of the 
aforementioned group of people that judged the experiment only to be a test 
of patience, which did not examine any meaningful questions. 
Table 6: Handedness in relation to the choice of position 
Table 6 shows the preferences of the two handedness groups. The top line 
indicates how often the right-handers (59.8 %) and left-handers (38.3 %) 
placed the better product on the right side of the shelf; the bottom line shows 
how often the right-handers (40.2 %) and left-handers (61.7 %) used the left 
side of the shelf for the better product. It is evident that the majority of both 
groups often evaluated their dominant side to be more suitable for the better 
product. In the case of left-handed participants this tendency is a little clearer 
than in the case of the right-handers. 
Looking at the product pairs separately, we can observe interesting 
variability. Overall, the participants positioned the better product on the 
dominant side in 61 percent of all case. In some categories, however, this 
allocation was much clearer. In particular, the left-handers’ preference in four 
product pairs peaks at about 70 percent. One of these was the category 
mattress. In 71 percent of cases, the left-handed participants placed the 
better product (with a cotton cover) on the left side of the shelf, and the 
inferior mattress (with a synthetic cover) on the right. Across left-handers and 
right-handers, 69.3% of participants placed the mattress with a cotton cover 
on the dominant side. In the case of the category soap, the distribution was 
similarly clear: 69 percent of the left-handers placed the skin-friendly soap on 
the left and the soap that may cause a burning sensation on the right. 
Overall, 63 percent of participants placed the former item on the dominant 
  
Handedness 
  
Right left 
Preference 
 
right 59.8 % 38.3 % 
left 40.2 % 61.7 % 
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side. Likewise, in the category chocolate, 68% of left-handed participants 
placed the objectively superior product with a fine vanilla flavor on their 
dominant side and the inferior product that smells rancid on the non-
dominant side. Across all participants, this value decreased to 64.9% 
percent. Even in the case of the LCD TV, the distribution is especially clear, 
particularly in the case of the left-handers. As in the Shopping Tour, 
descriptions made reference to a TV with a 48-inch screen and another TV 
with a 37-inch screen. 68 percent of the left-handers placed the larger TV on 
the left side of the shelf. Considering left- and right-handers together, 
however, only 60.3 percent of the participants placed the larger and, thus, 
objectively better TV on the dominant side of the shelves (below the overall 
average of 61 percent). 
These four examples involve categories in which the qualitative differences 
are large. Those participants who had read the descriptions carefully would 
normally always judge the objectively better product also to be the 
subjectively better product. They would not choose a soap that can harm the 
skin or cause pain; nor, as discussed in the replication of the Shopping Tour 
experiment, would they choose a food that smelled rancid, as this would 
normally be a sign that the product was unsafe to eat. The apparent danger 
emanating from these two products offers an explanation for the distinct 
distributions. It is highly probable that those participants who placed the 
cards in an orientation depending on their handedness chose the appropriate 
positions of the products for this reason. As mentioned in the replication of 
the Shopping Tour, it is still possible that a few participants still classified the 
objectively worse product as the subjectively better product for personal 
reasons, but these cases are likely to be exceptional. By contrast, for 
products that exhibited relatively small differences, there is a greater 
likelihood of participants’ subjective preferences conflicting with objective 
advantages. This principle was already apparent in the case of the LCD TV. 
Certainly, there are people for whom a large TV would be out of keeping with 
their décor, or unimportant, or distracting. These people might consider the 
smaller TV to be the better one. Thus, the decision between the two products 
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is much more subjective and less predictable than in the case of the 
categories with large objective contrasts.  
This principle could also be observed to affect behavior in the category 
mobile phone. This item was also used in the replication of the Shopping 
Tour, and attained comparable results in the Supermarket Manager 
experiment too. Recall that the participants were presented with descriptions 
of a mobile phone with high radiation intensity and one with low radiation 
intensity. Both the right-handers (57.5 %) and the left-handers (54 %) 
revealed only a slight tendency to place the objectively better product on the 
dominant side. However, this result was to be expected after the experiences 
with this item in the Shopping Tour experiment, where quite a few 
participants had justified a preference for of the objectively worse object. 
They stated that they would prefer the phone that radiates more strongly, 
because it has better reception. It is likely that in this experiment, some 
participants also positioned these items on the basis of this principle. In the 
case of the product pair potato chips, the objectively better object was even 
less clearly recognizable. Both products were identical, except for the fact 
that the first product was described as a reasonable test winner and the other 
was called expensive and of high quality. Therefore, a difference in 
preferability was hardly detectable in this category. Only the price functioned 
as a criterion that distinguished the superior from the inferior product. That 
being the case, the results obtained with this category in the Supermarket 
Manager experiment are not surprising: only 59.2 percent of the right-
handers and 54 percent of the left-handers placed the objectively better 
product close to their dominant side of their bodies. 
In conclusion, therefore, it can be argued that in the results of the 
Supermarket Manager experiment as well as of the results of the Shopping 
Tour replication might not correspond reliably to the actual distribution of 
body-specific preferences. In 61 percent of all cases, the participants in the 
Supermarket Manager experiment placed the object that was objectively 
better on their dominant side. However, the rate at which subjectively better 
items were placed on the dominant side is likely to be higher than this. The 
objective evaluation of the products does not correspond perfectly and 
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consistently to the subjective evaluation done by the participants for any of 
the given items. For logistical reasons, most participants performed the 
placement task simultaneously and in close proximity with others, but often at 
different speeds. For this reason, I opted not to inquire immediately as to the 
reason for their placement decisions: otherwise, the other participants could 
have been influenced in their decisions by the justifications that were given. I 
only asked them, shortly after finishing the experiment, whether they could 
guess why they had to perform the task (see section 4.1). Consequently, the 
placement strategies of the participants remained in their mental "black box". 
Nevertheless, the highly significant results of the Supermarket Manager 
experiment enable us to draw quite clear conclusions. 
 
4.3   Discussion 
The remarks made in section 3.5.1 regarding the differences in language and 
– to some extent – in culture, are still applicable for the Supermarket 
Manager task. Nevertheless, it is striking that this task was able to elicit a 
significant effect of handedness that is highly comparable with the results 
gained by the other discussed active placement experiments. Consequently, 
the influences that resulted from implementing this experiment in Germany 
turn out to be negligible in the reversed version of the former perceptual 
judgment experiment.  
In addition, the discussion in section 3.5.2 partly applies to the Supermarket 
Manager task. As in that case, those participants who read the descriptions 
carefully and did not perform the task completely arbitrarily simply have to 
have been influenced by the content. There was no other factor which could 
have had an impact on the participants’ behavior: the cards were equally 
large and each of the two products was given three short descriptions. So the 
participants’ statements gathered in the replication of the Shopping Tour 
seem also to be relevant to the Supermarket Manager task. They indicate 
that the objectively superior products were not always subjectively superior. 
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From this, coupled with the stronger directional bias when the objective 
differences were larger, one can infer that the proportion of subjectively 
superior items which have been placed close to the participants’ dominant 
side is appreciably larger than the percentages quoted in section 4.2, which 
quantify the placement preferences for objectively superior items. 
This returns us again to the question of why the participants tended to place 
the superior object closer to their dominant hand. So far, two possibilities 
concerning this issue have been discussed: either the participants could have 
acted arbitrarily or they could have decided based on their handedness. It is 
still possible that those participants whose behavior deviated from 
expectations were in fact pursuing completely different strategies (just as it is 
possible that they judged the objectively superior items to be subjectively 
superior in the majority of cases). 
It is conceivable that the people are influenced in their decision-making 
processes by their reading direction. Since all participants were German 
speakers, they are accustomed to reading from left to right on the page. 
Therefore, it is possible that the participants preferred to place the better 
product consciously or unconsciously at the left side of the shelf, because 
they might have thought potential customers would perceive them faster and 
thus decide to buy them. This theory might explain the left-handers’ more 
pronounced directional preference compared to the right-handers. As 
discussed above, the left-handed participants tended to place a greater 
proportion of the objectively better objects close to their dominant side than 
the right-handed participants did. This group might have been influenced by 
both the reading direction and their handedness. Nevertheless, the highly 
significant results of the right-handers suggest that this effect of reading 
direction is either not applicable, or fails to outweigh handedness 
preferences, for a large number of participants. So the reading direction 
hypothesis could indeed be tenable, but can only serve as a potential 
explanation for the more extreme results obtained from the group of left-
handers.  
5.   The Manipulation Specificity Hypothesis  95 
In this experiment, however, the change of the participants’ perspective 
should not be neglected. The participants in the Shopping Tour made 
decisions that affected only themselves. In the current experiment, they had 
to slip into the role of a supermarket manager. The participants in the 
Supermarket Manager task might have been aware of the fact that they do 
not equip the shelves for themselves, but for potential customers. In this 
respect, the experiment is analogous to one of the previously described 
active placement experiments, in which the participants had to adopt a zoo 
visitor’s point of view (Casasanto, 2009). It is entirely possible that the 
participants incorporated this knowledge into their decisions and did not 
place the products in the way that would have been preferable for them, but 
instead had the intention to influence their customers with their placement 
decisions. As a consequence, the participants could have placed the inferior 
product intentionally in a more accessible location to the customers in order 
to increase sales. It is also not unlikely that some participants had knowledge 
of certain marketing strategies, which could also have influenced their 
decisions. However, this theory appears to run counter to the clear results 
towards a significant influence of handedness. The odds are, of course, that 
a minority of participants pursued exactly this kind of thinking. Consequently, 
this could be an explanation for those participants who tended to place the 
better product on the non-dominant side. 
 
5.   The Manipulation Specificity 
Hypothesis 
The re-analysis and replication of the Shopping Tour task, the results of the 
Supermarket Manager task, and the results of all the previously discussed 
experiments testing the body-specificity hypothesis give a highly 
homogeneous general impression. The experiments designed as active 
placement tasks achieved highly significant results, whereas the experiments 
designed as perceptual judgment tasks failed to provide supporting evidence 
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for the body-specificity hypothesis. This became especially obvious in 
comparing the perceptual Shopping Tour task with its active placement 
analog, the Supermarket Manager task. For the most part, both experiments 
included identical content. Both dealt with pairs of products presented as 
short descriptions. Both involved the scenario of being in a supermarket. 
Only the task that the participants had to perform was different: the 
participants of the Shopping Tour experiment had to judge products, whereas 
the participants of the Supermarket Manager experiment had to place 
products.  
But this modification generated extremely different results. Unlike the 
Shopping Tour, the Supermarket Manager experiment showed a highly 
significant effect of handedness on the placement decisions of the 
participants, which emerged completely effortlessly. In the Shopping Tour – 
as in other perceptual judgment experiments concerning the body-specificity 
hypothesis – it turned out to be difficult or impossible to discern a significant 
effect. Only an unconventional method of analysis could reveal effects which 
were significant at the .05 level. However, even this small effect could not 
bear more detailed scrutiny. A hint towards the theory that the body does not 
influence the mind in perceptual judgment experiments is also provided by 
the third version of the Zoo Task (Casasanto, 2009). This active placement 
task gave rise to highly significant effects in support of the body-specificity 
hypothesis, as long as the participants had to express their decisions by 
drawing. However, the verbal expression of their choice clearly diminished 
the handedness effect. 
This suggests that physical properties only influence decision-making 
processes if one of the following two conditions is met. 
 First, spatial motor activities have to be involved while performing 
decision-making processes. These motor activities could entail moving 
an object in order to place it somewhere, or drawing an object.  
 Secondly, people have to be explicitly asked to transfer the abstract 
concepts good and bad to respectively the right and the left side. 
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I therefore propose the manipulation-specificity hypothesis, which states that 
the impact of handedness is only relevant in active placement tasks and not 
in perceptual judgment tasks. Thus, body-specificity is only a determining 
factor when people have to use their hands actively, in which case the better 
accessibility of objects serves as a positive criterion. This manipulation-
specificity hypothesis is weaker than the body-specificity hypothesis, but it is 
strongly supported both by the combination of the discussed experiments 
concerning the body-specificity hypothesis and by the two experiments 
implemented within the framework of this dissertation.  
However, there is still a need for further investigation in order to establish the 
sphere of influence of this manipulation-specificity hypothesis. It remains 
unexplained why people tend to place superior objects closer to their 
dominant side of the body. It is highly likely that people act this way only for 
reasons of comfort or convenience. But what implications might this have? 
From my point of view this implies that people are extremely conscious of the 
limits of their physical abilities and incorporate this knowledge into all 
decision-making processes involving active placement tasks. Consequently, 
people do not perceive the placement of objects as positive or negative 
abstract features of these objects, but simply place better objects in a way 
that guarantees their optimal accessibility. Thus, people seem to place 
objects highly rationally and in awareness of the strengths and weaknesses 
of their body. In order to illustrate this principle, people would not start writing 
with their non-dominant hand without a compelling reason, since their 
experiences suggest that this would not lead to acceptable results. 
In the following chapter, the claims made by Wilson (2002) will be discussed 
in detail. The main claim of this paper is that off-line cognition is body based. 
With regard to the previously suggested manipulation-specificity hypothesis, 
this claim implies that handedness should also influence the ability to 
simulate objects mentally, and that right-handers and left-handers might tend 
to solve these mental manipulation tasks in a different way.  
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6.   Mental rotation is embodied 
6.1  Wilson’s view of embodiment 
The majority of embodiment proponents provide the perspective that 
cognitive processes have their origins in the interaction of the body with its 
environment. “This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, 
some of which are more controversial than others” (Wilson, 2002, p. 625). 
Wilson outlines six principal and partially divergent claims: (1) cognition is 
situated; (2) cognition is time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto 
the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) 
cognition is for action; (6) off-line cognition is body-based. Whereas Wilson 
endorsed the fourth and the sixth claim, she discovered weaknesses in the 
first three claims and in the fifth. Thus, these four claims are only 
predominantly true for the most part – as can be verified if we subject these 
claims to closer scrutiny.  
Of course, it cannot be neglected that a large part of cognition is situated. 
Face-to-face communications, walking or even cooking require cognitive 
activities that are situated. But there are also cognitive tasks that are solved 
in non-situated contexts. Humans are able to imagine places they have never 
been before and situations they have never experienced before. These 
cognitive off-line activities allow people to remember, plan or daydream. 
Similar limitations can be found in the second thesis. Time pressure only 
serves as a limitation and not as an important factor in making cognitive 
processes work. Time pressure creates a mental obstacle which is described 
by Wilson (2002) as a representational bottleneck. The status of being in a 
hurry diminishes the ability of people to create a complete mental model of 
the current situation – thus, people tend to be overwhelmed by the time 
pressure they are exposed to.  
Given the opportunity, we often behave in a decidedly off-line way: stepping 
back, observing, assessing, planning, and only then taking action. It is far 
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from clear, then, that the human cognitive system has evolved an effective 
engineering solution for the real-time constraints of the representational 
bottleneck. Furthermore, many of the activities we engage in in daily life, 
even many that are clearly situated, do not inherently involve time pressure. 
Cases include mundane activities such as making sandwiches and paying 
bills, and more demanding cognitive tasks such as doing crossword puzzles 
and reading scientific papers. In each of these cases, input from and output 
to the environment is necessary, but is at the leisure of the cognizer (Wilson, 
2002, p. 628). 
Furthermore, the claim that people off-load cognitive work on their 
environment is restricted in its scope. It is obvious that people use their 
environment to solve certain tasks. For instance, people are likely to move 
around a room in order to develop better ideas about where to position new 
furniture. They use their fingers while counting and integrate pen and paper 
for solving mathematical problems. But off-loading is not the only way for 
people to circumvent the representational bottleneck. People can also rely on 
stored representations they had to build when performing similar tasks. 
Furthermore, Wilson (2002) discusses another restriction of this claim. For 
instance, counting on one’s fingers or solving mathematical problems in 
writing reduces the complexity of mental processing. Consequently, the 
cognitive work we have to do is less. However, these activities “are 
performed in the service of cognitive activity about something else, 
something not present in the immediate environment” (Wilson, 2002, p. 629). 
The cognitive processes simply make use of external resources in order to 
achieve new understanding that may or may not be applied later. This 
process, which Wilson calls symbolic off-loading, can be applied to spatial 
tasks and helps to establish links between different abstract categories. 
These categories can be mathematical variables that are expressed in a 
diagram or gestures that catalyze a person’s speech. 
The thesis that cognition is solely for action also cannot be maintained in its 
strongest sense. Of course, action is definitely an important task of cognition, 
but it is not the only one. It can be shown that certain visual inputs prime 
certain motor activities such as grasping or reaching for an object. 
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Nevertheless, the proponents of embodiment go many steps further. 
Memorizing processes, for instance, have been suggested as constituting 
“the encoding of patterns of possible physical interaction with a three-
dimensional world” (Glenberg, 1997, p.1). Nevertheless, a “representation for 
representation’s sake” (Wilson, 2002, 632) definitely exists. Looking at 
human faces, houses or landscapes does not evoke any perceptuomotor 
responses. The same is true for reading processes. While reading a book, no 
pattern of possible physical interaction develops.  
In general, Wilson advocates for a cognition that is not fixed, but completely 
flexible. Thus, I can notice a piano in an unfamiliar room, and being a non-
musician, I might think of it only as having a bench I can sit on and flat 
surfaces I can set my drink on. But I can also later call up my knowledge of 
the piano in a variety of unforeseen circumstances: if I need to make a loud 
noise to get everyone’s attention; if the door needs to be barricaded against 
intruders; or if we are caught in a blizzard without power and need to smash 
up some furniture for fuel. Notice that these novel uses can be derived from a 
stored representation of the piano. They need not be triggered by direct 
observation of the piano and its affordances while one is entertaining a new 
action-based goal (Wilson, 2002, p. 632). 
The claim that the environment is part of the cognitive system is rejected by 
Wilson (2002) in its entirety. Some theorists see cognition in this way: “The 
forces that drive cognitive activity do not reside solely inside the head of the 
individual, but instead are distributed across the individual and the situation 
as they interact” (Wilson, 2002, p. 630). Consequently, cognition should be a 
unified system consisting of the situated cognizer and the situation this 
cognizer is in. Of course, there is a link between a person’s action and their 
environment. But a system requires the properties of its elements to affect 
the other parts of the system. In this case, Wilson gives the example of a car, 
in which the spark plugs affect the work of the piston. In contrast to this, 
“many systems are open systems, existing within the context of an 
environment that can affect and be affected by the system” (Wilson, 2002, p. 
630). Thus, these systems receive input from the environment. Another 
distinction can be made, in the case that systems can be facultative and only 
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temporarily existent or obligate and effectively permanent. If the situation is 
part of the cognitive system, the system would emerge and split as often as a 
person enters a new situation – which happens continuously in everyday life. 
This is uneconomical. Consequently, cognition needs to be an obligate and 
open system, which receives permanent input from a person’s environment 
and adapts itself over and over again to a wide range of situations.   
In contrast to the previous five theories, the sixth claim, that off-line cognition 
is body-based, appeals to Wilson (2002). But, in the history of embodiment, 
this claim has tended to be disregarded. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that 
abstract cognitive activities make use of sensorimotor functions, which are 
performed only mentally as sensorimotor simulations. Mental imagery, for 
instance, does not consist of certain propositions, as the traditional view 
suggests, but instead uses mental representations that store properties of the 
environment. Working memory also makes use of sensorimotor simulations. 
It has “separate storage components for verbal and for visuospatial 
information, each of which was coded and maintained in something 
resembling its surface form” (Wilson, 2002, p. 633). Experiments support this 
theory by revealing that the quality of working memory is worse for words that 
sound similar or for words that include articulatory suppression.  
Implicit memory or automated processes seem to be embodied, too. 
Compare, for example, a novice driver and an expert driver making a left 
turn, or a novice juggler and an expert juggler trying to keep three balls in the 
air. In each case, the degree of control over the details of the behavior is 
quite poor for the novice, and the phenomenological experience of the 
situation may be close to chaos. For the expert, by contrast, there is a sense 
of leisure and clarity, as well as a high degree of behavioral control. These 
aspects of automatic behavior become less mysterious if we consider the 
process of automatizing as one of building up internal representations of a 
situation that contains certain regularities, thus circumventing the 
representational bottleneck (Wilson, 2002, p. 634). 
When people have to solve a problem, they tend to simulate a task mentally. 
An example of this method of problem-solving is the so-called Buddhist monk 
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problem. This monk needs one day to climb a mountain, the next day he 
descends. Is it the case that there is a particular point on the path that the 
monk passes at precisely the same time on both days? Visualizing this 
problem facilitates the process of finding a solution. The two days should be 
mentally depicted on a time bar. The time bar of the first day should be put 
on the top of the other. Continuing this way, a person can “see” two monks 
climbing the mountain and meeting each other at a particular position.  
 
6.2  Body based cognition and the Shepard 
Task 
It is obvious that off-line cognitive 
activities use sensory and motor 
resources in many different ways, 
since the same is observable in 
activities performed in reality. But, as 
observed by Wilson (2002), there is 
still need of further investigation. 
This also applies to the role of motor 
simulations, and especially to motor 
simulations of objects or actions that 
are imitable “and can be mapped 
isomorphically onto one’s own body” 
(Wilson 2002, p. 634). This more 
distinct evaluation of off-line 
cognition is particularly important 
with regard to the manipulation-
specificity hypothesis suggested in 
section 5 which also requires further 
experiments.   
Figure 17: Excerpt of the original       
Shepard Task. 
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The well-known mental rotation experiment of Shepard and Metzler (1971) 
gave a first indication that off-line cognition actually is body-based. In this 
experiment Shepard and Metzler investigated the cognitive processes that 
are involved in mental imaging and mental manipulation. The participants 
saw pairs of three-dimensional, asymmetrical drawings that consisted of 
composed cubes. These picture pairs are shown in Figure 17.  
In half of the pairs both drawings could be rotated into congruence with each 
other. This rotation was implemented either over the x-axis or over the z-axis. 
In the other half of the pairs of pictures, the objects were incongruent and 
could not be rotated into 
congruence again 
(Shepard & Metzler, 
1971). The participants 
were asked to 
determine as quickly as 
possible whether the 
two drawings were 
congruent, or whether 
the drawings were 
intrinsically different. 
When detecting 
identical objects, the 
participants had to pull a 
right-hand lever; when 
detecting incongruent 
objects, they had to pull 
a left-hand lever.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Excerpt of the original Shepard Task. 
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Shepard and Metzler (1971) developed the theory that people tend to solve 
such a task by choosing one object per pair and creating a three-dimensional 
mental image of this object. The participants then come to a decision by 
rotating this image mentally in order to “see” whether there is a possible 
rotation that brings this picture into congruence with the other one. Shepard 
and Metzler depicted the results in diagrams that related the average 
reaction times for correct responses to the angular difference in the 
congruent pairs. The upper graph in Figure 18 shows pairs that were rotated 
on the x-axis, and the lower graph depicts pairs that were rotated on the z-
axis. Both diagrams represent the overall mean reaction times as a function 
of the angular difference in orientation for all correct (right-hand) responses 
to “same” pairs. “In both cases, reaction time is a strikingly linear function of 
the angular difference between the two three-dimensional objects portrayed.” 
(Shepard & Metzler, 1971, p. 703).  
The results supported their theory that people create an internal analog of an 
external rotation (Metzler & Shepard, 1982). It was found that the response 
time increased linearly with the angular distance between the two objects, 
and that the plane of rotation made no difference. In effect, the larger the 
deviation between the objects was, the more difficult the decision was. This 
supports the hypothesis that the majority of people tend to rotate mental 
images. Hence, those pairs of drawings that showed a large rotational 
difference required more cognitive effort, since people had to cover a larger 
distance mentally in order to bring both objects into correspondence with 
each other. A difference between the rotation on the x-axis and the z-axis 
were not detectable. Consequently, it is highly likely that the same strategy 
was used in both rotation types.  
Furthermore, the participants were instructed to express what strategy they 
had used to establish the (in)congruence of objects. Shepard and Metzler 
stated that all participants claimed “that to make the required comparison 
they first had to imagine one object as rotated into the same orientation as 
the other and that they could carry out this ‘mental rotation’ at no greater than 
a certain limiting rate” (Shepard & Metzler, 1971, p. 701). The detected 
positive linear correlation between the reaction time and the angle between 
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the two depicted objects seems to confirm the subjective assessments of the 
participants. The greater the distance, the more time was needed for this 
mental rotation. Thus, the mental rotation appears to be analogous to a real 
rotation. Logically, it takes more time to rotate an object for instance by an 
angle of 200 degrees instead of only 20 degrees, if we are limited as to the 
speed at which we can move the object. This conformed with the participants’ 
subjective experience. 
But could the results of this one experiment really be interpreted as evidence 
that people tend to solve spatial problems by mental simulation? Shepard 
and Metzler (1971, p. 703) stated that “tentatively, [the majority] of these 
reaction times may represent some such process as “mental rotation” itself, 
rather than a preliminary process of preparation or search”. But the authors 
also admitted that further research was needed in order to draw broader 
conclusions. The external validity of this mental rotation theory, for instance, 
was investigated by Metzler and Shepard (1982, p.71), among others. Their 
discussion calls to mind Wilson’s claim (2002) that off-line cognition is body-
based:  
The analog operation that we are specifically considering, viz., “mental 
rotation”, seems to play a central role in tasks ranging from the 
relatively mundane and concrete one of planning the arrangement of 
furniture in a room, to the relatively more intellectual and abstract ones 
of solving problems in geometry, engineering design, or 
stereochemistry. 
It was not only Shepard and Metzler who investigated this topic further. On 
the contrary, the experiment ignited an explosion of work in this area. So far, 
more than one thousand articles concerning “mental rotation” have been 
published10. The majority of mental rotation experiments have been based on 
three-dimensional stimuli, similar to those used in the original Shepard Task 
(1971). As previously described, these stimuli consisted of ten cubes which 
were linked with each other in different ways. Part of the motivation for this 
vast quantity of work was criticism that arose especially because of 
                                                
10
 This figure has been obtained from the “PsycInfo” database. 
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Shepard’s strong claim of internal representation and his so-called “second 
order isomorphism” that existed between drawing and image (Shepard, 1975; 
Shepard & Chipman, 1970; Shepard, 1984). Hochberg & Gellman (1977) or 
Yuille & Steiger (1983), for example, doubted whether these drawings were 
rotated by the participants as a whole and posited that the participants simply 
compared single pieces of one drawing with those in the potential 
equivalents. Others even questioned whether the observed effect could be 
explained with imagery (Gibson, 1974). In his paper Gibson objects to the 
whole idea of mental images (p.42): “We certainly do not summon up 
pictures inside our head for they would have to be looked at by a little man in 
the head. (…) Moreover, the little man would have eyes in his head to see 
with and then a still littler man and so ad infinitum.”  
Shepard (1984) replied to these critics that mental imaging is, like perceptual 
processes, indeed realized mentally by physical procedures. However, there 
is no need to have a detailed knowledge about these processes in order to 
examine the phenomenon of imaging. Of course, people perceive or imagine 
external objects, but these objects need not to be present or even existent. In 
experiments conducted with Podgorny (1978, 1983), Shepard was able to 
support this argument. The participants had to look at a square grid, and 
were given a perceptual task and an imagination task. In the first condition, 
the participants had to perceive the shaded squares forming an object. In a 
second condition, there were no shaded squares anymore, but the 
participants had to imagine they still were visible. Then, in both conditions, 
probe dots were depicted on the screen and the participants had to judge 
whether these dots were placed in the same area that had been occupied by 
the shown or imagined objects. The reaction times were highly dependent on 
the position of the dots – the closer the dot was placed to the previously 
perceived or imagined object, the more time was needed to give an answer. 
Furthermore, these reaction times indicated that the objects were processed 
in the same way regardless of the condition (i.e., whether they were real or 
imagined).  
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Shepard (1984) argues that “by acknowledging that perceiving and imagining 
– as well as remembering, planning, thinking, dreaming, and hallucinating – 
do correspond to brain processes, we at least open the door to possible 
connections with evolutionary biology, clinical neurology, and artificial 
intelligence.” (p.421). This challenged the competing argument that the linear 
function of reaction time in the Shepard Task only arose because of the 
necessity of making more eye movements between the two drawings in order 
to judge their congruence. The larger the rotation level, the more different 
these pictures seemed to be. Consequently, the possibility had been mooted 
that more different pictures required more gazes in order to be captured in 
their full complexity (Just & Carpenter, 1976).   
Many scientists, as well as Shepard (1982), concentrated on variations or 
simplifications of the original 1971 Shepard Task of 1971. One of these 
simplifications was implemented by Steven G. Vandenberg and Allan R. 
Kuse (1978). The procedure was the same as that of Shepard and Metzler 
(1971), but the shown drawings displayed a significant difference. Since 
Shepard and Metzler were able to show that people behaved similarly in the 
mental rotation within both planes, the experiment was conducted on two-
dimensional rotations only. Referring to the original Shepard Task, the 
presented stimuli were either incongruent or could be rotated into 
congruence. Kuse and Vandenberg’s study achieved results similar to those 
of Shepard and Metzler (1971). Furthermore, Kuse and Vandenberg (1978) 
discovered a significant gender-related difference (male subjects were 
slightly faster in making their decisions than women) in the mental rotation 
strategies. This could be taken to correspond to the predictions of the body-
specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009), which claims that people with 
different bodies develop different mental concepts of the same objects.  
Another successful replication of the Shepard Task for two-dimensional 
rotation was implemented by Kirsh and Maglio (1994). Their Tetris 
experiment supported the theory that participants solve the task of placing 
the falling objects in the most space-saving way possible by rotation – and 
not just by mental rotation. If possible, participants also tend to rotate the 
objects physically. In the Tetris experiment, people rotated the objects on the 
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screen to optimize and accelerate the decision-making process. If the stimuli 
were not able to be rotated, the participants used to turn their heads to 
discover a possible congruence between the retinal image of one picture and 
the memory trace of the second one.  
Many experiments completely broke away from the cube-based structure of 
the stimuli and nevertheless achieved similar results to those of the original 
Shepard Task. For example, Cooper (1975, 1976) conducted experiments in 
which complex irregular polygons had to be rotated. Her results also 
exhibited a linear dependency between reaction time and rotation level. In 
some of these experiments, Cooper asked her participants explicitly to use 
mental rotation in order to solve the task. Although the participants used this 
strategy consciously, the results were still the same. On the one hand, this 
procedure could support the thesis that mental rotation is always the 
preferred strategy to solve tasks of this kind. On the other hand, opponents of 
this theory could argue that the participants were influenced by the instruction 
and only “produced” those results they thought the experimenter wanted to 
obtain. However, given the overwhelmingly large number of replications that 
have since been implemented, the possibility for a simple distortion by the 
instruction is quite low. On the contrary, Cooper’s experiments put the theory 
of mental rotation to the test – and succeeded in demonstrating its strength 
and external validity.  
The development of neuroimaging techniques in the 1990s enabled 
psychologists to discover the brain activities involved in mental rotation 
processes. For instance, Cohen et al. (1996) succeeded in showing through 
fMRI a significant change in the blood flow of certain brain areas, while 
participants performed the Shepard Task – and they detected a premotor 
activation, which is typical for physical manipulation of objects. “These data 
are consistent with the hypothesis that mental rotation engages cortical areas 
involved in tracking moving objects and encoding spatial relations, as well as 
the more general understanding that mental imagery engages the same, or 
similar, neural imagery as direct perception” (Cohen et al., 1996, p. 89). 
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Modern mental rotation tasks have continued to move away from the use of 
simple stimuli such as cube drawings. In such tasks, the participants often 
have to rotate hands (Parsons et al., 1995) or whole bodies (Amorim, Isableu 
& Jarraya, 2006) in order to activate egocentric motor strategies. Many 
studies, such as Bonda et al. (1995), have shown that the premotor area, as 
well as the primary motor cortex, is involved in mental rotation tasks. These 
areas are also activated when subjects are asked to rotate objects physically. 
This experiment entailed doing a task that involved the mental rotation of the 
subject’s hand and a control task that did not. Regional cerebral blood flow 
was measured by positron emission tomography (PET). Similar results were 
found by Parsons et al. (1995), who showed subjects pictures of hands that 
should be categorized as left and right hand. PET again revealed that the 
same areas were activated that are involved in motor control processes.  
Especially in the recent past, the immediate influence of the body on the 
results of the Shepard Task has come to be in the focus of mental rotation 
research. Ionta and Blanke (2009) concentrated on the effects of certain 
hand postures on the mental rotation of right or left hands and feet. The 
participants were asked to place their right hand on their right knee and their 
left hand behind their back – in a second part of this study the hand postures 
were reversed. In the case of the right-handed participants this manipulation 
had an influence on the response times for laterality judgments. Interestingly, 
these reaction times only increased when this group of people held their right 
hands behind the back while developing judgments about pictures of right 
hands. An effect for depicted left hands or feet could not be observed. The 
left-handed participants seemed to be unaffected by the change of hand 
posture. So, in the case of the right-handers, the power of judgment 
weakened only for those limbs which were manipulated by the change of 
posture.  
The investigation of the influence of artistic abilities on mental rotation has 
also revealed effects. Pietsch and Jansen (2012) showed that people with 
outstanding athletic or musical abilities tend to develop superior mental 
rotation skills. Sport students achieved significantly faster reaction times in 
mental rotation tasks than math or education students. Thus, mental rotation 
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seems to be more closely linked to the body than to logical reasoning. Again, 
it was shown that male participants were faster than female participants. The 
much more pronounced spatial awareness of athletes – including 
recreational athletes – was also demonstrated by Moreau et al. (2012). In this 
experiment the subjects had to deal with a mental rotation task before and 
after a workout in two different types of sport. After the training, the 
participants achieved better results than they did in the test before. 
Consequently, these results point to the possibility of optimizing visual 
thinking by physical training.  
 
6.3   The influence of handedness on mental 
rotation tasks 
The previous section discussed mental rotation research from the past four 
decades. The basis of all these experiments is the Shepard Task 
implemented in 1971. However, mental rotation experiments did not merely 
confirm the results that Shepard and Metzler discovered. So far, numerous 
issues have been investigated using this methodology. Gender differences 
were examined as well as the influence of athletic abilities and the different 
rotation of limbs and objects. These results have been supported by imaging 
techniques.  
So, the main claim of mental rotation has been proved in many respects. As 
already indicated, the main message is that merely imagining a rotation 
corresponds closely to a physically performed rotation. Thus, imagination and 
perception seem to be similar processes. This idea indeed captures the 
essence of embodiment, which emphasizes the interaction of body and mind 
(Gallagher, 2005). The nature mental rotation fits especially with the aspect 
of embodiment that was highlighted by Wilson (2002) as the most important 
one – that off-line cognition is body-based. The experiment of Ionta and 
Blake (2009) indicated how powerful the influence of a person’s body can be 
on off-line cognition processes such as mental rotation. Furthermore, Ionta 
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and Blake explored the difference of this influence on the mental rotation 
processes of right-handers and left-handers. While the right-handers were 
influenced in their mental rotation ability by a change in arm position, the left-
handers were completely unaffected by this manipulation. This fact again 
accords with the body-specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009), which claims 
that people with different bodies interact with their environment in different 
ways and develop different mental concepts.  
This claim leads us to consider that a large number of a person’s mental 
concepts are established by mental simulations of physical experiences. As 
this dissertation has shown, decision-making processes in perceptual 
judgment tasks are not significantly influenced by the properties of a person’s 
body. Nevertheless, different bodies definitely have an impact on a person’s 
mental processes, especially when these processes involve physical or 
simulated activity. This is the essence of the previously developed 
manipulation-specificity hypothesis. Of course, this dissertation, as well as 
the research conducted with regard to the body-specificity hypothesis, has 
primarily focused on abstract mental concepts. These principles lead us to 
ask: if the manipulation of objects affects the abstract evaluation of these 
objects, is it not correspondingly likely that physical characteristics also 
impact upon our mental manipulation abilities? 
As seen in Ionta and Blake (2009), the Shepard Task might be an 
appropriate means by which to investigate the influence of handedness on 
mental rotation processes. The physical manipulation of arm posture has an 
impact on a right-hander’s mental rotation ability. These results call for further 
development. Due to the fact that off-line cognition is body-based (Wilson, 
2002), linked with the claims of the manipulation-specificity hypothesis, it 
should be possible to execute this manipulation not just physically but even 
purely mentally. That is, through a replication of the Shepard Task, we can 
show whether left- and right-handed people are also equipped with a mental 
right hand and a mental left hand. Furthermore, this task might be able to 
answer several questions. Do left-handers and right-handers – without 
physical manipulation – rotate the depicted cube structures mentally in a 
different way? Do right-handed people prefer the rotation of the picture 
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shown on the right side of the screen? And what happens if these right-
handers are forced to rotate the left-sided object mentally? 
 
6.4   The differences between right- and left-
handers 
First, it is necessary to discuss the differences between right- and left-
handers. What distinguishes these two groups of people apart from the fact 
that they prefer a different side of their body for the execution of fine motor 
skills? The previous chapters only touched upon this question, but here we 
must examine it more closely. First, the development of handedness can be 
regarded as an evolutionary development. Widerman et al. (2011) suggested 
thinking of the higher development of one side of the body as an opportunity 
for the other side of the body. Due to the existence of handedness, children 
do not have to train both parts of their bodies in the same way. They implicitly 
know that one side of the body is well-suited to perform fine motor tasks, 
whereas the other side is supposed to specialize in different responsibilities.  
Of course, the lateralization of brain function (Toga & Thompson, 2003) is 
important in this context. Findings from studies on the lateralization of the 
brain show that the left hemisphere is primarily responsible for motor control 
of the right side of the body and the right hemisphere is primarily responsible 
for the left side of the body. The dominant hemisphere is the one which 
processes language, which is the left hemisphere in 95 percent of right-
handers, but the right hemisphere in 70 percent of left-handers. There is thus 
a strong correlation between the dominant hemisphere and handedness. 
Nevertheless, there is no clear regularity in the connection of handedness 
and lateralization (Young et al., 2008). Indeed, Oliveira et al., 2010 
succeeded in changing a person’s handedness temporarily by stimulating the 
motor cortex with magnetic pulses. 
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Consistently in all investigable cultures and in populations of apes the 
dominance of right-handedness is striking. Interestingly, a consistent 
regularity seems to be present: the higher the proportion of right-handers, the 
higher the development of the culture (Previc, 1991). It seems to be 
reasonable, on the grounds of division of labor, that the two parts of a body 
do not need to have the same abilities. However, no valid explanation for the 
predominance of right-handers has yet been found.  
This lack of an explanation is especially keenly felt when we consider the 
advantages that each form of handedness can confer, an issue that has been 
widely explored in the last decade. Left-handers seem to have a more highly 
developed ability to solve visual-spatial tasks and to imagine spatial 
arrangements (Santrock, 2008). This hypothesis not only explains the 
experimental results obtained by Ionta and Blake (2009), but in a wider sense 
could be seen as a reason for the strikingly large number of left-handers in 
the occupational groups of mathematicians, architects, artists and musicians, 
as Santrock noted. He also notes that 20 percent of the group achieving a 
top score on the Scholastic Apitude Test (SAT) was left-handed. This 
proportion significantly exceeds the proportion of left-handers in the Western 
world in general. Therefore, this test could be an indication of a higher IQ 
level in left-handers. Judge and Stirling (2003) demonstrated that left-
handers exhibit a significantly superior coordination of their left and their right 
hand. The performance difference between a left-hander’s hands is not as 
big as in the case of right-handers. Thus, left-handers are more flexible and 
achieve better results in tasks in which both hands must exhibit fine motor 
control. This observation may be explained by the fact that left-handers have 
to come to an accommodation with the right-handers’ world they live in. As 
previously mentioned, artifacts like scissors and even door handles are built 
for the purposes of right-handers. So, in the case of the left-handers, higher 
flexibility is necessary to succeed in everyday situations.   
Widerman et al. (2011) link left-handers’ better skills in spatial imagination 
and their greater flexibility with the outstandingly large number of left-handers 
in certain sports. However, this particularly concerns those sports in which 
one interacts with an opponent, such as table tennis, tennis, judo and 
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fencing. Recall that left-handers make up only ten percent of the population 
in the Western world. While it is commonplace for left-handers to compete 
against right-handers, right-handers are – due to a lack of experience in 
playing against left-handers – clearly at a disadvantage (Heinzel, 2008).  
But being a left-hander does not merely confer benefits. Initial studies show 
that left-handers have more difficulties in reading and in phonology 
(Santrock, 2008). The differences between right-handers and left-handers 
also extend to health issues. Although left-handers have a lower risk of 
suffering from arthritis, they lag behind right-handers in their physical 
development. On average, left-handers are smaller, weigh less, have a 
shorter life expectancy, reach puberty later and are more likely to suffer from 
neurological and immunological diseases (Widerman et al., 2011). 
 
7.   Experiment III: The extended 
Shepard Task 
7.1   Method 
The terms left-handers and right-handers suggest that the only difference 
between these two groups concerns the hand that is better at performing fine 
motor tasks. However, the previous chapter and the first two experiments of 
this dissertation demonstrated that these differences are much more 
extensive. The outside influences of a world made for right-handers make 
left-handers more flexible in using their hands. Left-handers often have to 
solve tasks with their right hands because only right-hander specific tools are 
available. It is highly likely that this issue is also responsible for the better 
spatial imagination of left-handers. Thus, the differences between the two 
groups of handedness are not merely reducible to physical properties, but 
also influence mental processes in many respects.  
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As previously mentioned, Ionta and Blake (2009) demonstrated that right-
handers are more susceptible to interference than left-handers – a physical 
manipulation also manipulated their mental abilities. This shows once again 
that the thinking of both left-handers and right-handers can be influenced by 
their physical differences. This is not only a confirmation of Wilson’s (2002) 
view that off-line cognition is body-based, but raises further questions. What 
happens if there are no external influences? Do right-handed and left-handed 
people still perform mental rotation differently? Do left-handers and right-
handers even use "mental right and left hands” to reconstruct the rotation?  
In the case of the Shepard Task one certain idea suggests itself. Shepard 
and Metzler (1971) had claimed that in mental rotation people rotate only one 
of the two figures mentally, while the other remains mentally fixed as a 
reference model. However, it has never been tested which figure left-handers 
and right-handers prefer to turn. On the basis of the previously achieved 
results with reference to differences evoked by handedness, it could be 
hypothesized that right-handers tend to rotate the figure which is placed on 
the right side and that left-
handers tend to rotate the 
figure on the left.  
In order to answer this 
question, the participants in the 
Shepard Task replication 
implemented in this dissertation 
were visually prompted to 
rotate certain objects mentally. 
The items that were shown 
forced the participants to 
choose one particular object as 
a reference object, which would not be the one rotated mentally. This was 
achieved by placing one of the two depicted objects on a base (see Figure 
19). Furthermore, this reference object was shown in an angular condition 
that suggested that this object was already in its original state. Consequently, 
there was no need to rotate this object mentally into its initial state. The 
Figure 19: Cube object fixed on a base. 
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second object of the picture pairs was shown in the same way as in the 
original Shepard Task. It conveyed the impression of a levitating object.  
In this replication each of the 40 participants (20 right-handers and 20 left-
handers) were shown 384 items consisting of the previously described cube 
objects. Twelve different cube objects were used for this experiment. The 
participants sat in front of a 16.4 inch LCD screen. The distance between the 
participants and the screen averaged 50 centimeters. In order to reinforce the 
impression of one fixed and one levitating object per item, the participants 
were given a short introduction. They were asked to imagine they are in an 
art museum and that they have to take part in a rally. They walk through 
different rooms. In each of these rooms two sculptures are placed. One of the 
sculptures is bolted to rods, the other sculpture floats in a large transparent 
water tank. The task was to look at one pair after another and to decide as 
quickly as possible whether the floating figure can be rotated into congruence 
with the bolted one. The participants’ choice was expressed by pushing one 
of two buttons on a gamepad. The green button had to be pushed in 
situations in which both depicted objects were judged as congruent. The red 
button had to be pushed when the participants thought the objects were 
different shapes. Half of the subjects used a gamepad with the red button on 
its left side and the green button on its right side; for the other half of the 
participants, the arrangement was reversed.  
As in Shepard and Metzler’s task, one half of the items showed congruent 
objects (Figure 20, A & B). The other half showed incongruent ones (Figure 
20, C & D).  
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Figure 20: An excerpt of the items used in the replication of the Shepard Task. 
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As in the original experiment, the levitating objects were rotated either on the 
x-axis or on the z-axis. The rotation level varied. The base object and the 
reference object differed by a rotation level of at least 10 degrees and at 
most 70 degrees. In addition to these extreme values the reference objects 
were also rotated by 30 and 50 degrees. The rotation was carried out in both 
directions, so that in total every reference object was depicted in eight 
different states. A weak deviation from the initial state is depicted in Figure A 
and C, while a strong deviation is shown in Figure B and D. The condition in 
which the base object and reference object are equally rotated has been 
omitted. This should ensure that participants consistently pay a high level of 
attention to the task, and is also motivated by 
practical considerations. Rotation levels of 0, 
20, 40, 60 and 80 degrees would have caused 
the problem of the depiction of a shape which 
would have appeared two-dimensional and 
therefore not been clearly recognizable (Figure 
21). This difficulty also caused the omission of 
the rotation level of 90 degrees in the chosen 
gradation of rotation states. 
The 384 items were shown in eight blocks. After each block the participants 
had the chance to take a break. The duration of this break was determined 
by the participants. When they were ready for the next sequence they had to 
signal this by pressing the appropriate button on the gamepad. In each of 
these blocks 24 congruent and 24 incongruent items were shown. The order 
of the depicted items was not random. In order to prevent an accidental 
occurrence of four or more successive incongruent or congruent objects, the 
order was set in advance. After every one of these sequences, the side on 
which the base object was placed was changed. The order was 
counterbalanced across the subjects.  
 
 
Figure 21: Object rotated by 80 
degrees 
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7.2   Results 
7.2.1   Reaction times 
In Shepard and Metzler (1971), two main hypotheses were articulated. The 
first one was that the reaction time needed to judge a pair of cube objects to 
be congruent or incongruent stands in a linear relation to the extent of the 
angular deviation from the initial position. This phenomenon could also be 
found in the replication conducted here (Figure 22).  
 
Figure 22: Relation of reaction times to degree of rotation, for different axes of rotation 
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Both diagrams depict proportional functions. The former shows the 
accumulated reaction times for items that were rotated around the x-axis of 
an imaginary coordinate system, the latter shows the reaction time for items 
that were rotated around the z-axis. It is obvious that both graphs display the 
same trend: the larger the angle between the base object and the rotated 
object, the longer the subjects required for their decision.  
In order to analyse this increase of reaction time in detail, every rotational 
level was compared with the next higher one. The numerical difference of 
reaction time between the rotation levels was evaluated using a mixed model 
in R, evaluated by a Monte Carlo Markov chain estimation with 50,000 
simulations. In order to determine the best matching and simplest mixed 
model, ANOVAs were conducted. The response time was used as the 
dependent variable. The factor ‘handedness’ embedded in the factor ‘display’ 
and, in addition, embedded in the factor ‘gamepad orientation’, as well as the 
factors ‘axes’ and ‘object congruence’ embedded in the different ‘rotation 
levels’ were used as independent variables and employed on the items as 
well as the subjects. 
 
Rotation level Angular 
deviation 
Mean RT 
(all) 
Mean RT  
(left-handers) 
Mean RT 
(right-
handers) 
 1 10° 2726 ms  2743 ms  2709 ms 
 2 30° 2814 ms  2791 ms  2838 ms 
 3 50° 3064 ms  3050 ms  3079 ms 
 4 70° 3347 ms  3256 ms  3441 ms 
 
Table 7: The obtained reaction times in each rotation level 
The results are depicted in Table 7, which shows the mean reaction times for 
each level of rotation. It can be observed that the time the subjects needed to 
judge an item to be congruent increases from step to step. This relationship 
is also revealed when one compares each rotational level to the next higher 
level. The difference from one level to the other was 20 degrees in each 
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case. This same angular distance makes the single steps readily comparable 
with each other. 
 Compared to level 1, in level 2 the reaction time increased by 88 
seconds on average. A slight increase in reaction time can be seen, 
nevertheless this tendency is only significant at the .05 level (t = 
1.146, pMCMC = .022). 
 The comparison of level 2 and level 3 shows a highly significant 
increase of reaction time of 250 seconds on average (t = 3.024, 
pMCMC = .002). 
 A similarly high significance can be observed in the comparison of 
level 3 and level 4. In this step, the reaction time increased by 283 
seconds on average (t = 3.093, pMCMC = .001). 
This comparison reveals that the increase of reaction time was significantly 
larger, the more the angle of the rotated objects deviated from the original 
image. That is, the graph has a consistently positive slope. However, the 
increase between the first and the second level is less significant. Figure 22 
suggests that this deviation is attributable to the z-axis rotation, for which the 
reaction times at level 1 and level 2 are approximately equal. This is due to 
the structure of the used items. As already mentioned, objects rotated by 90 
degrees were omitted in order to avoid ambiguous images being presented. 
In the case of the z-axis rotation, ambiguity could not be completely avoided, 
and consequently the recognition of objects rotated by 10 degrees may have 
been as difficult as the recognition of objects rotated by 30 degrees. The way 
the objects were depicted necessitated a closer look – and that required 
more time.  
This leads to the second claim Shepard and Metzler (1971) made: “This 
reaction time is found (…) to be no longer for a rotation in depth than for a 
rotation merely in the picture plane” (p.701). This claim is not completely 
supported by the findings of the current experiment. On average, the 
participants were significantly faster in deciding that the item shows 
congruent objects in cases in which the reference object was rotated around 
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the x-axis than around the z-axis (t = 3.36, pMCMC = .001). But, as argued 
above, this difference may stem entirely from the ambiguity that emerged in 
objects depicted at a level 1 rotation. Hence, this difference will be ignored in 
what follows.   
It is also striking that the left-handed participants needed a little more time 
than right-handers to resolve these objects. This slight difference is depicted 
in Table 7 and in Figure 23. In the case of the x-axis rotation, the graphs 
closely resemble one another, whereas the graphs of the z-axis rotation 
revealed a larger deviation between level 1 and level 2. This deviation led to 
the relatively small increase in reaction time between these levels. 
Furthermore, it is striking that the left-handers not only required less time to 
recognize congruence in the second level of the z-axis rotation, but that the 
left-handers’ graphs were generally flatter than the graphs of the right-
handers. However, the difference in response time between right- and left-
handers is not significant (t = 11.752, pMCMC = .7129). This apparent trend 
can again be explained by the small deviation caused by the ambiguous 
objects in level 1. Figure 23 shows that the left-handers were especially 
influenced by these ambiguities, which consequently caused an increase of 
reaction time at level 1, and contributes to the graph being apparently flatter 
across the four levels. 
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Up to this point, the experiment has only confirmed the observations made in 
the original experiment (Shepard & Metzler, 1971) and in previous 
replications (for instance, Kuse & Vandenberg (1978) and Kirsh & Maglio 
(1994)). There are no new insights, but these results make it clear that the 
replication was successful. Now, the hitherto disregarded factor "base" will be 
included in the analysis. As noted earlier, the fact that one of the two 
depicted cube objects was fixed in each case had a relevant consequence: 
Figure 23: Reaction times with regard to handedness  
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this fixation made it possible to prompt the participants to rotate a certain 
object mentally and choose the other one as a reference object.  
This effect of displaying the basis shape on each side of the screen was 
evaluated within left- and right-handers (F(2) = 166.71, f = 0.159). For 
modeling the hypothesized interaction, the factor “handedness” was defined 
as a group variable to mediate the effect of display, and hence the effect of 
display was evaluated in right- and left-handers separately. Again, the 
contrast was evaluated using a Monte Carlo Markov chain with 50000 
simulations. In the case of the right-handers the effect of display under 
handedness turned out to be highly significant (t = -18.142, pMCMC < .0001). 
The left-handers also exhibited a significant difference when judging the 
reference objects placed on the right side of the screen instead of on the left 
side of the screen (t = 2.323, pMCMC = .02). This influence of this effect of 
side on the average reaction time is depicted in Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 24: Reaction times with regard to the base 
Shepard and Metzler (1971) argued that people simulate real rotation 
processes when performing mental rotations. Consequently, the further the 
figure is twisted, the greater the distance it has to cover to return to the 
starting position, as in the case of real rotation. This theory explains the 
increasing response time with increasing angular size between the original 
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and the rotated object. This increase in response time was replicated in this 
experiment, as shown in Figure 23. As explained above, this increase was 
not completely linear, but deviations from a linear effect were minor and 
could have been caused by visual ambiguities. Thus, these deviations are 
negligible. So, for the sake of simplicity, the further analysis uses completely 
linear functions.  
The following linear graphs arose from the mapping of point clouds, which 
display the reaction time as a function of the rotational levels. Each point of 
this point cloud corresponds to one trial. Initially, this procedure was carried 
out for each subject. Those items which showed the base object on the right 
side were treated separately from those with the base object on the left side, 
in order to illustrate the consequences of the manipulation in detail. In a 
second step, a trend line was drawn. This procedure revealed predictable 
general differences in the reaction times from one subject compared to 
another – but a significant large number of subjects exhibited an effect of 
side. Figure 25 shows two examples of these reaction time effects, in the 
case of two right-handers.11 As in the previous diagrams, the abscissa 
represents the rotation level and the ordinate maps the reaction time. 
 
 
                                                
11
 Figure 25 shows only two examples out of the group of right-handers. The reason for this is that this 
group developed a particularly strong and highly significant effect and therefore offers the more 
interesting diagrams. 
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Both graphs reveal the fact that right-handers tend to have shorter reaction 
times, if they can mentally rotate the figure on the right. In a next step, the 
point clouds of the right-handed participants were accumulated. The same 
was done in the case of the left-handed participants. Hence, this procedure 
was carried out for four separate sets of data.  
 Figure 26 A depicts the point clouds for all decisions in which right-
handers saw the base figure on the left.  
 Figure 26 B depicts the point clouds for all decisions in which right-
handers saw the base figure on the right.  
Figure 25: Reaction times of two right-handed participants depending on the rotation levels.  
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 Figure 26 C depicts the point clouds for all decisions in which left-
handers saw the base figure on the left.  
 Figure 26 D depicts the point clouds for all decisions in which left-
handers saw the base figure on the right. 
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Figure 26: Developments of reaction times shown with point clouds 
Regression over these data sets creates four new linear functions, the 
coefficients of which are also shown in Figure 26. The curves in which the 
rotated object was placed on the dominant side of the subjects had a lower 
slope. In the case of right-handers, the intercept was also substantially 
smaller.  
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As already mentioned, the rotational levels signify the different sized angles 
between the starting position and the rotated figure. Going one step further, 
we can use these functions to estimate the angular velocity of the 
participants’ mental rotations, for each of the four different conditions. To 
calculate this angular velocity, the rotational levels have been replaced by 
angular sizes in radians. In a second step, the difference between the 
reaction times as a function of the radians made it possible to determine the 
angular velocity using the formula  = Δ / Δ . This approach reinforced the 
significant influence of the position of the base figure on the behavior of 
subjects (Figure 27).  
 
Figure 27: Calculation of the angular velocity 
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 The right-handed subjects mentally rotated on average at 3.16 rad/s 
with their right and consequently preferred mental hand, and at 2.58 
rad/s with their left and consequently non-preferred mental hand. 
 The left-handed subjects mentally rotated on average at 2.54 rad/s 
with their left and consequently preferred mental hand, and at 1.95 
rad/s with their right and consequently non-preferred mental hand. 
As these were calculated by the formula  = Δ / Δ , the four quoted values 
for angular velocity do not include the intercept. The presented values only 
depict the slope of the graphs depicted in Figure 27 and, thus, “ignore” the 
starting point. For this reason, the four values create the impression that the 
right-handers were faster than the left-handers. It is therefore crucial to note 
that the intercepts shown in Figure 27 differ in the predicted directions:  
 Left-handers were faster than right-handers. 
 The difference between the criteria “base-right” and “base-left” were 
bigger in the case of the right-handed participants.  
Both were disregarded in the calculation of angular velocity. Thus, the four 
values only serve as an indication of how rapidly the participants were able to 
perform rotation over additional distances. The angular velocity indeed shows 
that right-handers and left-handers were both faster when rotating with their 
preferred mental hands. That is, the increase in angular deviation affects 
reaction time less when acting with the preferred hand.  
These results demonstrate again that left-handers were averagely slightly 
faster than right-handers. But furthermore, they show that the subjects 
performed mental rotation more fluently when the object which had to be 
rotated was positioned on the dominant side. This agrees completely with the 
participants’ statements after performing the experiment. The participants 
were asked whether they had noticed anything. Subsequently, 17 of the 40 
participants expressed that they had noticed an increase of difficulty each 
time the base figure was placed on a particular page. Eleven of these 17 
participants were right-handers; the remaining six participants were left-
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handed. In this context it is highly noteworthy that all these right-handed 
participants expressed the subjective assessment that it was more difficult to 
rotate the object on the left. In the case of the left-handers, the perception 
was the other way around. 
 
7.2.2   Error rates 
The errors also patterned analogously to those in the original experiment 
(1971). The participants judged more congruent items to be incongruent the 
greater the angular difference was between the base and the rotated figure. 
 In level 1, the error rate averaged at 4.2 percent and increased at level 
2 by 0.6 percent. This difference is not significant (z = 0.683,  
p = .495)12. 
 In level 2, the error rate averaged at 4.8 percent and increased at level 
3 by 2.3 percent. This difference is significant (z = 2.510, p = .012). 
 In level 3, the error rate averaged at 7.1 percent and increased at level 
4 by 3.0 percent. This difference is highly significant (z = 5.037,  
p < .001). 
This development of errors is depicted in Figure 28, which concentrates on 
the average of the x-axis rotation and the z-axis rotation. The separate 
analysis of both is not necessary in this case, since the subjects did not act 
significantly differently when working with the x-axis instead of the z-axis (z = 
1.554, p = .120). 
 
                                                
12
 This is due to the ambiguity of the images and is therefore in no way in conflict with the findings of 
Shepard and Metzler (1971). This discrepancy was already explained in the course of the analysis of 
reaction times in detail. 
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Figure 28: Development of the error rate across rotations 
In fact, the error rates remained mostly unaffected by the side at which the 
base object was placed. This is illustrated by the bar charts in Figure 29, 
which depict the error rates as a percentage. This illustration separates the 
results of the right-handed participants from the results of the left-handed 
participants and includes errors in which congruent objects were falsely 
judged as incongruent as well as those in which incongruent objects were 
falsely judged as congruent.  
 
Figure 29: Developments of error rate with regard to the base 
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In both groups, the right-handers and the left-handers, the error rate 
amounted on average to around ten percent. The left-handers made 
fractionally fewer mistakes than the right-handers, but this difference is not 
significant (z = 1.309, p = 0.191). As Figure 29 shows, the error rate of the 
right-handers (z = 0.353, p = 0.724) and the left-handers (z = 0.625, P = 
0.532) remained unaffected by the side on which the base object was placed.
 
7.3   Discussion 
This slightly altered replication of the Shepard Task achieved three main 
results. First, it closely replicated the results of the original experiment 
(Shepard & Metzler, 1971). In particular, the positive linear function between 
reaction time and angular difference was comparable to that observed in the 
original Shepard Task. Secondly, it provided evidence in support of the 
described theories concerning the mental and physical differences between 
right- and left-handers. As the results gained by Santrock (2008), Judge and 
Stirling (2003) and Widerman et al. (2011) suggested, left-handers have 
better skills in solving visual-spatial tasks. This is obviously also applicable to 
tasks that they perform with their non-dominant hand – hence, the difference 
between the non-dominant hand and the dominant hand is not as marked as 
in the case of the right-handers. Both claims were also supported by the 
findings of this replication, which indicated that left-handers are faster than 
right-handers in judging rotated objects to be congruent regardless of on 
which side the rotated object is placed. 
Thirdly, this experiment makes completely new observations. In prior work, 
participants were not restricted in choosing an object as a reference, which 
made it impossible to characterize some potential regularities. Fixing one of 
the two displayed objects on a base addressed this limitation. Right- and left-
handers do indeed seem to prefer to rotate an object placed next to their 
dominant side. This suggests that the principle that acting with the dominant 
hand leads to greater fluency is just as applicable to mental rotation tasks as 
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to other virtual movement tasks. Since Cohen et al. (1996) already figured 
out that mentally simulated manipulations of objects and actual manipulations 
involve the same brain areas, some slight effect of handedness could be 
expected. Nevertheless, the extent of the effect caused by a few centimeters’ 
distance between the fixed object and the rotated one on the screen was 
surprising.  
Of course, we did not discover the reasons that underpin the well-marked 
preference for participants to rotate an object placed on their dominant side. 
A clear understanding of this would require further investigation. It is 
possible, however, that the participants were simply accustomed to regarding 
objects while holding and rotating them in their dominant hand. This would 
predict that the right-handers and left-handers were only slowed down 
because of the irritation caused by the unusual perspective of a rotated 
object being placed on the “wrong” side of the screen.  However, the less-
marked effect in the group of left-handers leads to another hypothesis. As 
Judge and Stirling (2003) claimed, the difference between dominant and non-
dominant hand is not as great for left-handers as for right-handers. This is 
due to the fact that left-handers have to live in a world which is made for 
right-handers. In order to manage everyday situations left-handers have to 
come to terms with scissors or door handles made for the needs of right-
handers. Indeed, there is no need to regard an object while holding it in the 
non-dominant hand. If the mental simulation of object manipulation is strongly 
embodied, mental rotation would not only refer to simulating the rotation of 
the objects, but also the tools that are needed to perform a physical rotation – 
in this case, the right or the left hand. This is consistent with the smaller 
effects observed in the left-handers as well as with Wilson's (2002) claim that 
off-line cognition is body-based. In the mental simulation of object 
manipulations, people seem to have the same strengths and weaknesses as 
in physical simulation situations. Thus, people have two pairs of hands – a 
real and a mental one. 
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8.   Manipulation-specificity in real 
and virtual acting 
The manipulation-specificity hypothesis states that the impact of handedness 
is only relevant in active placement tasks and not in perceptual judgment 
tasks, since people seem to act the way they do only for reasons of comfort. 
Within the framework of this dissertation, I suggested the idea that people 
place superior objects in a way that guarantees optimal accessibility. 
However, they do not consider the placements to be positive or negative 
aspects of the objects. This foregrounds the extreme economy people reveal 
in active placement tasks: they tend to ensure that more useful objects are 
close to the hand that is more highly developed and probably able to grasp 
and manipulate the object more precisely and more quickly when the need 
arises. There is simply no logical reason why people should place an object 
close to the hand with which they would never use this object. These 
assumptions were successfully proved in implementing the first two 
experiments and reveal that the results of prior experiments testing the body-
specificity hypothesis were only slightly misunderstood and overstated. 
Since off-line cognition is body-based (Wilson, 2002), I also proposed that 
handedness would have an impact on the ability to move virtual objects 
mentally and the fluency people display in these tasks. The replication of the 
Shepard Task supported this hypothesis by showing that right-handers and 
left-handers do indeed seem to solve mental rotation tasks differently. Left-
handers prefer virtually rotating objects placed on the left and right-handers 
tend to virtually rotate objects placed on the right – and people do not feel 
comfortable when being forced to act differently. This also fits with the results 
from the Shopping Tour and the Supermarket Manager task.  
So, the restrictions of the body obviously do not leave mental abilities 
untouched. This has already been supported by previous investigations. As 
discussed in section 6.4, Rietsch and Jansen (2012) revealed that people 
with outstanding musical or athletic abilities also display extraordinarily 
developed mental rotation abilities. This again hints towards the correlation 
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between real and virtual acting. Athletic and musical people have one 
important aspect in common – they are extremely well-coordinated in their 
physical actions. Since they also have to simulate certain movements in 
training or rehearsal, they are consequently more practiced and skilled in 
performing mental actions.  
Moreover, the body does not merely restrict the mind, but also serves as a 
catalyst. This is also backed up by Wilson’s (2002) observation that people 
use their body as a tool while finger-counting or gesturing. This again points 
to the economy with which people solve certain problems. Without the body’s 
help such tasks would be much more effortful to solve. The Tetris experiment 
performed by Kirsh and Maglio (1996) also gave a hint toward to this 
economy theory by revealing that people tend to use visual help in solving 
mental rotation tasks.  
All these aspects cohere and reveal that the manipulation-specificity 
hypothesis is at once a theory that points to the link between real and mental 
manipulation of objects and a theory that highlights the economy with which 
people solve active placement as well as mental simulation tasks. In a very 
literal sense, people are equipped with two pairs of hands, a real and a 
mental one. This implies that the features of a body also impinge on the 
mind. When a person is left-handed in the real world, the person is also a 
left-hander in his mind. When a person is well-coordinated in the real world, 
the person shows the same feature in her mental actions. But first and above 
all, when a person solves a manipulation task mentally or in reality, this 
person always does this as economically as possible – and makes use of the 
close link between body and mind. Thus, mental acting indeed seems to be 
embodied, but judging does not. 
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